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ABSTRACT
In local communities across the United States, local government officials – specifically
local bureaucrats – are faced with the realities of a changing climate which include severe
storms, prolonged droughts, larger and more damaging floods, and more. Simultaneously, the
issue of climate change is incredibly polarized in US politics with one side claiming it is not
happening (or if it is happening it is not human caused) and the other framing the issue as the
direst threat (or close to it) facing the planet.
This dissertation examines a empirical puzzle, asking whether and how local bureaucrats
respond to the threat of climate change in their communities. I find that many, but not all, local
bureaucrats are responding by developing climate adaptation plans and considering policies
which might help their communities avoid the consequences of climate change. They are not
acting alone, they work with support from the federal or state government, other bureaucrats, or
multi-stakeholder organizations which allow them to access resources and gain political support
when they would otherwise not have it. Climate change adaptation, like other emergency and
disaster management policies, does not garner much attention from local politicians unless there
currently is a disaster the community is responding to or recovering from that forces their
attention.
Throughout this project, I examine how local bureaucrats step out of their conventional
role as policy implementors to shape local agendas and formulate policy – policymaking roles
often dominated by elected politicians, members of the media, and advocacy organizations. I
argue that local bureaucrats occupy the perfect institutional role for shaping the development of
climate adaptation in local governments. They have issue-specific knowledge, making them
emergency management and climate adaptation experts (or at least the actors with the most

expertise of this kind in local government). This often leads to elected officials deferring to
bureaucrats when policies and plans need to be written, like emergency management plans, land
use plans. When bureaucrats write these plans, they have the opportunity to incorporate climate
adaptation provisions. Local bureaucrats also hold institutional knowledge in local governments.
They are more likely to know state and federal policies and requirements, which may encourage
climate adaptation (e.g. the Obama Administration’s efforts through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) to encourage local adaptation policy).
Local bureaucrats are also more motivated than elected officials to address climate
change. I find that the bureaucrats in this study were aware of the political debates around
climate change, but they often adopted a position which separated local adaptation efforts from
the polarizing debate around what causes climate change (i.e. who or what is responsible for the
problem). This enabled them to address their communities’ needs to adapt without drawing
opposition from conservative members of their communities who do not think climate change is
happening or caused by human activities.
I also address the intergovernmental environment local bureaucrats respond to:
specifically, their relationship with their state governments and the federal government. Even
though states and the federal government wield significant influence over local governments –
mostly through the control of resources – local bureaucrats do not avoid climate adaptation
solely because the state government disapproves. A few cases demonstrate that state
governments’ and FEMA’s encouragement to address climate adaptation impacted local
bureaucrats’ decisions to create adaptation policies. However, it was not the only or the most
important influence in local bureaucrats’ decision-making.

In sum, this project demonstrates that local bureaucrats are important actors in the
development of local climate adaptation policy. Local bureaucrats’ efforts alone are not enough
to adapt to climate change, but they are an important first step when politicians cannot or will not
act. While only climate adaptation policy was studied in this project, these findings speak to the
important role bureaucrats play in creating policy when elected officials do not – either because
the issues have low saliences, are highly technical, or are politically polarized.
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CHAPTER 1: THEORY
1. The Water Is Rising in Miami Beach
Miami Beach, Florida is a city of approximately 90,000 people situated on a barrier
island at the southernmost end of the Floridian peninsula. The city is known for its pristine white
sand beaches and semi-tropical climate, but in the past four years Miami Beach has been making
national headlines for its sea level problems. The city sits at an average elevation of only four
feet above sea level and many areas in the city are at or below sea level. In the past several years,
ocean tides caused flooding even on sunny days and a yearly extreme high tide called “King
Tide1” has inundated the entire city.
Despite the immediacy and obviousness of sea level rise in Miami Beach, the city is
operating without support from the State of Florida in their attempts to address the flooding
(Wile, 2015). Florida’s Governor Rick Scott claims he is incapable of judging if climate change
or sea level rise is a real threat or not because he is “not a scientist” (Caputo, 2014).
Additionally, Scott’s administration has an unofficial policy banning the use of “global
warming” or “climate change” in any official state communication (Korten, 2015).
Without state government support, Miami Beach is left to figure out its own solution and
raise its own funding. The city government decided to install a massive pumping system to keep
the streets dry. The project is estimated to cost in excess of $400 million dollars (Davenport,
2014; Paquette, 2014) and relies on existing drainage canals which use gravity to drain the land.
However, the canals no longer properly function because of sea level rise, so large pumping
stations push the water out to sea. The project is funded in large part by local property taxes,

For more information about King Tides, see the Environmental Protection Agency’s explanation at
https://www.epa.gov/cre/king-tides-and-climate-change.
1
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leading to what Washington Post reporter Danielle Paquette deemed “Miami’s climate catch-22”
because the city must encourage beachfront development in order to raise funds to build the
pumping system that will keep those same beachfront locations from flooding (2014).
The situation in Miami Beach provides an example of how climate change will impact
communities in the United States and how the polarized political debate surrounding the issue is
likely to force policymaking away from federal or state venues and into alternative policy
pathways with fewer partisan political consequences. Miami Beach is not the only community
facing significant threats from climate change. The Universal Ecological Fund published a report
in September 2017 estimating that the costs of climate-driven extreme weather and air pollution
accounted for $360 billion in economic losses annually in the U.S. (Watson, McCarthy, & Hisas,
2017). This report took into consideration the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA) list of billion-dollar disasters. In 2017, NOAA identified 16 billiondollar (or more) disasters including Hurricane Harvey in Texas, Hurricane Irma in Florida,
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, wildfires in the western states, and severe storms and tornadoes
in the plains states. These 16 disaster events combined caused upwards of 309 billion dollars of
damage (NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, 2018).
Compiling the direct costs of severe weather or disease outbreaks caused by climate
change is in many ways a conservative estimate of climate change costs. According to a study of
the county-level damages from climate change written by Hsaing et al (2017), climate change
will also injure the economy by disrupting entire sectors like agriculture or hurting the labor
market (e.g. more people suffer from diseases which take them out of work and more people are
displaced from their homes due to severe weather). The researchers calculated a county-level
mortality estimate. Nationwide, nine people out of every 100,000 people is likely to die from
2

climate change each year. Their estimate allowed variation by county, and they found that the
high range of this is in Hernando County, Florida (just north of Tampa, Florida) where 69 people
a year are likely to die from climate change. The authors found that climate change is likely to
exacerbate existing inequalities. Poor communities and the southern states will be hit harder by
the effects of climate change, largely because these areas have less economic capacity than
northeastern or west coast states whose communities can afford to prepare for and respond to
climate threats.
Studies like those mentioned above try to quantify the costs of climate change. However,
they cannot capture more intangible damages that lead to larger, long-term problems. For
instance, after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005, entire neighborhoods were
abandoned as their former residents migrated out of the state. Businesses and schools in these
communities were radically transformed (Robertson & Fausset, 2015). The cultural and social
impacts of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico are only beginning. Due to the U.S. federal
government’s minimal disaster recovery efforts, campaigns for statehood and even independence
are stronger (Hernández, 2018). If successful, these efforts could radically redefine the island’s
economy, politics, and society.
Even though the risks from climate change are not evenly distributed across the U.S.,
every county faces the potential of significant problems if climate change is not addressed.
Climate mitigation would minimize these threats across the country (and the world), although it
is too late to prevent any effects of climate change (Jones N., 2017). However, if climate
mitigation does not occur – or occur fast enough – communities will need to adapt to minimize
damage and save lives.

3

The risk of climate change damage, especially in areas with political opposition to
addressing climate change, means that many local communities will be left to deal with the
consequences of climate change without support from the state government. This raises a number
of important questions about how local communities deal with climate change adaptation
including: Who in local government is advocating for climate adaptation? What impact does
polarization have on local adaptation policy development? Broadly speaking, this dissertation
will answer this question: what role do local bureaucrats play in shaping local policy, especially
local climate adaptation policy?
2. Research Questions
Climate change adaptation policy is at a nascent stage at the federal level in the United
States largely due to political polarization and gridlock around the issue. Like many other
environmental policy areas, legislative gridlock in Congress has pushed advocates to pursue nonCongressional venues for policy change (Klyza and Sousa 2008, Pralle 2003). As alternatives to
the national legislature become more important, scholars must turn their attention to the actors
and institutions that shape policy change at the state and local level, which will not merely look
like ‘scaled down’ versions of national politics.
For U.S. policy, scholars are only beginning to explore local climate change adaptation
planning. Scholars are looking at how institutions and organizations are building capacity to
address climate change across sectors (Craft & Howlett, 2013), the adoption of specific policies
(see Wood, Hultquist and Romsdahl’s work on Midwestern U.S. policy development (2014) and
Zimmerman and Faris’s study of climate action plans (2011)), and the legal foundations for
creating local policy (Gremillion, 2011). These articles suggest that integrating or
“mainstreaming” climate adaptation into existing policies in the United States as an important
4

pathway for local policy development.2 Mainstreaming (or policy layering) capitalizes on
existing structures rather than creating entirely new institutions. In other words, it represents a
path of less resistance to policy change, although some authors have raised the possibility that
this leads to maladaptation (Tennekes et al, 2014). While scholars are beginning to address
climate adaptation integration, including Haywood et al’s study of adaptation through land-use
planning in North and South Carolina (2014) and Wilbanks and Kates’s work on New Orleans
(2010), they do not examine the process by which integration happens.
Furthermore, when climate adaptation is considered as a new goal within an existing
nonpartisan or bipartisan issue area – like preparing for disasters or managing public water – we
expect to see climate change’s partisan baggage enter the conversation about the new policy.3
This can cause traditional policymaking channels – like the federal legislature and the executive
branches – to close due to partisan gridlock. However, other policymaking routes exist and may
constitute the main arenas for action, including policymaking through the bureaucracy. As media
reports show, some local bureaucrats are already playing an important role in shaping new
climate adaptation policies (see Flesher 2014, Wernick 2014). Picketts, Curry, and Rapaport, for
example, found that environmental planners in British Columbia are interested in incorporating
climate adaptation into land use planning, even though they currently did not have the resources
to do so (2012).
Local bureaucrats are an important group of actors who are often overlooked in research
on policy formulation and change. Scholars often focus on their role in policy implementation

2

There is a large emerging literature on climate policy integration focusing largely on efforts in Europe to address
climate change through existing policies. For examples see Adelle & Russel (2013), Brouwer et al (2013), Carter
(2011), Kok & de Coninck (2007), and Uittenbroek et al (2013).
3
This dynamic has already been observed in the recovery effort from Sandy in New York City where Henry Ovik –
former advisor to former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan –admitted to avoiding the
language of climate adaptation to sidestep the associated polarization (Shorto, 2014).
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and miss how their behavior might impact whether and how policies change. I argue that local
bureaucrats are uniquely situated to shape local climate adaptation policies because of their
expertise and relative isolation from partisan pressures. I seek to improve our understanding of
whether, and how, local bureaucrats influence climate change adaptation policy by studying the
integration of climate adaptation goals into local flood and drought management policies.4
Additionally, I examine how polarization and intergovernmental relations interact when a
polarized issue – climate change – is introduced in an already complex policy area – disaster
management. Understanding these dynamics sheds light on the role that bureaucrats play in
shaping policy at the local level, but it also helps us understand when and how bureaucrats
engage with highly polarized issue areas and become policy advocates or agents of policy
change. The polarized nature of climate change contributes to the gridlock that stops national
action and it also influences bureaucrats in unanticipated ways to both encourage and discourage
action at the local level.
This project specifically draws attention to bureaucrats as important strategic actors
whose choices are influenced by their career goals, the wishes of their political superiors, a
polarized issue environment, pressure from the public, and their personal beliefs (Teodoro 2011,
Lipsky 2010, Wilson 1989, Stensöta 2011). Their position as local implementers of natural
disaster policies makes them more likely to (a) pay attention to how climate change alters flood
and drought prediction models, and (b) have expertise at the local level to shape the integration
of climate change into existing policy. Thus, the first question this project asks is: In what ways

4

See Chapter 2: Methods for a more in-depth discussion of why flooding and drought management policy were
chosen. In short, floods and droughts represent two types of regularly occurring disasters that will become worse
with climate change.
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do local bureaucrats play a driving role in shaping local communities’ climate adaptation
plans?
Second, this project unpacks the influence of intergovernmental arrangements on
bureaucratic behavior. Federal, state, and local governments participate in flood and drought
management. Federal and state governments set minimum standards and local governments
design and implement policies to comply with those standards. Due to this, existing institutional
arrangements and intergovernmental relationships shape local bureaucratic behavior as it pertains
to integrating climate change adaptation into flood and drought management. Therefore, this
project also addresses if and how the intergovernmental policy environment influences
bureaucratic behavior vis-à-vis the development of climate adaptation policy.
In the following sections, I develop a series of testable hypotheses and a typology of
bureaucratic behavior. First, I discuss who front-line bureaucrats are and why they are uniquely
situated to address climate adaptation in local governments. Next, I examine the sources of local
bureaucrats’ influence over policy change, discussing both structural autonomy and personal
motivations. Third, I argue that the level of agreement within the policy community about the
validity of climate change and agreement on whether local governments can or should adapt
influences bureaucratic decision making and action. Fourth, I present a typology of bureaucratic
behavior which helps us understand how bureaucrats act to shape local climate adaptation
efforts. This typology is not specific to climate change and can be applied to any situation where
bureaucrats might act to shape policy in highly polarized issue contexts. Finally, I discuss how
the influence of multiple principals at each level of government – local, state, and federal –
shapes bureaucrats’ decision making.

7

3. Local Bureaucrats’ Unique Position to Shape Local Climate Adaptation
To begin, it is important to clarify who front-line bureaucrats are and where their ability
to shape local policy comes from. Front-line bureaucrats are on the edge of the bureaucracy, they
work directly with the targets of a policy within a given community (the recipients of services or
subjects of regulation). Also called street-level bureaucrats (as coined by Lipsky in his book
Street Level Bureaucracy (1980 [2010])), common examples of front-line bureaucrats are police
officers, social services case workers, and public-school teachers. Front-line bureaucrats can also
be administrators whose work is predominately completing paperwork or attending meetings, as
long as those tasks work directly for the people in a community.5 Examples of bureaucrats who
work on flood management and drought management are publicly employed civil engineers,
land-use and zoning administrators, community planners, and public water utility managers.
These bureaucrats often work with community members on technical questions about policy
regulations and requirements.
Scholars and advocates often focus attention on elected officials as agents of change and
overlook bureaucrats as potential policymakers. Instead, bureaucrats are cast primarily as policy
implementers (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Altfeld & Miller, 1984; May & Winter, 2007;
Wilson, 1989). This strain of the literature relies heavily on the principal-agent model6
(beginning with Terry Moe’s application of principal-agent modeling to the bureaucracy (1984))
and shows clearly bureaucrats are not only agents of elected officials but are also beholden to
their bureaucratic superiors and to the publics they serve.
This differs slightly from Lipsky’s definition because he was most interested in bureaucrats who worked directly
with members of the general public. However, many of his observations apply to bureaucrats who work with a select
group or class of community members.
6
This work does not argue that principal-agent theory cannot explain part of the role of bureaucrats in the
policymaking process. However, it demonstrates that principal-agent theory can be limiting because it minimizes the
role bureaucrats play in shaping climate adaptation policy independent of their implementation duties.
5
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Principal-agent theory provide a framework for scholars to examine how well bureaucrats
implement the policy preferences of elected officials and how and why bureaucrats do not
conform to these preferences (Moe, 1984; Whitford, 2005; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987;
McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Scholars have also tested alternative explanations for why
bureaucrats conform to politicians’ wishes, including bureaucratic values (Meier & O'Toole,
2006) and organizational structure (Hammond, 1986).7 Despite their disagreements, these
scholars all remind us that bureaucrats step out of the role of “agent” and occupy other roles in
the policymaking process. They can change policies during implementation by being ‘bad
agents’: defying their superiors through whistleblowing (Peters & Branch, 1972; Martin &
Rifkin, 2004), employing guerilla behaviors (O'Leary, 2006), or exercising their autonomy
(Rourke, 1979; Carpenter, 2001). They can also exercise significant powers of discretion during
policy implementation (Teodoro, 2011). Bureaucrats also influence policy formulation through
sharing their expertise and influencing agendas (Altfeld & Miller, 1984), building neutrality in
political fights (Huber, 2007), and by playing multiple principals off one another (Whitford,
2005).8 Some bureaucrats even become policy entrepreneurs and introduce new policies onto the
agenda in the same way that activists and elected officials might (Teske & Schneider, 1994).
While most of these studies focus on federal or state-level bureaucrats, local bureaucrats
are capable of shaping policy change, as several studies show. Lipsky (2010) focuses on the
power of discretion in policy implementation and demonstrates that street-level bureaucrats are
capable of ushering in innovations. Relatedly, Teske & Schenider (1994) argue that local

7

Although it is not germane to this project, the growing literature on stewardship theory to explain bureaucratic
behavior further demonstrates the weaknesses in assuming a perfect principal-agent relationship between politicians
and bureaucrats (see Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson (1997) and Van Slyke (2006) for examples). The relationship
is much more fluid with bureaucrats taking on significant policymaking responsibilities.
8
These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, Section 4.
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bureaucrats – especially city managers – are well positioned in local government to become
policy entrepreneurs: introducing new agenda items and formulating policies. The authors argue
that city managers’ structural influence in local government makes them excellent candidates to
introduce a wide range of innovations. Both of these studies were right to focus on the
institutional position of local bureaucrats as their source of influence over policy. This project
builds on their work to argue that front-line local bureaucrats occupy an institutional position
which makes them likely to influence policy change for the following reasons. First, they are
more sensitive to changing conditions and attitudes of the publics they serve because they work
on the front lines (Lipsky, 2010). This is especially true in local disaster management where
bureaucrats are active in mitigation and response planning (Kusumasari, Alam, & Siddiqui,
2010). The number and types of interactions front-line bureaucrats have with community
members change with on-the-ground conditions, serving as a barometer of sorts. For instance,
when heavy rain events lead to increased flooding in a community, the city engineer and public
works director get more calls from residents, leading them to increase the community’s debrisremoval efforts or to consider changes to their storm water management system.
The further removed a bureaucrat is from these pressures – or the higher in the
organizational chart an individual is – the less likely they are to be responsive to these
fluctuations. This is not to say that top-level officials in the bureaucracy or elected officials are
always unresponsive; however, since their day-to-day activities do not include working with the
local community or local environment in one issue area, they are less exposed to fluctuations as
they occur. While Teske and Schneider emphasize the influence of top-level local bureaucrats
(city managers), they overlook the role of information in shaping policy agendas (Jones B. D.,
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1994). Front-line bureaucrats have first-hand knowledge about the policy environment9 whereas
city managers must rely on these actors passing information to them. Lower-level local
bureaucrats therefore have an agenda setting power that managers lack. Their decisions about
how to prioritize information shape how policy is created.
Local bureaucrats have access to and influence in local agenda-setting venues. They are
present during conversations and in spaces where local policies are made. These spaces include
both public and private government meetings, conversations with other bureaucrats at the local,
state, or federal level, and interactions with policy targets – property owners, builders, local
businesses, the agricultural community, etc. Where advocacy groups have to establish access to
local governments in order to shape policy, bureaucrats have this access as a part of their job.
The spaces or locations where policies would change, then, include: local ordinances, local
management plans, and conversations between the local bureaucrats and policy targets.
Empirically, it is easier to see formal policy change – e.g. in ordinances and formal planning –
because these are recognized spaces often documented with meeting minutes. However, as
Lipsky (2010), Lin (2000) and others show this is not the only space where policies are shaped –
informal venues like conversations between policy implementers and policy targets are spaces
where policies can change.
In local governments, front-line bureaucrats are also more likely to be aware of the
policies that state and federal governments are addressing than their elected counterparts. Most
local governments have volunteer or part-time elected officials, with the exception of large cities.
Here, “policy environment” describes the physical and social conditions the policy affects or is affected by. In the
case of flood or drought management, the policy environment includes the local climate (rainfall and water in the
natural environment), government agencies, citizens that would be affected by a flood or drought, and organized
groups that have an interest in floods or droughts including – but not limited to – disaster response organizations like
the Red Cross, homeowners associations, environmental protection groups, agricultural organizations, business
owners, and business advocacy groups.
9
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Thus, the professionalized policymakers in local governments are almost always bureaucrats.
Local bureaucrats’ tenure is often long – surviving many turnovers in elected officials, and they
are full-time hired staff rather than volunteers. Therefore, local bureaucrats are aware of signals
sent from superior governments in the form of memos, grant application guidelines, discussions
about new laws or policies, and more. For instance, when Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick
created a climate change adaptation fund (Schoenberg, 2014), it sent the signal to local
governments that climate adaptation is an important policy priority. Conversely, when North
Carolina’s legislature passed a law to prevent localities from considering sea level rise in their
planning documents, this sent the signal that climate change adaptation should not be prioritized
(Rawlins, 2012).
Additionally, front-line bureaucrats are nonpartisan actors, allowing them to take
unpopular positions without worrying about straying from the “party-line.” Due to this, front-line
bureaucrats might be more accountable by responding to changing conditions and the needs of
the public (e.g. preventing flooding damage due to climate change) than elected officials who are
pressured to follow partisan commitments. In the case of flood management and drought
management policy, front-line bureaucrats are sensitive to changes in flood or drought frequency
and severity (including those due to climate change) as well as public attitudes about acceptable
levels of risk. This makes them more likely to consider promoting or blocking flood or droughtrelated climate adaptation efforts to fit with the community’s needs. Since they are more
removed from partisan consequences, the polarized debate around climate change is less likely to
influence how they act.
Due to the characteristics discussed above: (1) responsiveness to the public and to
changing on-the-ground conditions, (2) awareness of signals from superior governments, and (3)
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protection from partisan or electoral consequences of policy positions, I offer the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Front-line local bureaucrats are more likely than elected officials
to introduce climate adaptation into the local agenda.
Hypothesis 2: Bureaucrats with a special area of focus – e.g. water managers,
floodplain managers, etc. – are more likely than general-focus bureaucrats – e.g.
city managers – to suggest integrating climate adaptation into existing policy
areas.
However, just because they can take more politically controversial positions – like introducing
climate change adaptation onto the local agenda – does not mean that they will. The following
sections argue that bureaucrats’ actions are shaped by their institutional environment, specifically
the amount of autonomy they have in relation to their superiors (the principal in a principal-agent
relationship) and the amount of agreement there is in the policymaking community that climate
change is real and the locality should adapt to it.
4. Local Bureaucrats’ Influence: Expertise and Autonomy
In the few studies that look at the conditions under which bureaucrats act as policy
advocates and introduce agenda items, scholars consistently find that autonomy mixed with
personal or professional motivations shape bureaucratic action. Examples of studies include
Teske and Schenider’s study of city managers (1994), Teodoro’s examination of the link
between career motivations and bureaucratic innovation (2011), and Carpenter’s in-depth
examination of bureaucratic-led policy innovation during the Progressive Era in the United
States (2001). Autonomy comes from personal experience and knowledge as well as structural
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independence. Personal experience and knowledge-based autonomy come from a variety of
sources including professionalization standards related to their expertise, training, and
educational background (Teodoro, 2014) as well as ideology (O'Leary, 2006). Structural
autonomy comes from policies and institutions like administrative procedures (McCubbins, Noll,
& Weingast, 1987), who has hiring or firing power, where funding for a program or agency
comes from, and agency structure (Huber & Shipan, 2002).
An important implication of the bureaucratic behavior literature is that when bureaucrats
have autonomy, they are more likely to influence the shape of policy (Carpenter, 2001; Lin,
2000; Lipsky, 2010; Teodoro, 2011). Lipsky’s study on street-level bureaucrats demonstrates
that the bureaucrats working at the street-level or on the front lines often have significant
autonomy in shaping policy implementation (2010). By combining the lessons of the
entrepreneurship literature (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Kingdon, 1995), bureaucratic
entrepreneurship studies (Teske & Schneider, 1994; Teodoro, 2011; Carpenter, 2001) and the
literature on street-level bureaucratic discretion, this project argues that front-line bureaucrats are
capable of acting as agenda-setters and policy advocates. This is not to say that bureaucrats
create policies singlehandedly. Local bureaucrats are saddled with high institutional obstacles as
the U.S. democratic system gives law-making power to elected officials and not the bureaucrats
whose primary responsibility is to implement laws (Waterman, Rouse, & Wright, 1998; Wood &
Waterman, 1991; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987). However, they can introduce new goals
into pre-existing policy areas, like integrating climate adaptation into existing floodplain
management policy.
I expect local hazard mitigation administrators to be especially well situated to introduce
climate adaptation into local policies for two reasons. First, these bureaucrats cultivate autonomy
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using their expertise and their institutional position. They monitor climate and weather in order
to predict or prepare for disasters like floods, which makes them more likely to be aware of and
understand the science and debates concerning climate change. Additionally, these bureaucrats
work with federal agencies like NOAA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) which disseminate information about climate change on their websites and in
communication with local governments (NOAA, 2016; FEMA, 2016; FEMA, 2013). Local
bureaucrats’ attention to these issues combined with their expertise and training prepares them to
implement policies addressing hazard mitigation, but it also enables them to serve as experts and
agenda setters in the formulation of new policies.
Second, bureaucrats working on climate-related disaster management policies will likely
be motivated by professional ambitions. To minimize blame from politicians, advocacy groups,
and the public when problems arise that are not adequately addressed (Boin, McConnell, & Hart,
2008; Hood, 2002), we would expect bureaucrats to try to understand the many causes and
consequences of phenomenon related to their work. In the case of managing climate-related
disasters like flooding and drought, bureaucrats would view climate change as an important
threat multiplier (i.e. climate change will make disasters worse). Simply put, bureaucrats want to
be successful at their jobs and avoid blame (Hood, 2002), and this may lead them to integrate
climate change adaptation into existing policies even in the face of political polarization. This
leads to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by providing issuespecific expertise about potential harms.
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5. Bureaucrats and Problem Definitions
Like any other policy entrepreneur, local bureaucrats have the ability to shape the
political agenda by offering particular definitions of public problems. Problem definitions frame
issues to convey information about the issue’s severity, frequency, temporal proximity,
geographic proximity, who or what caused the problem, and who is responsible to remedy the
problem (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 2002). After becoming aware of climate change’s
potential impacts in their communities, local bureaucrats can identify climate change as a driver
of local disasters, implying that climate change adaptation is needed in addition to existing
disaster prevention goals. Policy entrepreneurs do not need to invent a new problem definition,
they can employ existing problem definitions that work toward their goals. For instance, local
bureaucrats can look at problem definitions in superior governments as signals describing how
they should act vis-à-vis a new policy area. In the case of climate change, signals from FEMA or
state governments influence how local bureaucrats perceive the importance of including climate
change as a threat multiplier for floods or droughts. These signals are important to local
bureaucrats because FEMA and state governments determine grant funding levels for local
hazard mitigation planning (discussed more below in Chapter 1, Section 7).
A possible problem definition would likely (1) define climate change as a significant
threat or threat multiplier to existing disasters like floods or droughts; (2) claim that local
adaptation is possible; and (3) argue that local government should get involved. In this way, local
bureaucrats highlight deficiencies in current policies and suggest routes for fixing those
deficiencies. This problem definition frames the political conflict by describing what the conflict
is about: minimizing risk from climate change. It describes who or what is to blame for a
problem (climate change), what solutions are appropriate (using existing policies to address the
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new climate change threat), and how much we should care (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). In sum,
local bureaucrats can use problem definitions which link climate change to existing flood or
drought management concerns to push for local policy change.
Hypothesis 4: Local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by presenting
arguments that climate change predictions can be integrated into existing policies
rather than suggesting adaptation should be pursued through new policy areas.
However, problem definitions are not infinitely powerful ideas that can be employed in a
Machiavellian manner by politicians or bureaucrats. Often, problem definitions are deemed
acceptable based on ideological or partisan attitudes and fundamental disagreements about one or
more aspects of a problem definition arise. Disagreements emerge concerning the cause of a
problem, its severity, its proximity (temporally and geographically), whether government is
capable of addressing it, and if proposed solutions are appropriate and efficacious (Rochefort &
Cobb, 1994). For the problem definition above, each of the elements is influenced by ideological
and partisan attitudes concerning the validity of climate change and the appropriate role of
government. Republican leaders often deny climate change is happening, claim it is not a
problem, or argue that government should not be involved in addressing it (Antonio & Brulle,
2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Furthermore, liberals and conservatives fundamentally
disagree about the appropriate role of government in addressing climate change (Leiserowitz,
Maibach, Ropser-Renouf, & Hmielowski, 2011).
While bureaucrats do not face the same pressures from political parties to “tow the party
line” that elected officials might, the fundamental disagreements a problem definition can shape
how bureaucrats act to influence policy. If key actors like elected politicians and powerful
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community groups agree with the bureaucrats’ problem definition, change can be facilitated
through those positions. However, if these actors disagree, the policy can be gridlocked and
stasis becomes the default. Therefore, to avoid gridlock, bureaucrats might choose less overt
methods of policy change like implementation discretion (Lipsky, 2010; Lin, 2000) or guerilla
behaviors (O'Leary, 2006). What motivates bureaucrats to choose between different types of
action is discussed in the next section.
6. Modeling How Bureaucrats Change Policy
As discussed above, autonomy and problem definition agreement both independently
influence if and how bureaucrats act to change climate change adaptation policy. (Autonomy
describes the bureaucrats autonomy in their position rather than just on the issue of climate
adaptation.) I propose they interact to shape the type of action local bureaucrats take to influence
policy change. As Figure 1 shows, the interaction of these variables leads to four distinct or
“pure-types10” of actions: defiant behavior, cooperative action, politician-led action, and nonconfrontational behavior. While each of these behaviors has been described in the literature, no
studies attempt to explain why a bureaucrat would choose to act defiantly rather than nonconfrontationally. By developing and testing this typology of action, this study attempts to
explain the variation in bureaucratic behavior rather than studying the different categories in
isolation.
Defiant Behavior is likely to arise in a situation with high autonomy and low problem
definition agreement between politicians and bureaucrats. In these instances, we would expect to
see bureaucrats capitalize on their autonomy to actively challenge politicians, leading to conflict.

10

These categories are referred to as pure-types because administrative independence and political agreement are
both continuous scales rather than dichotomous categories. However, theorizing about the pure-types helps us
conceptualize differences between low and high values for each dimension.
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Bureaucrats might choose less overt pathways to change policy but would still be doing so
openly rather than in secret. Substantive policy changes are unlikely, but changes controlled by
the administrators are possible. These include implementation decisions like the choice of
measurement tools, the prioritization of tasks, and allocation of (human) resources (May &
Winter, 2007; Rourke, 1979; Carpenter, 2010). Defiant behavior is likely to manifest itself in
informal spaces including conversations between the local bureaucrat and citizens affected by
policies as well as policies that are controlled by bureaucrats including departmental policies.
Figure 1: Forms of Bureaucratic Behavior to Integrate Climate Change Adaptation into
Existing Policies

Problem Definition Agreement
Low
Low

High

Non-Confrontational
Behavior
example: guerilla bureaucrats,
disgruntled bureaucrats

Politician-Led Action
example: traditional legislative
or executive policymaking

Bureaucratic
Autonomy
Defiant Behavior

Cooperative Action

examples: autonomous agencies,
whistleblowers

example: collaborative
governance

High

Bureaucrats cannot defiantly pass new ordinances or write management plans without the
cooperation of superiors, so we would not expect to see defiant behavior show up in ordinances
or management plans that must be approved by superiors.
Cooperative Action is likely to arise in a situation with high bureaucratic autonomy and
high problem definition agreement. In these cases, we would expect bureaucrats and politicians
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to work together to change policy. Bureaucrats can work with local politicians or with state-level
politicians depending upon which principal-agent relationship we are considering. Policy change
would likely occur through political (legislative or executive) channels to capitalize on elected
official support but could also occur through bureaucratic rule changes endorsed by elected
officials. Since there is high bureaucratic independence, buy-in from bureaucrats is crucial to
ensure implementation.
Politician-Led Action is likely to arise in a situation with low bureaucratic independence
and high problem definition agreement. In these instances, politicians would lead reform efforts,
with support (i.e. no defiance) from bureaucrats. Policy integration is expected to occur through
political channels rather than through administrative rule changes. This is the more traditional
legislative-executive route to policy change.
Non-Confrontational Behavior is the type of bureaucratic behavior (if any) that will
likely occur in a situation with low bureaucratic autonomy and low problem definition
agreement. If bureaucrat-driven attempts at policy change occur, bureaucrats would likely avoid
confrontation with politicians. If politicians seek policy change, bureaucrats can “drag their
feet” or engage in other tactics to prevent policy implementation which effectively prevents
policy change (O'Leary, 2006). Therefore, no policy change is expected because both politicians
and bureaucrats can effectively stall change. This project, then, will test the following:
Hypothesis 5: If a bureaucrat acts to integrate climate change into existing
policy, the form their action takes will depend upon their autonomy and the extent
of problem definition agreement in the policymaking community.
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Hypothesis 5a: When the bureaucrat is autonomous and there is low problem
definition agreement in the policymaking community, they will act defiantly.
Hypothesis 5b: When the bureaucrat is autonomous and there is high problem
definition agreement, they will cooperate with politicians and other policymakers.
Hypothesis 5c: When the bureaucrat is not autonomous and there is high problem
definition agreement, politicians will lead policy development.
Hypothesis 5d: When the bureaucrat is not autonomous and there is low problem
definition agreement, they will either act non-confrontationally or not act at all.
7. Managing Floods and Droughts: An Intergovernmental Tangle
The model presented above (Figure 1) defines bureaucratic action in relation to the
bureaucrat’s principal. For instance, when an autonomous bureaucrat disagrees with her
principal, her action is defiant. When they agree, it is cooperative. However, the
intergovernmental nature of flood and drought management policy means that local bureaucrats
who implement intergovernmental policies are subject to multiple principals11 who had different
levels of influence and expertise (see the argument Whitford (2005) makes about multiple
principals).
In terms of influence over local bureaucrats, federal and state principals have the power
of the purse and local principals have hiring and firing power. For example, the Stafford Act (42
U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) distributes funds to local governments that have recently experienced a
disaster so they might take measures to mitigate future disasters. While the program is

11

Figure 2 maps these relationships.

21

administered through FEMA and state disaster management agencies,12 the mitigation activities
are planned and implemented by local bureaucrats including city or county engineers, public
works directors, and building code enforcement officers. The federal and state governments
create rules and standards, but do not employ the people who enforce them. Instead, FEMA uses
grants to stipulate what (at minimum) local policies should include. States can also add
requirements to FEMA’s policies that local governments must follow in order to get funds.
Without these grants, most local governments could not possibly fund any disaster mitigation,
and even the largest local governments would not be able to afford recovery efforts. So, the
federal government influences local bureaucratic action by controlling funding.
In a way, this reinforces what Birkland and Waterman (2008) identify as the dominant
pattern where local governments are first responders in natural disasters but state and federal
governments can help overcome the limitations of small government (funding and coordination
across jurisdictions). However, they do not make hiring or firing decisions; this power is given to
local principals. Therefore, the multi-level implementation of disaster mitigation and planning
policies has insulated bureaucrats from oversight from federal politicians and made bureaucrats
more answerable to local preferences (akin to Whitford, 2002). If these principals all agreed,
then bureaucrats’ decision-making environment would be clear. However, in the area of climate
change adaptation, this is not the case.
To understand if local bureaucrats will integrate climate change adaptation into existing
policies, we need to understand how the principals (federal, state, and local) and bureaucrats
view a problem. Often, federal, state, and local principals’ goals diverge. For instance, FEMA

12

FEMA provides funding to state governments who distribute it to local governments. The federal government
does not directly provide grants to local governments through this program.
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has been encouraging local governments to engage in climate adaptation (FEMA, 2013; FEMA,
2016) but some state governments like those in Florida and North Carolina wrote rules and
created laws discouraging or preventing local action (Korten, 2015; Rawlins, 2012). Local
governments’ attitudes towards climate change adaptation vary as well. As strategic political
actors, local bureaucrats shape their behavior based on the level of agreement they perceive in a
policy area. When agreement is high, they are likely to work with the principals they agree with;
but when there is disagreement, bureaucrats are likely to find other pathways to shape policy.
Therefore, we would expect local bureaucrats who think that climate change is a threat to align
their actions with federal principals and try to bypass state influence. On the other hand, local
bureaucrats who think climate change is not a threat may align their actions with state principals
if those principals reject adaptation policies. As a result, a locality might be cooperating with
their federal principals but defying their state principals when incorporating climate adaptation
into local hazard mitigation.
Additionally, how we understand autonomy changes based on which principal we are
talking about. Regardless of who their principal is, autonomous bureaucrats are more likely to
follow personal motivations or internal pressures when deciding how to act. Yet, autonomy from
state or federal principals does not come from establishing expertise because local disaster
managers and federal disaster managers have similar knowledge bases. Instead it largely comes
from fiscal independence and local government independence from the state. If a local
government can raise funds for flood management on its own (and the local bureaucrat has
expertise in flood management), then local bureaucrats have a high amount of independence to
shape policy. Or, if a local government does not need state approval to create a new policy
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initiative (i.e. they have home rule13), then we would expect to see local bureaucrats using their
expertise at the local level to shape policy. The more dependent the local government is on
superior governments for either funding or legislative authority, the less autonomy bureaucrats
have to shape policies. Therefore, the institutional position of the principal changes both how we
understand problem definition agreement and autonomy. Throughout this dissertation, special
attention will be paid to who the principal is in any given relationship.
Figure 2 (below) shows the relationship between local bureaucrats and their principals at
each level of government. As the figure shows, disaster management policy is shaped by an
intergovernmental web of policies and actors – all of which local bureaucrats respond to.

“Home rule” policies mean that local governments exist separately of the state government and are not tied to the
state’s wishes and policies, except through grants or regulations, much like the relationship of the 50 states and the
U.S. federal government (Wolman, McManmon, Bell, & Brunori, 2008; Zimmerman J. F., 2012).
13
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Figure 2: Principal-Agent Relationships for Local Implementation of Disaster Mitigation
Policy

Key
Actor
Principal to agent
Agent to principal

FEMA
(principal)

crafts policy
requirements and
provides funding

crafts local policies to
meet requirements in
order to secure
funding

State Emergency
Management
Agency
(agent of federal
government,
principal for local
government)

sets additional policy
requirements and provides/
distributes federal funding
Local Government
(agent of state
government, principal
for local bureaucrat)

hires and pays

runs programs and provides
expertise on how to craft local
policy to comply with state and
federal requirements

Local Bureaucrat
(agent, answerable to
local, state, and
federal governments)

Finally, we must understand the intergovernmental context of policy development
because local governments are often considered appendages of their state governments: they do
not exist without state approval and they exist to enact state goals. Called Dillon’s Rule, this
arrangement is prevalent in most states. However, a minority of states operate under ‘home rule’
arrangements where cities and counties are essentially independent from the state, allowing them
to set different (and sometimes opposing) political goals. We can also think of this as local
governments having high autonomy or low autonomy in terms of creating and implementing
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their own policies (Wolman, McManmon, Bell, & Brunori, 2008). The character of the state-tolocal relationship shapes how local governments act because states determine local government
size, funding sources, and required policy initiatives (Zimmerman J. F., 2012). Even in home
rule states, the state government influences local behavior much in the same way the U.S. federal
government influences how states act. State governments in home rule states can set minimum
policy requirements, provide grants, pass unfunded mandates, etc. to shape local action. Thus,
even though local disaster management policy is answerable to federal standards, local
governments must answer to state governments first and foremost. While there might be
differences in political relationships between localities in home rule states and those in Dillon’s
Rule states, we would expect local governments to work with (or at least not actively against) the
wishes of state governments. This leads to the last hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: When state governments oppose climate change action, local
bureaucrats are less likely to develop climate change adaptation policy for fear of
losing an important source of disaster mitigation or relief funding.
8. Plan for the Dissertation
In the following chapters, the six hypotheses presented above will be evaluated using
case studies of local governments and front-line bureaucrats in communities that are at high-risk
of climate-related disasters. Chapter 2 will discuss the methods used to choose cases, collect
data, and analyze the data.
Chapter 3 addresses the question: Do local bureaucrats play a driving role in shaping
local communities’ climate adaptation plans? In this chapter, I will establish if climate change is
on the local agenda and trace who introduced it. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are evaluated to see if
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bureaucrats introduce climate change adaptation instead of politicians and if special-focus
bureaucrats (like emergency managers) introduce climate adaptation instead of general-focus
bureaucrats (like city managers). Chapter 4 addresses if and how bureaucrats choose to act. It
specifically looks at how autonomy and problem definition agreement shape bureaucratic action
to evaluate hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 (including 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d).
Chapter 5 addresses the intergovernmental context for disaster management and climate
adaptation policy. This chapter discusses how the web of laws and policies from the federal
government and state governments shapes local bureaucratic behavior. Additionally, it considers
how bureaucrats negotiate conflicting orders from the federal and state governments – especially
when state governments discourage climate adaptation.14 Finally, Chapter 6 presents conclusions
and future directions for research into local bureaucratic behavior and local climate adaptation.

14

The Obama Administration was in office during the entirety of the data collection for this project. During the
Obama Administration, climate change adaptation was encouraged by FEMA. Therefore, disagreements between the
federal and state governments can only arise when state governments do not think climate change is a threat because
the Obama Administration consistently identified it as one.
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS
To test the hypotheses for this project, I use the method of structure-focused comparisons
described by George and Bennett (2005). Structure-focused comparisons give the researcher the
ability to examine a variety of cases in a systematic fashion. It capitalizes on the richness of
qualitative data while providing a replicable test of the hypotheses. The research design for this
project is guided by George and Bennett’s description of structured-focused comparisons,
although it requires a slight modification when it comes to case selection. As George and Bennett
argue, researchers should not only focus on cases that have a large quantity of data that is easily
accessed (p. 69) but focus on theoretically interesting and important cases. For the purpose of
this study, I am interested in looking at local bureaucrats responding to the threat of climate
change. Unfortunately, there is no database of local bureaucratic behavior or action on climate
change upon which to base my case selection. Therefore, this study takes a new approach for
choosing cases. I use geographic informational systems (GIS) analysis of climate risk to choose
cases. This avoids selecting cases on the dependent variable (form of bureaucratic action on
climate change adaptation), but the larger number of cases (18 communities and 30 local
bureaucrats in those communities) increases the chances of capturing variation on the dependent
variable (explained in more detail below).
Structured-focused comparisons allow for exploring the hypotheses presented here as
well as any unexpected variables or mechanisms at play in local government policy
development. Like all non-experimental research, it is not possible to control for all variables
except those of interest. However, the larger number of cases (18) allows for finding mostsimilar comparisons between cases as well as most-different comparisons within the same study.
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The cases are built using a large quantity of government documents, media reports,15 and
interviews with local officials. To make sense of these documents, this project also uses
qualitative content analysis as a strategy for sifting through the high volume of data (Schreier,
2014; Mayring, 2000).
In the following sections, I describe the case selection strategy. Then, I describe the
variables and measurement strategies employed to test each hypothesis. Third, I discuss the data
collection strategy. Fourth, I outline how qualitative content analysis is used to code the data.
Finally, I discuss limits to generalization from this study.
1. Choosing Cases
When developing structured-focused comparisons, the first and most important step is to
identify appropriate cases. As George and Bennett describe, the first step in choosing cases is to
clearly identify the universe of cases. In this study, the universe of cases is local bureaucrats who
work on existing policies that will be affected by climate change in communities at risk of
climate-related disasters.
This study looks specifically at flood management and drought management because they
are both policy areas where climate adaptation goals can be achieved by front-line bureaucrats.
For instance, a local flood manager can suggest to builders to move structures further from
floodable waters or build the structure higher off the ground to prevent flooding damages.
Similarly, a drought manager might plan water storage goals in line with more severe droughts
predicted under climate change. Furthermore, these policies are ideal cases to study because
front-line bureaucrats in these policy areas are employed by local governments but they often

15

All total, this project has upwards of 1,000 documents between meeting minutes, government reports, and news
articles for each of the 18 communities (totaling over 20,000 documents for the entire project).
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implement intergovernmental policies like those run through FEMA and state emergency
management and mitigation policies. Thus, studying the intergovernmental versus intragovernmental tension is possible with these policy areas.
To study the variation in front-line bureaucratic behavior, this project looks at local
governments in five sites across the US. The five sites represent areas at high risk from climate
change-related flooding or drought. Within each site, several local governments were selected
for case analysis. This allows both within-site and across-site comparisons. The case studies for
this project will provide rich data to understand how relationships between bureaucrats and their
superiors shape how bureaucrats consider (or disregard) climate adaptation as an influence on
flood or drought management. The local governments selected for study are at high risk of
climate-related flooding or drought, making it more likely that climate adaptation is on the
agenda for the individual bureaucrat or the entire community. I select cases based on climate
risk rather than the existence of adaptation policies so this project includes cases where action
was taken and cases where no action was taken.
Specific sites for data collection were chosen based on high predicted risk from climate
change related flooding and drought. To capture this risk, I combined climate change prediction
data from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (2014) with the United State Geological
Survey's (2014) coastal vulnerability index to show areas in the contiguous US that are at a
greater risk of climate change-related flooding and drought. Climate anomalies (i.e. how
different the future is from the historical average) were calculated for four variables: total
precipitation, atmospheric water vapor (precipitable water), soil moisture, and moisture in the top
10 centimeters of soil. Using ArcGIS, a county-level average for these four variables was
calculated. The climate anomalies were then standardized so these measures could be combined
30

to find areas of high drought risk (low precipitation and low soil moisture) or high flood risk
(high precipitation and high soil moisture). Then, the climate prediction models and coastal
vulnerability measures were displayed together to guide study site selection.
Figure 3: Site Selection for Case Studies

The resulting map displays several areas at high risk of drought (red or orange indicating
low standardized average climate anomaly) or flooding (teal or blue indicating high standardized
average climate anomaly or high coastal vulnerability). From these regions, five sites for study
emerge: (1) coastal flooding and increased precipitation on the North Carolina coast, (2) inland
flooding in the Savannah River basin in South Carolina, (3) a combination of sea-level flooding
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and decreased precipitation (freshwater) or drought in central Florida, (4) drought in the Carson
City, Nevada border area, and (5) drought in central Washington state (see Figure 3)16.
From these sites, cases were chosen based on two criteria. First, to be included in the
study, the county or city government needed to be sufficiently large to have a professionalized
bureaucracy dedicated to addressing flooding or drought concerns. While not a perfect
relationship, areas with larger populations are more likely to have larger city or county
governments. Therefore, having a city with a population of 15,000 or more people was a
requirement to be considered in the study. Cities with a population of less than 15,000 were
dropped as well as counties that had no cities with a population of 15,000 or greater.
This yielded an initial list of potential cases for each site:
•

Florida: five cities and three counties

•

Nevada: two cities and one county (one city – Carson – is a combined city/county)

•

North Carolina: three cities and two counties

•

South Carolina: seven cities and four counties

•

Washington: four cities and three counties

From this list, any site that had three or more potential cases was trimmed down to three
cases using a random number generator. For instance, South Carolina had seven cities and four

16

Climate risk could have been operationalized to reflect estimated costs of climate change in the community.
However, these data were not available at the local level until Hsaing et al published a study in Science in summer
2017 (after data collection for this project concluded). The potential loss of life and economic costs of climate
change, however, are influenced by an area’s population density and its current economic capacity. Areas with
higher population density are at higher risk of loss of life from severe weather. Areas with larger economies can
divert funds to managing risk from severe weather and other consequences of climate change, effectively reducing
their climate risk. As Hsaing et al found, this means that areas with weaker economies and more spread out
populations – i.e. rural counties – are at higher risk of climate change damage. Therefore, future studies should take
into account economic risks and mortality risks from studies like that by Hsaing et al. However, this information
should be combined with data on climate threats like floods and droughts to capture a fuller image of climate risk.
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counties as potential cases, the cities were assigned a random number and one through three were
chosen for study. Similarly, the four counties were assigned random numbers and numbers one
through three were chosen for study. Therefore, for each site we are left with the following
number of potential cases:
•

Florida: three cities and three counties

•

Nevada: two cities and one county (one city – Carson – is a combined city/county)

•

North Carolina: three cities and two counties

•

South Carolina: three cities and three counties

• Washington: three cities and three counties
Each of the 14 cities and 12 counties was contacted for interviews. Of the 26 total potential
cases, eight did not respond to any interview requests.17 As interview data is considered vital for
understanding the role of bureaucrats in developing climate adaptation policy, cases with no
response were dropped. The final list of 18 communities is below:
•

Florida: Fort Pierce (city), Martin (county), St. Lucie (county)

•

Nevada: Carson City (county/city), Fernley (city)

•

North Carolina: Elizabeth City (city), Havelock (city), New Bern (city), Pasquotank
(county), Craven (county)

•

South Carolina: Greer (city), Mauldin (city), Greenville (county), Oconee (county)

•

Washington18: Grant (county), Yakima (city), Kittitas (county), Yakima (county)

Cases were chosen to control for potential alternative explanations including the severity
of expected effects of climate change (all cases have severe expected effects) and size of

17

The strategies for contacting interview subjects and the interview protocol are described below (Section 3)
Yakima and Kittitas Counties (and the localities therein) are part of a multi-jurisdictional effort to regulate the
Yakima River Basin called the Yakima River Basin Integrated Plan (hereafter “Integrated Plan”). While they are
treated as separate cases for this analysis, these governments often collaborate through the Integrated Plan.
18
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jurisdiction which is related to several other variables.19 These include economic status
(measured by median income, property values, and employment rate.) Additionally, local
attitudes concerning climate change (public opinion) and government structure (e.g. most local
governments are run through a manager-council form of government) might account for
differences in local climate adaptation efforts. However, these variables do not greatly vary
nationwide or in the cases tested here. Therefore, these too are controlled for as potential
explanations. Specific data for the control variables are presented in tables in Appendix D.
The total number of cases in this project allows for both within-site comparisons and
cross-site comparisons. As George and Bennett argue:
“…a study that includes many cases may allow for several different types of
comparisons. One case might be most similar to another and both may be least
similar to a third case. As noted below, case selection is an opportunistic as well
as structured process – researchers should look for whether the addition of one or
a few cases to a study might provide useful comparisons or allow inferences on
additional types of cases,” (2005, p. 83).
These 18 cases allow for several types of comparisons, capitalizing on similarities on the
following dimensions. Cases in the same state have similarities which include the
attitudes of state leaders, experiences with prior disasters (at least those that were
sufficiently large to hit an entire region in a state), and proximity to a local climate leader
like Miami, Seattle, or New York City. The cases can also be compared on a variety of
other dimensions including population size, economic strength, budget size, attitudes of
local leaders, number or severity of prior disasters (see Appendix D for these
comparisons).

19

Although there is not a perfect correlation between the size of a jurisdiction and its economic status, the
differences are not overwhelming. For instance, we are not comparing a small town in New York State to New York
City’s economic power.
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2. Variables and Measurement
As George and Bennett stress, structured-focused comparisons work best when each case
is interrogated using the same variables to standardize data collection and comparisons (2005, p.
67). To test the six hypotheses in this project, six main variables of interest are considered:
1. Agenda-setter: Who introduces climate change adaptation onto the local agenda,
bureaucrats or elected officials? (Independent variable).
2. Status of climate change adaptation policy: Integration of climate change into existing
policies; separate initiative to address climate change adaptation (Dependent variable).
3. Bureaucratic background: Training and current responsibility of bureaucrats who
address flooding or drought in their jobs (Independent variable).
4. Bureaucratic autonomy: Bureaucratic independence from her superior (Independent
variable).
5. Problem definition agreement: Agreement concerning the need climate change
adaptation between the bureaucrat and her superior; to build this measure, two submeasurements are required: (Independent variable).
a. Bureaucrat’s argument about climate change adaptation: How the bureaucrat
frames the need for local adaptation (and the path by which adaptation should be
achieved).
b. Principal’s argument about climate change adaptation: If and how the
principal frames the need for local adaptation (and the path by which adaptation
should be achieved).
6. Bureaucratic action: How bureaucrats act to address climate change (Dependent
variable)

Table 1 on the next page shows which variables will be used to test each of the six
hypotheses in the project. In the following sections, I describe how each variable is measured
including which data will be used to craft the measures and how different values for each
variable are determined.
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Table 1: Variables Used to Test Hypotheses

Hypothesis

Variables

1. Front-line local bureaucrats are more likely than
elected officials to introduce climate adaptation
into the local agenda.

• Agenda-setter
• Bureaucratic action

2. Bureaucrats with a special area of focus are more
likely than general-focus bureaucrats to suggest
integrating climate adaptation into existing policy
areas.

• Agenda-setter
• Bureaucratic background
• Bureaucratic action

3. Local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by
providing issue-specific expertise about potential
harms.

• Bureaucratic autonomy (specifically expertisebased autonomy)
• Bureaucratic action

4. Local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by
arguing that climate change predictions can be
integrated into existing policies.

• Bureaucrat’s argument about climate change
adaptation (part of measure for problem definition
agreement)
• Bureaucratic action

5. If a bureaucrat acts to integrate climate change
into existing policy, the form their action takes
will depend upon their autonomy and the extent of
problem definition agreement in the policymaking
community.
5a. When the bureaucrat is autonomous and
there is low problem definition agreement in
the policymaking community, they will act
defiantly.
5b. When the bureaucrat is autonomous and
there is high problem definition agreement,
they will cooperate with politicians and other
policymakers.
5c. When the bureaucrat is not autonomous and
there is high problem definition agreement,
politicians will lead policy development.
5d. When the bureaucrat is not autonomous and
there is low problem definition agreement,
they will either act non-confrontationally or
not act at all.

• Bureaucratic autonomy
• Problem definition agreement
• Bureaucratic action

6. When state governments oppose climate change
action, local bureaucrats are less likely to act for
fear of losing an important source of disaster
mitigation or relief funding.

• Principal’s argument about climate change
adaptation (part of measure for problem definition
agreement) –for state government principals
• Bureaucratic action
• Status of climate change adaptation policy
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Additional data were used to supplement these measures, including statements made by
policymakers, budget information (especially funding for disaster mitigation), and
characterizations of policymakers’ action in the local press. These data are supplements to the six
main variables of interest listed above. In the following sections, I describe how these six main
variables of interest are used in this study.
2.1 Agenda-Setter
Not all agenda-setters are created equal. The identity of the individual who brings an
issue onto the policymaking agenda can shape the eventual outcome of the policy. This argument
is woven through the literature on policy entrepreneurs (see Kingdon, 1995; Mintrom, 1997 and
subsequent work; Schneider, Teske and Mintrom, 1995). Constructing a measure of agendasetters and policy entrepreneurs, then, is an important step for this project. This measure has two
parts. First, I determine if and when climate change is on the local agenda20. This part of the
measure attempts to identify the first time the issue was discussed either formally or informally.
Second, I identify the individual or individuals who introduced the issue onto the agenda.
Agenda setting can occur during official meetings where records are kept, but it can also
happen during informal discussions among policymakers. Additionally, a policy entrepreneur
often advocates for her policy over an extended time. Thus, if an individual is repeatedly
discussing climate change adaptation, this too will identify her as an agenda-setter. However, a
distinction should be made between agenda setters who repeatedly advocate for an issue or
policy response and those who casually address the issue once or twice.

20

If and when climate adaptation reaches the agenda is an element in both the variable capturing who the agendasetter is and the status of climate change adaptation policy. For clarity, the agenda-setter variable is measuring the
identity of the actor and not the action. The action is captured in the status of climate change adaptation policy
variable.
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Several data sources will be used to get the best possible measure of who introduced
climate adaptation onto the agenda. Data for this measure come from government reports,
meeting minutes, media articles, and interviews.21 As Flescher showed in his article on local
bureaucrats using euphemisms to address climate change (2014), a simple search for “climate
change” would miss these euphemisms. Therefore, this project used Atlas.ti to search for climate
change as well as flooding, and drought in the documents. The areas that contain these search
terms (see Appendix A for list of search strings) were then manually coded to determine if
climate change is being addressed (see Appendix B for codebook).
Once mentions of climate change were identified, the next step was to determine who
brought the issue on to the agenda. Members of the public, members of the media, members of
interest groups, and members of the government can all introduce issues on the local government
agenda. Within the group of members of the local government, I distinguish elected officials
from hired or appointed public bureaucrats. Public bureaucrats are individuals employed by a
government who did not arrive at their position through a public election. The growing use of
contractors for government service muddles this distinction somewhat, but if a local government
chooses to outsource their disaster management or planning efforts, the contractor will have
similar expertise and autonomy (even more autonomy than a typical bureaucrat). They might
lack the same quality of access to the elected officials, but they will likely engage in similar
activities like meeting with elected officials and presenting plans and updates at local meetings
that government-employed bureaucrats do. Data for this measure come from local government
websites which identify elected officials and employees of the local government. Contractors
working for local governments are often identified on government websites as well.

21

A description of the data collection procedures is below (Section 3)
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2.2 Status of Climate Adaptation Policy
Policy scholars widely recognize that public policy encompasses both what governments
decide to do as well as what they decide not to do. Therefore, every local government either has
a policy to address climate change adaptation or does not have a policy to address climate change
adaptation (either explicitly stated or implied by a lack of policy and discussion).
However, it is not a fair evaluation of government policy to group purposeful inaction
with lack of discussion of the issue altogether (Dye, 2010). Therefore, identifying the status of
climate adaptation policy requires two steps. The first step is determined during the previous
measure on agenda-setters: is climate change on the agenda? If climate change is not on the
Table 2: Status of Climate Change Policy on Local Agendas
Policy Status

Description

Indicators

Decided not to address climate change
adaptation

Discussions proposing climate change
action existed and either no follow up OR
an active decision not to act

Climate change adaptation is being
discussed by members of the local
government and policymaking community

Climate adaptation is mentioned by
members of local government, even if it is
dismissed

Crafting policies to address climate
adaptation, although not necessarily
adopting any

Elected officials or bureaucrats discussing
climate adaptation and strategies to achieve
it

Policy adoption

Policy has been approved by the necessarily
players in local government (most likely
elected officials, but could be a
discretionary policy adopted by
bureaucrats)

Policy is “on the books” – written as a local
law/ordinance or put into a planning
document that is used to guide local
government choices

Implementation
of an adaptation
policy

A plan is in place and the local government
is creating programs or developing
infrastructure to respond

Developing infrastructure, hiring adaptation
planners, creating systems, etc. Investing
and implementing a policy to address
climate change

No action

On the agenda

Policy
formulation

Categories based on Anderson, Brady, and Bullock III (1978). Not including evaluation because adaptation
policy is in its infancy.
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agenda, then this is distinguishable from a policy of inaction on climate adaptation. If climate
change is on the agenda, we can progress to the second measure which measures the state of the
policy as shown in the range of options in Table 2 (above). Data for this measure come from
analyzing government documents (meeting minutes, planning documents, and reports), media
coverage of local government, and interviews with government officials.
2.3 Bureaucratic Background
Bureaucrats’ training and expertise can shape how they act (Lipsky, 2010; Teodoro,
2011). Information on bureaucrats that will be helpful for this analysis include education and
training, length of tenure in local government they currently work for, and time in current
position. Education and training is operationalized by looking at their professional training (i.e.
disaster management specific training, engineering training, or natural science/environmental
science training).
As several interview subjects chose not to be identified, this information was generalized
to protect confidentiality of interview participants. For instance, education and training was
described as either (a) general administrative or public policy background or (b) specific policy
area expertise. Their length of tenure in their current job was described as either five or fewer
years or more than five years. While more a specific measure would contribute to a richer and
fuller analysis, it would compromise the confidentiality assured to the interview participants.
Data for these measures came from interviews with bureaucrats, personal biographies on local
government websites, and resume websites like LinkedIn.
2.4 Bureaucratic Autonomy
The bureaucratic politics literature identified several ways that bureaucrats establish
autonomy or independence from their political superiors. In this project, I employ several
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different measures of bureaucratic autonomy in order to provide a clearer and more
comprehensive picture of the independence that bureaucrats can exert. For instance, autonomy
built by expertise might yield different results than autonomy derived from structural rules and
protections.
First, bureaucrats can establish autonomy through their expertise. This is an expected
outcome, especially when the politician-bureaucrat relationship is viewed through the
perspective of a principal-agent relationship. Asymmetric information in the principal-agent
relationship means that as agents, bureaucrats have specified knowledge (Weber, 1922; Altfeld
& Miller, 1984). We would expect bureaucrats with merit-based appointments to have
specialized training and knowledge that politicians do not. However, because local bureaucrats
answer to principals at multiple levels of government and with different types of expertise,
including non-elected principals like FEMA or state emergency management agencies as well as
elected officials, the form asymmetric information takes should be modified for the specific
principal-agent relationship. Below (Table 3) I identify the different groups of principals that
local disaster managers answer to and what type of expertise, information, or knowledge they
likely have in common with the bureaucrat.
Federal and state principals are also knowledgeable about emergency management
practices and FEMA requirements. State emergency management agencies have similar
knowledge about emergency management practices, FEMA requirements, and any additional
state requirements. However, the federal government and the state government do not have
specific knowledge about local conditions.
Local elected officials and local bureaucrats share knowledge about their communities,
the local political scene (budget and staff constraints, current debates, etc.), and present and past
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disasters. However, we would not expect local elected officials to have specialized knowledge
about disaster management policy implementation or even FEMA or state emergency
management agency requirements.
Table 3: Sources of Bureaucratic Autonomy vis-à-vis Superiors
Information in Common with
Bureaucrat

Principal
FEMA/Federal
Government
State
Emergency
Management
Agency/State
Government
Local Elected
Officials

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Emergency management practices
Policy requirements of FEMA’s programs
(Stafford Disaster Act, NFIP)
Emergency management practices
Policy requirements of FEMA’s programs
(Stafford Disaster Act, NFIP)
Additional state emergency management
requirements
Local Community
Local Conditions (present and past
disasters)
Local politics

Bureaucrat’s Specialized Knowledge
vis-à-vis their Principal
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Local Community
Local Conditions (present and past
disasters)
Local politics
Local Community
Local Conditions (present and past
disasters)
Local politics
Emergency management practices
Policy requirements of FEMA’s programs
(Stafford Disaster Act, NFIP)
Additional state emergency management
requirements

To measure differences in expertise, I used several types of data:
1. Interviews with bureaucrats, asking if they think of themselves as experts and what types
of expertise they bring to the table.
2. Education, training, and personal background of bureaucrats and local principals.
3. Reports written by local bureaucrats: information provided in reports (i.e. specific to the
locality, about emergency management, etc.) reflecting the expertise of writer.
4. Reports, guide books, manuals written by FEMA or state emergency management
agencies: information provided in reports reflecting the expertise of writer.
5. Types of information local bureaucrats provide when reporting at meetings for the local
elected officials.
When the measures of expertise do not match the principal, we can conclude that the
bureaucrats have expertise-based independence. This does not mean that they use it to act on
climate change adaptation, but it leaves open the possibility. These measures are meant to be
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completely separate of their actions on climate change adaptation to prevent the problem of
endogeneity.
A second measure of bureaucratic independence comes from structural independence.
Again, because local bureaucrats answer to three sets of principals at different levels of
government, structural independence is level-dependent. One measure of structural independence
is if the bureaucrat runs their own department or is a member of a separate department that is
mandated with running programs. If bureaucrats have autonomy over their own department or
program implementation, they have structural authority to make decisions separately from the
elected officials. For example, if the local bureaucrat is a department head or part of a separate
emergency management department where she can make her own decisions on implementation
or running a program, she has structural autonomy.
Structural independence also comes from fiscal independence. At the local level, fiscal
independence can be identified if they run their own budget. The data for this can be found in
local budgets. At the state and federal level, local bureaucrats can be said to have fiscal
independence if they can raise money at the local level through levies, fees, or taxes in sufficient
quantity to respond to disasters on their own. Data for this measure come from measures of local
fiscal independence and the number of grants received for disaster management.
A third measure of independence comes from who holds hiring and firing power. For all
the cases, only the local principals will have hiring and firing power. While this does not vary
when we are discussing local principals for each case, there is variation when comparing a
situation with a local principal to one with a state- or federal-principal. Thus, this measure
provides a useful distinction for those comparisons.
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The fourth and final type of independence comes from bureaucrats exercising discretion
in their work. While bureaucrats can exercise discretion often during their work (Lin, 2000;
O'Leary, 2006; Lipsky, 2010), we get a sense of their opportunity to do so by looking at the
programs and policies they implement and what extent of influence they have in writing planning
documents or dealing with citizens. Data for this measure come from interviews, bureaucrats’
job descriptions (often found on government websites and local ordinances), and planning
documents.
2.5 Problem Definition Agreement
As Rochefort and Cobb (1994), and Stone (2002) show, defining problems involves
several elements and disagreement can arise for each dimensions of the problem definition22.
First, policymakers can disagree if climate change is the reason why the local government needs
to adapt their flood or drought management policy to respond to changing conditions. In other
words, is climate change the cause – or at least one important cause – for their need to adapt?
Second, there can be disagreement about whether the local government can address or
should address climate adaptation. In other words, is the local government the correct scale for
action? While disaster management has historically been the purview of local government, the
growing role of state and federal governments in providing grants has increased their influence
over the shape of local policy (Birkland & Waterman, 2008). As a response, local governments
increasingly rely on the federal and state governments to respond to new threats. Local
governments might hesitate to take on climate change because it is framed as a global problem

Rochefort and Cobb’s problem definition concept is used throughout this project as the basis for the problem
definition measure. It can also be understood as issue definition or problem definition. I use the term problem
definition to refer to Rochefort and Cobb’s concept which highlights several dimensions including temporal
proximity, geographic proximity, problem cause, severity, and who is responsible for fixing the problem.
22
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requiring global solutions. Although this rhetoric largely surrounds questions of mitigation,
adaptation is increasingly part of the global conversation through the United Nations Climate
Adaptation Fund for developing nations and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) Second Working Group which focuses on adaptation. Therefore, the question concerning
who should respond is unsettled and grounds for disagreement.
Third, disagreement can arise around the issue of proximity. As Rochefort and Cobb
(1994) show proximity refers both to geographic proximity and temporal proximity. These
dimensions of problem definition answer the questions: Is climate change going to make natural
disasters worse here (within the local government’s jurisdiction) as opposed to elsewhere? Is
climate change going to be an issue now or in the near future as opposed to a long time from
now?23
Fourth, there can be disagreement on the question of problem severity. This asks: Is
climate change going to be a severe problem or a mild one? The case selection strategy controls
for the predicted level of severity, but objective severity does not necessarily match subjective
judgments of severity. As problem definitions are more a matter of perception, then it is possible
that even within places at high risk of climate related flooding or drought that there would be
disagreement on this dimension.
To measure problem definition, I use statements made by policymakers – bureaucrats and
elected politicians – about climate change. For bureaucrats, this largely comes from interviews
and meeting minutes; for their principals, I use statements from media coverage, meeting

23

It is important to notes that answers to these questions are political as well as empirical. Political, social, and
economic motivations shape how information is received and process by political actors (Jones B. D., 1994)
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minutes, press releases, and reports.24 As opinions about scale, proximity and severity all rely on
agreeing that climate change requires adaptation, that question must be answered first. If the
individual or organization expressed that climate change requires adaptation, then questions
about scale, geographic proximity, temporal proximity and severity were asked. If, however, the
individual or organization expresses that climate change is not happening or will not require
adaptation, then we would not expect them to make further statements about other dimensions of
the problem definition. The flow chart (Figure 3, below) was used to identify the elements of
Figure 3: Problem Definition Agreement for Climate Change Adaptation FlowChart
Identifying climate change as a
cause for the need to adapt

No

STOP

Yes

Step 1

Step 2

Scale

Geographic Proximity

Temporal Proximity

Severity

problem definition.

Then, a measure of problem definition agreement was constructed between the bureaucrat
and their principal. Agreement is measured on five dimensions: (1) climate change is the reason
why local flood or drought policy should be changed, (2) the local government is the right scale

24

Ideally, interviews would have been conducted with all elected officials. However, many did not respond to
interview requests. Of those that did, most pointed the researcher to speak with the local bureaucrats who managed
flooding and drought policy instead of completing an interview themselves. This is a limitation, but it also speaks to
the dominance local bureaucrats have over these policy areas. Other data sources like meeting minutes and news
coverage supplemented the missing data interviews would have provided for this measure.
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for adapting to climate change, (3) climate change is geographically proximate, (4) climate
change is temporally proximate, and (5) climate change will be severe. For each element,
agreement received a score of 1 and disagreement received a score of -1. When there was not
opinion (from a bureaucrat or elected official), disagreement was assumed because when
someone does not have an opinion, they likely require persuasion (like someone who disagrees
with you).
2.6 Bureaucratic Action
Measuring bureaucratic action was achieved through interviews with bureaucrats, and
when possible, the results were confirmed with meeting minutes, planning documents, and media
reports. (If bureaucrats are acting in a non-confrontational manner, it is unlikely their actions
would be reflected in media coverage, meeting minutes or official documents.)
In order to determine bureaucratic action, the following types of questions were asked of
interview subjects after they acknowledged that climate change is a problem they will need to
address. The questions were:
1. Did you discuss climate change when crafting planning documents, like emergency
management plans, land use plans, comprehensive plans, etc.?
a. If so, why?
b. Who introduced the idea?
2. Do you think the policies need to be changed?
3. Are you working with others to address climate change?
4. Did you introduce the idea of climate change adaptation onto the agenda?
These questions were used to guide analysis of meeting minutes and media reports.
Distinguishing between the different types of action presented in Chapter 1 was based on this
series of coding questions shown in Figure 4 (below).
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Figure 4: Type of Bureaucratic Behavior Flow Chart
1. Did the bureaucrat work
with her superior?

Yes

No

2. Did the bureaucrat introduce the
idea of climate change action?

Yes
Cooperative
Action

3. Did the superior say not to act
to address climate change?

No

Yes

No

Politician-Led
Action

Defiant
Behavior

NonConfrontational
Behavior

3. Data Collection
Data for this project came from three types of sources: (a) interviews with local
bureaucrats and other players in the policymaking community, (b) government documents, and
(c) media articles.
3.1 Interviews
Selecting interview participants for each community began by identifying a list of local
bureaucrats whose work was related to flood or drought management, as shown on local
government websites. These individuals were contacted by either email or telephone asking for
an interview on local flood or drought management practices and policies. (Copies of Internal
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Review Board approved emails and phone scripts are in Appendix C.) By framing the interview
requests broadly – flood and drought management policy instead of climate change adaptation
affecting flood and drought management policy – I avoided priming the respondents to think
about or talk about climate change if they would not have otherwise. Furthermore, it allowed me
to speak to people who might have otherwise refused the request because climate change is a
taboo subject in their state.
Often, the first people contacted in a locality would redirect me to someone else who
knew more about the policy or was more involved in implementing the policy.25 Anyone who did
not reply to the first request for an interview was contacted again, but no more than three
additional times.
Interviews lasted an average of 44 minutes and ranged from the shortest interview at 12
minutes to the longest lasting one hour and 14 minutes. The length of interview varied based on
how much information the interviewee wanted to share and how developed the local climate
adaptation policy was. Interviews were semi-structured and covered the following topics:
describing (a) the subject’s work for the local government, (b) existing flood or drought
management policy, (c) bureaucratic autonomy and expertise in the local government, (d)
challenges for flood and drought management success, (e) the local governments’ (and the
bureaucrats’) relationship with local elected officials, state-level government, and the federal
government, and (f) attitudes about the issue of climate change. Climate change was left as a last
topic unless the interviewee brought up the issue independently of the researcher’s questions.
This was meant to allow participants to identify climate change without prompting. Furthermore,
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This is the primary reason many elected officials refused interview requests when a reason was provided to the
researcher.
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interviewees who identified climate change independently demonstrated that the issue is higher
on their personal agenda than interview subjects that had to be prompted.
Interviews were transcribed verbatim using TranscriberPro software. All except one
interview was recorded using an audio recording device. For one interview where audio
recording was not used at the request of the interviewee, I took extensive notes which were typed
for use in analysis. Any section containing a personal story, like a story about family members or
personal vacations, was removed. Additionally, any interviewee who requested to make their
comments confidentially had personal references removed to protect their identity, including
names and job titles.26
3.2 Government Documents
All local governments studied in this project had online data and document repositories
which included meeting minutes, planning documents, and budgets. For each case, as many
documents and webpages as possible that related to flood or drought management or the
bureaucrats of interest were collected. This process was intended to collect more documents than
would eventually be used in analysis in order to avoid missing anything relevant to climate
adaptation, flood management, or drought management.
I used the following process to identify and collect documents. First, all meeting minutes
for the local elected council from 2010 to 2016 were downloaded, and when possible additional
meetings from years before 2010 were obtained. Not all local governments had this entire time
period available in digital form, so I contacted the local government to have the files sent to me.
As climate adaptation in local U.S. governments is a relatively new issue, missing documents

26

The interview protocol was developed, tested, and refined through three test cases: Troy, New York, Manchester,
Vermont, and Pittsburgh, Massachusetts. These interviews were conducted in the fall and spring of 2014 and 2015.
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from before 2010 was not seen as an obstacle for thorough data collection. Even large, climatefriendly local governments had not begun to plan for climate change adaptation until the late
2000s. Climate adaptation pioneers Chicago, Illinois published their plan in 2008, King County,
Washington (Seattle-Tacoma) published their plan in 2009, and New York City, New York
created their climate adaptation plan in 2013 (C2ES, 2015; Georgetown Climate Center, 2015).
Second, all local planning documents were downloaded. These include land use plans,
comprehensive plans, economic plans, and emergency management plans. Often, local
government websites have a section devoted to planning documents. However, when this did not
exist, I looked for links to planning documents on the webpages for each department. When
available, old and new versions of planning documents were obtained. When planning
documents were not available electronically, I requested them from the local government records
office. Third, I downloaded all local budgets available from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2016.
Like meeting minutes, budgets for this time period were not always available. Therefore, budgets
from at least 2010 to 2016 were downloaded. Fourth, I downloaded the local laws of each city or
county. Often called “Codes of Ordinances” or “Municipal Codes,” these were sometimes
managed by the local government, but many were managed by a third-party organization called
Municode.
Fifth, I created PDF versions of any webpage related to flooding or drought, climate
change, or any of the bureaucrats of interest. When there was no profile for a bureaucrat
available on the website, I looked for one from LinkedIn.com, a professional social media
website where members post resumes which include employment and educational background.
Sixth and finally, if a website had a search function, I used it to find documents with the key
terms “flood,” “drought,” or “climate.” Any new documents identified in this fashion were also
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downloaded. If a local government had something like a newsletter that was identified through
this search, I then downloaded any available version of the newsletter from 2000 to 2016.
3.3 Media Articles
While interviews and government documents provide good data to test the hypotheses
presented here, both sources originate from the local government. Therefore, using local media
coverage provides an important perspective which covers community attitudes and responses to
local government actions and does not reflect government bias. However, the declining number
of local newspapers and resources for the local papers that have persisted makes it difficult to
find thorough coverage of local governments (Farhl, 2014). Thus, media coverage will be used to
confirm or add to findings from interviews and government documents but does not represent a
strong enough data source on its own.
Media articles were collected using the Access World News Database. First, I identified
which publications covered the local community. Articles were identified for collection by
searching for climate, or flood, or drought. Before downloading the article, I checked for false
positives like “business climate,” or “a flood of responses.” Often one news media organization
covers an entire county, so some publications were used for multiple cases. However, when this
was the case, searches included the name of the local jurisdiction to make sure articles were
appropriate for each community.
4. Qualitative Content Analysis: Computer-Guided and Manual Coding
Qualitative content analysis (QCA) was the coding strategy used to measure each of the
six variables. According to Margrit Schreier and Phillip Mayring – two prominent methods
scholars – QCA allows the researcher to deal with a high quantity of qualitative data in a way
that does not lose sight of the information contained and its context (Mayring, 2000; Schreier,
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2014). While not specified in George and Bennett’s description of structured-focused
comparisons, QCA provides an excellent approach for making sense of the large quantity of data
for each case. Schreier (2014) presents a series of eight steps which complement the steps
presented by George and Bennett (2005). Steps 1 and 2 instruct the researcher to determine
research questions and select material (described above). In step 3, the researcher builds a coding
frame or a codebook. For step 4, the material is segmented. This is the process of choosing which
portions of the data to focus on for analysis. In step 5, the codebook is tested on a small segment
of the data. The sixth step is when the codebook is revised. Then during the seventh step, the
data are analyzed in their entirety. Below I describe how the codebook was developed and
refined (steps 3, 5, 6 and 7) and how the documents are curated for manual coding (step 4). Step
8 is the presentation of findings.
4.1 Developing the Codebook
This project relies predominantly on a deductive coding scheme. Decisions about coding
were made prior to analysis and are driven by the theory presented in Chapter 1. The codebook is
presented in Appendix B. However, I acknowledge that the complexities of social reality are
difficult to anticipate or fully describe. To accommodate this, the codebook was tested and
subsequently refined. The test was performed on a subset of the data: Pasquotank County, North
Carolina; the City of Elizabeth City, North Carolina; and Martin County, Florida. These three
cases represent both counties and a city in two states in order to capture as much variety as could
be anticipated for testing the codebook.
After the codebook was finalized, data for all cases were analyzed including the three
cases used to test the codebook. Repeating the analysis on these cases serves two purposes: (1) it
allows for conformity in coding across cases, especially as it regards any changes made to the
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codebook during testing, and (2) it tests for reliability. Recoding yielded highly similar results
with no substantive interpretation changes. For instance, when recoding one county, problem
definition agreement between the elected officials and bureaucrats was measured at an eight
during the first code but a 7 on the second code. This did not change the substantive
interpretation of the result.
4.2 Curating Documents for Manual Coding
The data collection strategy employed in this project purposefully over-collected
documents to build the cases. By collecting more documents than might apply, it minimizes the
likelihood that a discussion about climate change adaptation – however minute – is missed.
However, this requires that the extraneous documents are sorted out. To achieve this, I use
computer-assisted coding through Atlas.ti27 to identify documents with key words or phrases that
relate to the variables of interest (see Chapter 2, Section 2; search strings listed in Appendix A).
Any document not containing one of the search terms related to climate change adaptation,
flooding, drought, and the bureaucrats of interest were not analyzed.
Once the quantity of documents was pared down, manual coding was used to determine
specific measures. The manual coding is guided by the codebook (see Appendix B) When
questions arose concerning the coding decision, the decision was made conservatively (i.e. in a
way that would underestimate theorized effects). For instance, when coding for bureaucratic
autonomy, the coding decision was made for less expertise.

27

Atlas.ti is a computer program that allows researchers to automatically and manually code qualitative data
including written documents, pictures, audio files, and video.
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5. Limits to Generalizability
The 18 cases included in this study are not intended to be representative of all local
governments. There are limits to the generalizability of the findings from this study that I
acknowledge. First, the findings do not apply equally to bureaucrats in all local governments.
The choice to focus on small-to-medium-sized localities was an intentional one because the
dynamics of a smaller municipality do not match those of a mega-city like New York City or Los
Angeles or a very small community. Many other researchers focus on dynamics in large cities
(for examples see Bhullar, 2013 (Singapore); Gremillion, 2011 (large U.S. cities); Zimmerman &
Faris, 2011 (large U.S. cities)) and these are important studies. However, the effects of climate
change are being felt and will be felt by smaller communities with smaller populations and fewer
government resources. Local bureaucrats are likely to play a larger policy-shaping role in a small
or medium sized government than one that serves a population of millions of residents with
professionalized elected officials who have their own advisory staffs. Conversely, these results
should not be applied to bureaucrats in very small localities. Bureaucrats in these communities
often take on many jobs and do not have the same types of expertise or amount of resources that
those studied here do. Additionally, as described above in justifying the size cut-off for choosing
cases, smaller communities often do not provide the services studied here like drought
management or flood control. Instead, these are contracted out to larger governments with the
resources to address these concerns.28

28

Unfortunately, scholars do not often devote time studying very small governments (i.e. communities with fewer
than 10,000 residents). This represents a gap in our understanding of local government behavior, although the
importance of filling it is up for discussion. Small communities might provide interesting cases for understanding
the social world, but often they provide few services and rely on contractors and collaboration with other (larger)
governments to provide services (see articles on the “Hollow State” including Milward and Provan (2000) and Terry
(2005)).

55

Second, these findings do not apply to communities with no climate change-related
threats. With the progression of climate change and the wide-ranging predicted impacts, this is
admittedly a very small group of localities.
However, I argue that there are important lessons which can be derived from this study to
apply beyond the case of climate change adaptation to other issues where local governments face
growing on-the-ground problems but state and the federal government are stymied from acting
due to political disagreement and polarization. Similar issues might include vaccinations, natural
gas extraction (fracking), school vouchers, and rights for transgender individuals. In all of these
policy areas, local officials are dealing with implementing policies and navigating these
problems while state and federal politicians disagree about how the policies should be shaped,
what the role of the government should be, and if the problems are even real.
Third, the findings should be limited to local governments in federalized systems. The
division of labor, expertise, and funding is central to the theory and findings presented here.
Similarly, political systems without a professionalized bureaucracy are not sufficiently similar to
warrant generalization of these findings.
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CHAPTER 3: DO LOCAL BUREAUCRATS SHAPE LOCAL CLIMATE ADAPTATION PLANNING?
In order to answer the question, “How do local bureaucrats shape local climate adaptation
planning?” we must first establish if they do. This essentially is a question of local bureaucrats’
agenda-setting power. As this chapter will show, local bureaucrats are not the only players in
local policymaking circles who bring climate adaptation onto the local agenda. Like state,
national, and international policy agendas, a wide range of actors work to put issues onto the
agenda (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Mortensen & Seeberg, 2016) and work
to prevent issues from reaching the decision agenda (Cobb & Ross, 1997). However, bureaucrats
occupy a key space in local policymaking – they fulfill the roles of policy implementer as well as
policy advisor to local elected officials (much like staff for members of congress or governors).
In their role as advisors, local bureaucrats provide elected officials with (a) policies for approval
(b) suggestions about how policies should be crafted to meet requirements from superior
governments or legal requirements, (c) research and data germane to policy decisions, and (d)
information about issues that are not typically the concern of local citizens or the local media.
Access to local politicians and influence over the agenda puts local bureaucrats in a key position
to shape the agenda and consequently influence policy.
In this chapter, I look at several ways to answer the question: Do bureaucrats shape the
local agenda on climate change adaptation? To begin, I look to see if bureaucrats bring the issue
of climate adaptation onto the local agenda first. Answering this “first mover” question addresses
if bureaucrats are creating interest in adaptation by introducing the issue; if they do not introduce
the issue it indicates that they are likely responding to a pre-existing concern in the community.
However, a single mention is not enough to claim that climate adaptation is part of an ongoing
conversation at the local level. Therefore, I also look to see if local bureaucrats are responsible
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for increasing attention to the issue beyond a single mention. Here, I operationalize this by
determining if climate was discussed by at least two individuals on two separate occasions within
a 30-day period.29 Identifying multiple mentions attests to the rising salience of the issues being
addressed. If only one person is discussing climate adaptation, and there are no responses to
those statements, the issue has not been fully integrated into the local agenda. Policy agenda
scholars from Downs’ issue attention cycle (1972) to Baumgartner and Jones’ punctuated
equilibrium (2009) have paid considerable attention to how issue rise and fall in prominence on
the agenda. However, I am not aware of any scholars who examined the first mentions of issues
– especially issues like climate adaptation – that have not risen to a point where they dominate
attention. For the purposes of this project, differentiating between a simple mention and multiple
mentions is sufficient. Climate adaptation remains a low salience issue in most local
governments.
Next, I examine where local bureaucrats discuss climate adaptation because local agendas
are multifaceted – comprised of public meetings with elected officials, meetings among
government officials without public participation, and discussions between government actors.30
In these different settings, I look to see where local bureaucrats discuss climate adaptation and I
connect these spaces to bureaucrats’ institutional power and the control they can exert. In the
order they appear in this chapter, I examine: public meetings with elected officials (section 2),
policy documents written by local bureaucrats31 (section 3), conversations or research efforts

29

A month was chosen to allow for the variation in meeting schedules and activity levels of different jurisdictions.
Jurisdictions that meet biweekly would then be discussing an issue at two back-to-back meetings in order to qualify.
Any longer period might miss-measure jurisdictions that meet at a more frequent interval, like weekly meetings. For
a more detailed discussion of methods, see Chapter 2 and the Appendix B: Codebook.
30
Includes conversations between (a) an elected official and an elected official, (b) an elected official and a
bureaucrat, and (c) between bureaucrats.
31
As a reflection of meetings among government officials without public participation.
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initiated by elected officials where bureaucrats complete the research and fill in the details
(section 4), and conversations between bureaucrats and other members of local government
(section 5).
I find that bureaucrats are not always the first or the only actors in local governments to
bring climate adaptation onto the local agenda. However, they are the actors in local government
who develop climate adaptation ideas into concrete (actionable) policies by (a) including climate
adaptation in policy documents they write, (b) following-up on elected officials’ suggestions to
consider climate adaptation solutions, and (c) bringing up the issue in conversations with
coworkers. I do not find much evidence in my cases that local bureaucrats use public meetings to
discuss climate adaptation. Consequently, there is support for hypothesis 1: Front-line local
bureaucrats are more likely than elected officials to introduce climate adaptation into the local
agenda, although elected officials are still important players in this process.
This chapter also addresses hypothesis 2: Bureaucrats with a special area of focus – i.e.
water managers, floodplain managers, etc. – are more likely than general-focus bureaucrats –
i.e. city managers – to suggest integrating climate adaptation into existing policy areas. In order
to discuss differences between general-focus bureaucrats and specific-focus bureaucrats, all of
the bureaucrats discussed in this chapter are listed in Table 7: Special- or General-Focus
Bureaucrats.32 Hypothesis 2 is supported because there are many more special-focus bureaucrats
working on integrating climate adaptation into local policies. Their positions include: planners,
emergency managers, floodplain managers, water (and irrigation) managers, engineers, and
public works and utilities specialists. This indicates that climate adaptation is less of a political
issue in many of these localities and more of a technical challenge for the local government to

32

For more information about the coding system used, see the Codebook, Appendix B.
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address. This distance from the polarized and partisan nature of climate change politics helps to
explain why climate adaptation is being considered in many conservative areas of the country
represented in these cases. However, it is not the only explanation because, as cases from North
Carolina will show, the polarized nature of climate change politics does impact local government
actions in some areas.
1. Agenda-Setters
In this section, I look generally at who introduces the issue of climate adaptation onto the
agenda in the local community. First, I look at the individual who initially mentions climate
adaptation. Second, I look at who is involved in increasing climate adaptation’s salience by
discussing the issue beyond the first mention.
1.1 Do Local Bureaucrats Introduce Climate Adaptation onto the Agenda?
As Table 4: First on the Agenda shows, local bureaucrats do introduce the issue of
climate adaptation onto the agenda first. In half of the cases in this study (9 of 18), a local
bureaucrat is responsible for the first mention of climate adaptation on the local agenda.33
Comparatively, in only one of the 18 did cases local citizens bring the issue onto the agenda first
and in five of the 18 cases elected officials brought climate adaptation onto the agenda first.34

33

In three cases climate adaptation was not on the agenda: The City of Greer, SC, the City of Mauldin, SC, and
Oconee County, SC.
34
Count does not include the City of Havelock, NC where local citizens and local elected officials advised in the
creation of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan but were not responsible for drafting portions.
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Table 4: First on the Agenda

Florida

North Carolina

State

Case

First on the Agenda

Identity of Individual(s)

Position of
Individual(s)

Craven
County

November 19, 2007
Board of
Commissioners
Meeting

County Commissioner M. Renée Sisk

Local Elected
Official

City of
Elizabeth
City

May 12, 2008 City
Council Meeting

Councilwoman L. Anita Hummer

Local Elected
Official

City of
Havelock

June 15, 2009
Comprehensive Land
Use Plan

Written by Planning Director Scott Chase,
Consultants Matt Noonkester and Erin
Musiol, with comments and guidance
from the Board of Commissioners and
Citizen Advisory Committee

Local
Bureaucrat with
guidance from
Local Elected
Officials and
Local Citizens

City of
New Bern

December 13, 2011
Board of Aldermen
Meeting

Mike Avery, Director of Planning &
Inspections

Local
Bureaucrat

Pasquotank
County

February 21, 2011
Board of
Commissioners
Meeting

Board of Commissioners Chairman Lloyd
Griffin

Local Elected
Official

City of Fort
Pierce

Not on the public
agenda; mentioned as a
concern in interview
January 29, 2016

Marc Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat762

Local
Bureaucrats

Martin
County

November 2013 in the
Comprehensive
Emergency
Management Plan

Written by the Emergency Management
Department with input from all Martin
County Departments, Martin County
Constitutional Offices, the Martin County
School Board, County municipalities and
quasi- and non-governmental agencies
involved in emergency preparedness

Local
Bureaucrats

St. Lucie
County

March 2010 in the
Local Mitigation
Strategy

St. Lucie County Grants / Disaster
Recovery Department

Local
Bureaucrats
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Table 4: First on the Agenda

Washington

South
Carolina

Nevada

State

Case

First on the Agenda

Identity of Individual(s)

Position of
Individual(s)

Carson City

February 15, 2006
Board of Supervisors
Meeting

Supervisor Pete Livermore

Local Elected
Officials

City of
Fernley

August 2014
University of Nevada
Reno Water for the
Seasons

Dr. Maureen McCarthy (Project Director),
and team of academics and hydrologists

Local Citizens

Greenville
County

January 2015
Greenville County
Multi-Jurisdictional
Hazard Mitigation Plan

Greenville County Floodplain
Administrator Robert Hall; Greenville
County Codes Enforcement Teresa Barber
and representatives of city governments

Local
Bureaucrats

Grant
County

May 2, 2007 in “Area
water managers
respond to declining
snowpack concern” in
the Moses Lake
Columbia Basin Herald

General manager for the Grant County
Public Utilities District Tim Culbertson;
East Columbia Basin Irrigation District
Manager Dick Erickson

Local
Bureaucrats

Kittitas
County

October 2012 Kittitas
County Hazard
Mitigation Plan

Christina Wollman, Hazard Mitigation
Plan Project Manager; Kirk Holmes,
Public Works Director; Jason Eklund,
Information Services; Fred Slyfield,
Emergency Management Specialist; Joe
Gilbert, Public Health; and Tetra Tech
Engineering and Architecture Services

Local
Bureaucrats and
Local
Consultants

City of
Yakima

June 2011 City of
Yakima Water System
Report

Thomas E. Coleman, P.E. Consulting
Services; David Brown Water/Irrigation
Manager

Local
Bureaucrats and
Local
Consultants

Yakima
County

December 29, 2009
“County
commissioners approve
of Yakima basin water
plan” in the Yakima
Herald-Republic

Yakima, Kittitas and Benton County
Commissioners

Local Elected
Officials

Note: The following cases did not have climate adaptation on the agenda: the City of Greer, SC, the City of Mauldin, SC, and
Oconee County, SC.
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Local bureaucrats were not the only actors who introduced climate adaptation on the local
agenda. However, in half of the 18 cases, local bureaucrats introduced the issue first.
1.2 Do Local Bureaucrats Increase the Salience of Climate Adaptation on the Agenda?
When looking at which actors worked to raise the salience of climate adaptation on the
local agenda, the story looks somewhat different. As shown in Table 5, climate adaptation rose
on the agenda in only seven cases, indicating that in most areas adaptation is only discussed
occasionally. Of those seven cases, four had bureaucrats involved in raising the salience of the
issue on the agenda: Pasquotank County, NC, Martin County, FL, Greenville County, SC, and
Kittitas County, WA. Comparatively, in four cases local citizens increased the issue’s salience
(Elizabeth City, NC, Pasquotank County, NC, St. Lucie County, FL, and Carson City, NV) and
local elected officials increased the issue’s salience in two cases (Elizabeth City, NC and Kittitas
County, WA).35
These counts give us a rough picture of the role that bureaucrats play in introducing the
issue of climate adaptation onto the local agenda. However, it is an imperfect picture because the
numbers do not illuminate the methods chosen to introduce the issue of climate adaptation or the
potential impacts of that choice. In the next sections, I examine four different pathways
bureaucrats use to introduce or shape discussions and policymaking for climate change
adaptation in their local governments.

35

To be described as rising on the agenda, climate adaptation needed at least two mentions from two different
individuals. For many cases, these two people were not in the same category (elected official, bureaucrat, or citizen).
Therefore, the total number does not add up to seven.
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Table 5: Climate Adaptation Rising on the Agenda

State

Case

North Carolina

City of
Elizabeth
City

Dates of Two Mentions of Climate
Adaptation

Identity of
Individual(s) who
Discussed Climate
Adaptation

Position of
Individual(s)

January 25, 2016 City Council Work
Session Minutes

UNC College Students

Local Citizens

January 29, 2016 City Manager’s FYI

City Manager Richard
Olson

Local
Bureaucrats

November 16, 2015 Board of
Commissioners Meeting

UNC Students presenting
report on sea level rise

Local Citizens

December 7, 2015 Board of
Commissioners Meeting

Floodplain Manager
Shelley Cox

Local
Bureaucrat

No two mentions are within a month;
however the interviews indicated that
there was an ongoing effort by
bureaucrats to craft a climate change
adaptation strategy that is at its
formative stages

Anne Murray

Local
Bureaucrat

Kathy Fitzpatrick

Local
Bureaucrat

Deborah Drum

Local
Bureaucrat

October 1, 2013 Board of County
Commissioners Meeting

Richard Sylvestri,
Stockard Holand

Local Citizens

October 15, 2013 Board of County
Commissioners Meeting

Richard Sylvestri, David
Luke, Jerry Beekler, Rick
Modine, Howard Fine

Local Citizens

February 7, 2008 Carson City Board of
Supervisors Meeting

Nevada Division of
Forestry Fire Management
Officer Michael Klug

State
Bureaucrat

February 16, 2008 “The time is now to
begin thinking about Nevada’s water
future” in the Carson City Nevada
Appeal

Fred Kessler, general
contractor

Local Citizen

Pasquotank
County

Florida

Martin
County

Nevada

St. Lucie
County

Carson City
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Table 5: Climate Adaptation Rising on the Agenda

Washington

South
Carolina

State

Identity of
Individual(s) who
Discussed Climate
Adaptation

Position of
Individual(s)

Paula Gucker

Local
Bureaucrat

James Bishop

Local
Bureaucrat

May 18, 2015 “Basinwide water plan
aims for long-range solution” in the
Ellensburg Daily Record

Urban Eberhart Kittitas
Reclamation Board
Director (also participant
in the Yakima Integrated
Plan)

Local
Bureaucrat

April 11, 2015 “Residents, county at
odds over Lake Kachess reservoir” in
the Ellensburg Daily Record

Gary Berndt County
Commissioner

Local Elected
Official

Case

Dates of Two Mentions of Climate
Adaptation

Greenville
County

Low salience on a public agenda;
interviews indicate that it is an ongoing
conversation among bureaucrats in
hazard mitigation

Kittitas
County

Note: The following cases did not have climate adaptation on the agenda: The City of Greer, SC, the City of Mauldin, SC,
and Oconee County SC. The following cases had climate change on the agenda, but it was discussed infrequently enough that
it was deemed to be low salience: Craven County, NC, the City of Havelock, NC, the City of New Bern, NC, the City of Fort
Pierce, FL, the City of Fernley, NV, Grant County, WA, the City of Yakima, WA, and Yakima County, WA.

2. Introduce Climate Adaptation during a Public Meeting
The most direct (and public) way that an issue can be introduced onto the local agenda is
to mention it during a public meeting. In council-manager or council-administrator forms of
government, the agendas for these meetings are set by the council members and the local
manager or administrator. The issues considered are often determined by current events but are
also influenced by what local bureaucrats bring to the attention of a council member or the local
manager.
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There is evidence from the cases in this study that bureaucrats introduce issues directly
onto the agenda. In three cases, bureaucrats independently brought up climate adaptation during
public meetings:36 New Bern, NC, Pasquotank County, NC and Elizabeth City, NC.
In New Bern, NC, climate adaptation never reached the agenda beyond one mention.
However, the first-time climate adaptation was addressed – and the only time it was mentioned
in a public meeting or other official documentation – was on December 13, 2011 when Planning
and Inspections Director Mike Avery discussed a program run by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to address community
resilience planning. The meeting minutes state:
“…the city has been selected to participate in the EPA/FEMA Community
Resilience Planning in a Coastal North Carolina technical assistance program.
This will help the city use the best data to determine how climate change might
impact local land use and infrastructure investments and to develop strategies that
reduce vulnerability to known hazards, build long-term community resilience, and
provide economic, environmental, and social benefits.” (Board of Aldermen
Meeting, December 13, 2011)
There appears to be no follow up on this by the elected officials and no comments from
community groups or members. The only other times climate adaptation enters the local agenda
are in the local newspaper37 and when a University of North Carolina graduate course capstone
project was presented.38
In Pasquotank County, NC, local Floodplain Manager Shelley Cox brought up climate
change in a discussion of floodplain maps with elected officials (County Commissioners Joe

36

Local bureaucrats are present at local public meetings to provide information either on specific agenda issues or to
be available in case a topic arises they can speak to. If a local bureaucrat is only responding to someone else
discussing climate adaptation, they were not considered to be introducing the issue.
37
“Commentary: Reform national disaster policy before the next storm strikes” in the Sun Journal August 25, 2014;
“Letter: Climate change and the Clean Power Plan” in the Sun Journal June 2, 2015
38
“New Bern Stormwater Management: An Integrated Low-Impact Design Approach” capstone for ENST 698 at
UNC Institute for the Environment, Spring 2013.
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Winslow and Bettie Parker) on December 7, 2015. The discussion was mostly about how new
floodplain maps issued by FEMA would impact flood insurance premiums in the community.
The meeting minutes state:
“[Shelley Cox] said the state believes that these maps are more accurate than we
had before. She said she and other planners throughout the region have some
concerns that these maps may take the reductions too far. She added that these
maps do not take climate change or sea level rise into consideration. They are just
storm modeling from hurricanes. … Ms. Cox said her concern is residents
dropping flood insurance and then being flooded. She said hopefully people will
see this as an opportunity to reduce their flood insurance policies and not
completely eliminate them. … She is a little disappointed because she feels the
maps do not accurately reflect some of the areas that she feels there could be
flooding.” (Board of Commissioners meeting, December 7, 2015)
In addition to introducing the issue themselves, local bureaucrats can organize to have
others present information to the elected officials at a public meeting. While the local bureaucrat
is not speaking herself, she is using her position to make space for a message to be delivered.
This happened in Elizabeth City, NC at the City Council’s January 25, 2016 work session when
City Manager Richard Olson brought a group of University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
students to present their capstone project on the likely impacts of climate change on sea level rise
and flooding in the area.39 The meeting minutes state:
“Mayor Peel recognized Mr. Olson for an overview of this matter. Mr. Olson
reported that present for the meeting were some of the members of a team from
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He advised that the team had
performed an assessment of the vulnerability to sea level rise in Pasquotank
County and had recommended a number of mitigation strategies to combat the
issue. … He noted that the presentation had been given to the Board of County
Commissioners in November 2015; and based on that report, City staff felt it

39

A similar presentation occurred at the Pasquotank County Board of Commissioners meeting on November 15,
2016. However, the county’s meeting minutes are not clear how the issue entered the agenda (e.g., at the request of a
commissioner or a local bureaucrat).
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would be appropriate to provide the information to the City Council.” (City
Council Work Session, January 25, 2016)
Later in the same meeting, one of the elected officials – Councilwoman Jean Baker –
asked about the information from this presentation and asked if the city was going to follow-up
on the students’ recommendations. From the city manager’s response, it seems unlikely that he
will be heading any efforts to proactively address the issue because he emphasized existing
policies that address current flooding concerns. City Manager Olson did follow-up on the
presentation in a few weeks in his weekly memo to the elected officials on January 29, 2016.
However, he again did not present any long-term planning efforts to address climate adaptation,
only a focused effort on one development project.
“Additionally, and at Council’s suggestion, I have shared with GEI’s project
engineer details from the UNC Sea-Level Rise Study recently presented to the
City of Elizabeth City. The MGP site is one of several properties in the Knobbs
Creek area to be affected by potential sea level rise. In order to mitigate saturation
of the subject property and others nearby, I have suggested formation of a berm
along the northern border of the MGP site. GEI nor Pivotal have committed to
this suggested storm water management improvement.” (City Manager’s Weekly
FYI, January 29, 2016)
It is possible, then, that local bureaucrats will present information in public forums without
supporting further action on that issue – as Richard Olson’s actions indicate.
In only one case – New Bern, NC – a local bureaucrat introduced climate change
adaptation onto the formal agenda. The issue was discussed by local bureaucrats in two other
cases but was not introduced by the bureaucrats themselves: (1) in Pasquotank County, NC a
local bureaucrat discussed climate change but only in response to questions about a related topic
(floodplain maps), and (2) in Elizabeth City, NC the issue was on the public agenda without
support from the City Manager who facilitated the presentation.
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Bringing information about climate adaptation to local public meetings is done more
often by elected officials and citizens. In Craven County, NC, Elizabeth City, NC, Pasquotank
County, NC, St. Lucie County, FL, Martin County, FL, and Carson City, NV elected officials or
citizens discussed climate adaptation on 17 separate occasions. Considering that for each of the
18 cases in this study there are regular public meetings (weekly, bimonthly and monthly), there
are relatively few mentions of climate adaptation. Public meetings do seem to be more the realm
of elected officials and citizens for bringing up issues or topics of concern, and not where
bureaucrats discuss issues or shape the agenda. This might be one reason why local bureaucrats
are overlooked as important policymakers – their efforts are not as clearly documented or visible.
Meeting minutes show bureaucrats’ role as more supportive than leading the policy discussion.
However, as the next sections will show, bureaucrats are shaping local discussions about climate
change more ‘behind the scenes’ than at public meetings.
3. Bureaucrats Write Policy Language and Policy Documents
Local bureaucrats are often responsible for both drafting policy language or writing
planning documents, as well as researching what is required and recommended to be included in
these documents. In this way, they act like congressional aides by providing information for
council members to propose policies. This is especially true for complex policy documents like
hazard mitigation plans or floodplain documents which are required by FEMA for disaster
recovery and mitigation funds.
From my interviews and readings of local government documents, the adoption of hazard
mitigation plans or floodplain ordinances is often a response by the local elected officials to
incentives attached to these policies. For instance, when a local community adopts a hazard
mitigation plan, FEMA promises matching funds for the community in the aftermath of a
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disaster, plus extra funds for disaster mitigation projects designed to reduce damage from future
natural disasters (FEMA, 2017). Similarly, membership in the Community Rating System (CRS)
allows localities to offer discounted flood insurance to residents (FEMA, 2017). However, local
elected officials who want to participate in these programs do not craft documents. Interpreting
requirements from superior governments, researching, collecting data, and crafting language are
left to bureaucrats (and increasingly contractors hired by local governments to help write these
documents. See Peters, 1994; Peters & Pierre, 1998 for a discussion of the “hollowing out” of
government services). Local officials are consulted during the process and they approve or reject
the final project but are not directly involved in the creation of these documents. Thus, it is often
in local bureaucrats’ power to make decisions about if or how to address non-required elements
like the influence of climate change on the community and the need to adapt.
In seven cases – Havelock, NC, Martin County, FL, St. Lucie County, FL, Greenville
County, SC, Grant County, WA, Kittitas County, WA, and the City of Yakima, WA – the firsttime climate adaptation was on the formal agenda it was written into planning or policy
documents written by local bureaucrats. In an additional three cases – Carson City, NV,
Pasquotank County, NC, and Craven County, NC – climate adaptation was included in these
documents although it was not the first mention. As shown in Table 6: Planning Documents,
climate adaptation appears in a variety of documents written by bureaucrats including hazard
mitigation plans,40 land use plans, and a water system report.

40

Also called Local Mitigation Strategies (in Florida) and Emergency Management Plans (as in the case of Martin
County).
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Table 6: Planning Documents Written By Bureaucrats which Mention Climate
Adaptation
Case

Date

Type of Document

First Mention of
Adaptation

Havelock, NC

June 2009

Comprehensive Land Use Plan

Yes

Craven, NC

October 2009

Coastal Area Management Act Land Use
Plan

No

March 2010

Local Mitigation Strategy

Yes

October 2010

Comprehensive Plan: Coastal
Management Element

No

November 2010

Hazard Mitigation Plan

No

September 2015

Hazard Mitigation Plan Update

No

City of Yakima,
WA

June 2011

Water System Report

Yes

Kittitas County,
WA

October 2012

Hazard Mitigation Plan

Yes

November 2013

Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan

Yes

October 2015

Local Mitigation Strategy

No

Grant County, WA

December 2013

Hazard Mitigation Plan

Yes

Greenville County,
SC

January 2015

Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation
Plan

Yes

Pasquotank, NC

March 2015

Albemarle Regional Hazard Mitigation
Plan

No

St. Lucie County,
FL

Carson City, NV

Martin County, FL

3.1 Land Use Plans
Including sea level rise in a planning document can guide future land use decisions,
potentially prompting zoning or development decisions which discourage development in areas
at risk of flooding related to sea level rise or encouraging water smart development sensitive to
drought risk. The main strength of incorporating climate adaptation through land use planning is
that the document is written by bureaucrats and for bureaucrats to interpret during
implementation. This insulates climate adaptation from political debates which might otherwise
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prevent progress. There are three cases where climate adaptation was incorporated into land use
or comprehensive planning documents.
The first case where climate adaptation was incorporated is Havelock, NC. The city’s
Comprehensive Land Use Plan was finalized in June 200941 and is a 304-page document
outlining “long-term, sustainable growth in the community,” (p. 1-2). It was written by two
contracted consultants for land planning – Matt Noonkester and Erin Musiol – and local planning
director Scott Chase. The document was crafted with input from citizens and local elected
officials. It mentions sea level rise twice:
“The City of Havelock will continuously monitor the effects of sea level rise and
update land use plan policies as necessary to protect the city's public and private
properties from rising water levels. Annual report documenting the effects of sea
level rise; revisions to the land use plan based on the conclusions and
recommendations from this report.” (p. 278)
“The City of Havelock will support bulkheading on the mainland to protect its
shoreline areas from intruding water resulting from rising sea level. Number of
bulkheads constructed on the mainland to protect the shoreline since 1996.” (p.
279).
Nearby Craven County, NC also included climate adaptation in their land use plan. Their
Coastal Area Management Act Core Land Use Plan was finalized in October 2009, and like the
Havelock Plan was written by local bureaucrats working with contracted consultants. Holland
Consulting Planners worked with local bureaucrats in the Planning and Inspections Department
to craft the 258-page document. It includes four mentions of monitoring and preparing for sea
level rise, but does not plan for any specific actions:

41

Dates when the document was finalized are reported instead of dates when the documents were written because
crafting these documents takes many years.
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“Craven County will continuously monitor the effects of sea level rise and update
the land use plan policies as necessary to protect the county’s public and private
properties from rising water levels.” (p. 145)
“Craven County recognizes the uncertainties associated with sea level rise. The
rate of rise is difficult to predict. Thus, it is difficult to establish policies to deal
with the effects of sea level rise. Craven County supports cooperation with local,
state, and federal efforts to inform the public of the anticipated effects of sea level
rise.” (p. 154)
“Craven County will rely on the North Carolina Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Division of Coastal Management to monitor and regulate
development in areas susceptible to sea level rise and wetlands loss.” (p. 154)
“Craven County will support bulkheading to protect its shoreline areas from
intruding water resulting from rising sea level.” (p. 155).
No subsequent documents in Havelock or Craven County discuss climate change or sea level
rise. This could be due to the changing attitudes of the North Carolina legislature which became
more opposed to climate change action starting in 2012 (for a more detailed description of this
and state-local dynamics in North Carolina see Chapter 5, Section 3.1).
St. Lucie County’s (FL) Comprehensive Plan was written by the planning division led by
Planning and Development Services Director Leslie Olson and Planning Manager Bonnie
Landry and completed in October 2010; it also mentions the threat sea level rise poses to the
county in the Coastal Management Element section. It focuses on documenting and monitoring
sea level rise data as a basis for future actions:
“The County shall continue to monitor all credible climate change and sea level
rise data and what direct and potential effects this has on the coastal system
natural resources. Based on this data the County shall evaluate and update the
resource protection standards of the Land Development Code and this plan as
necessary.” (p. 5-17)
“Policy 5.2.1.6 - The County shall consider the most current and credible sea level
rise data when planning long term infrastructure and capital improvement
expenditures and land use amendments in areas less than 10 feet in elevation.” (p.
5-25)
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In St. Lucie County, climate change and sea level rise come up again and again including in the
county’s Local Mitigation Strategy (2010 and 2016 updates, discussed more with other hazard
mitigation plans below). It is clear that the Comprehensive Plan’s treatment of climate change
and sea level rise reflect local commitments, at least among the local bureaucrats.
3.2 Disaster Preparation and Mitigation Documents
Disaster preparation and mitigation documents are prepared by bureaucrats and
predominately used by bureaucrats, much like land use plans. While the literature faults these
documents as exercises in completing checklists rather than thoughtful hazard planning efforts
(Godschalk, 1999; Birkland T. A., 2009), I argue that because these documents are mostly used
by bureaucrats, the exercise is useful in raising awareness among bureaucrats about the threats
from climate change including flooding, drought, wildfires, and severe storms. By including
information about how climate change will impact disaster frequency and severity and how the
community can respond to these threats, hazard mitigation plans can encourage climate
adaptation driven by emergency managers. For instance, connecting climate change to
increasingly severe and more frequent floods can lead emergency managers to recommend flood
management strategies like preserving green space or turning lots into green space instead of
rebuilding structures after a flood (called Severe Repetitive Losses by FEMA (FEMA, 2015)).42
In the seven cases where climate adaptation is incorporated into hazard mitigation plans,
there is a range from plans that quickly mention climate change as a general threat to plans that
incorporate climate threats in every section and for every hazard the document addresses. The

42

FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants often provide the funds necessary to purchase lots that have been repeatedly
damaged by floods. The goal is to turn these lots into non-inhabited spaces to reduce the human and property losses
associated with flooding.
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extent to which climate adaptation is addressed in the plan reflects how committed the
bureaucrats are or how much pressure they faced to include climate adaptation in the plan.
Greenville County’s (SC) Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan, January 2015
Update contains a single paragraph referencing climate change’s impacts on the county:
“Greenville County acknowledges that climate change can have an impact on
hazards affecting the County. Over time, the County may experience more intense
rainfall events and droughts of longer duration. However, it is not anticipated that
climate change will have a significant impact during this planning cycle. Issues
regarding climate change will be considered again in the next planning cycle.” (p.
6-2)
Interviews with members of the county’s emergency management team indicate that they believe
climate change will be a larger part of their hazard mitigation efforts, but they had not done
enough research to include details in their most recent update to the hazard mitigation plan.43
“That is the next big thing that we've been told by a number of folks in some of
the other regulatory agencies, and by doing a lot of research, that climate change
will be the next thing that we have to deal with.” (Interview with Paula Gucker,
October 29, 2015)
“So it is better to plan for something [like climate change] and it not happen than
obviously not plan and it does. We need to address that. And again this whole
document is to try to help Greenville County citizens to be safer and more
prepared.” (Interview with Brian Bishop, November 9, 2015)
While Greenville County, SC barely mentioned climate change, the hazard mitigation
plan covering Pasquotank County, NC goes into more depth to address climate adaptation.
Pasquotank County is a member of the Albemarle Region in North Carolina’s northeast corner.
They joined with 24 other local governments to craft the Albemarle Regional Hazard Mitigation
Plan, published in March 2015. While the local bureaucrats in Pasquotank County were not the

43

Under FEMA rules, hazard mitigation plans need to be updated every 5 years for the locality to remain eligible for
disaster mitigation funds (FEMA, 2013).
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principals in writing the documents – that task was completed mostly by the Wooten Company, a
planning consultant firm – Pasquotank’s previous hazard mitigation documents were used to
craft the Albemarle Plan and two representatives from Pasquotank County participated in
developing the plan: Emergency Management Coordinator Christy Saunders and Floodplain
Manager Shelley Cox. The document does not extensively address climate adaptation, but it does
discuss how climate change is likely to impact flooding from sea level rise:
“Sea level rise may impact the frequency and severity of these hazards in the
future. Sea level rise occurs when the oceans warm or ice melts, bringing more
water into the oceans. ... There is strong evidence that global sea level is now
rising at an increased rate and will continue to rise during this century.” (p. 7)
“Additional factors involved in coastal erosion include human activity, sea-level
rise, seasonal fluctuations and climate change.” (p. 29)
The Albemarle Plan does not develop a strategy for addressing sea level rise. It is merely
bringing attention to the threat.
St. Lucie County and Martin County in Florida go beyond the brief treatment that
Greenville, SC and the Albemarle Regional Hazard Mitigation Plans gave climate adaptation.
Both St. Lucie and Martin counties include information about how climate change, and more
specifically sea level rise, is likely to hurt their communities.
The St. Lucie County’s 2010 Hazard Mitigation Plan44 discusses the impacts of climate
change on severe storms and hurricanes, pointing to the potential for warmer temperatures to
lead to stronger storms (March 2010, p. 84-85) and the impacts of sea level rise on coastal area
development (August 2010 update). In the county’s 2016 update to their Local Mitigation

44

Written by William Hoeffner the Local Mitigation Strategy Coordinator and the Grants/Disaster Recovery
Division.
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Strategy,45 climate adaptation – specifically dealing with the threat that sea level rise poses – is
given more extensive attention. In addition to an entire section describing the threat sea level
poses to the county (p. 145-149) and it links sea level rise to flooding:
“The probability for future flooding in St. Lucie County is high, and based on
recent rain events and potential climate change will continue to grow.” (p. 92)
It also discusses climate change in relation to severe storms, storm surges, and hurricanes:
“Global warming may cause changes in storm frequency and the precipitation
rates associated with storms. A modest 0.9°F (0.5°C) increase in the mean global
temperature will add 20 days to the annual hurricane season and increase the
chances of a storm making landfall on the U.S. mainland by 33%. The warmer
ocean surface also will allow storms to increase in intensity, survive in higher
latitudes, and develop storm tracts that could shift farther north, producing more
U.S. landfalls.” (p. 103)
St. Lucie, FL’s plan discusses the threat in more detail but does not separate responses to
flooding from responses to sea level rise-based flooding. The Martin County Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan,46 published in November 2013, discusses sea level rise:
“Sea level changes can have a compounded impact when a flooding or storm
surge event impacts coastal and inland areas. Adaptation of current structures,
mitigation and/or managed withdrawal of structures in redevelopment activities
can lessen economic and social impacts to County businesses, government and
residents.” (p. 12-13)
The plan does suggest strategies the county can adopt which specifically address responding to
climate change. The county’s 2015 Unified Local Mitigation Strategy echoed these sentiments
discussing sea level rise at length (p. 157-162) and how climate change will impact the number
of hurricanes expected (p. 99).

45

Written by Tom Daly, the Local Mitigation Strategy Coordinator with the Department of Public Safety Division
of Emergency Management and the Treasure Coast Regional Planning County.
46
Written by the Emergency Management Department, led by Mike Ewing.
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More extensive coverage of climate adaptation and suggestions for responses are present
in the disaster preparation documents from Carson City, NV, Kittitas County, WA, and Grant
County, WA. Carson City, NV’s Hazard Mitigation Plan was completed in November 201047
and includes several sections discussing how climate change will change snowpack levels which
are crucial for water storage in the area (p. 5-21). The document’s 2015 update (completed in
September of that year) went into more detail about how the area needs to prepare for changing
precipitation patterns (p. 5-21 to 5-22). Additionally, every hazard was evaluated for impacts of
climate change, including predictions for more rain instead of snow in winter (p. 5-14), increased
length and severity of drought (p. 5-14), higher temperatures linked to the spread of disease (p.
5-33), a longer fire season (p. 5-56), and more severe winter storms (p. 5-45). The document
goes onto make suggestions for how the community can respond to these threats, although it
does not differentiate adaptation from other disaster preparation efforts.
Kittitas County’s (WA) Hazard Mitigation Plan was completed in October 201248 and
looks at climate adaptation for every identified hazard and includes a separate section on climate
change where the threat is discussed holistically – considering how different climate threats
interact. The document discusses drought and higher temperatures in depth. As drought will
strain the already dry climate in Kittitas and increase forest fire concerns, the mitigation plan
points to ways local planners can build on current projects to deal with these challenges:
“The best advice to water resource managers regarding climate change is to start
addressing current stresses on water supplies and build flexibility and robustness
into any system. Flexibility helps to ensure a quick response to changing
conditions, and robustness helps people prepare for and survive the worst
47

Written by Staci Giomi the Carson City Emergency Management Director, Gary Dunn from the Carson City Fire
Department, and Karen Johnson from the State Department of Emergency Management.
48
Written by Christina Wollman, a planner in the Kittitas County Department of Public Works and members of the
Tetra Tech, Inc. consultant firm.
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conditions. With this approach to planning, water system managers will be better
able to adapt to the impacts of climate change.” (p. 8-6)
Grant County’s (WA) Hazard Mitigation Plan update was completed in December
2013,49 and like Carson City, NV and Kittitas County, WA, it addresses climate adaptation
concerns for every hazard included in the plan. They also suggest that the best adaptation
strategies local water managers can adopt for dealing with water shortages (one of the county’s
biggest predicted problems) is to improve and maintain existing water storage systems (p. 11-8).
Moving forward, it is possible that more plans will include climate adaptation. However,
this is contingent on the Trump Administration’s actions. As Chapter 5 will discuss in more
detail, FEMA’s move to integrate climate adaptation in their grant programs inspired many
localities to start considering the impacts of climate change – and in some areas like Greenville
County, SC this was the first time the locality started planning for the impacts of climate change.
As FEMA’s approach to climate adaptation changes with the Trump Administration, fewer
communities may be inspired to act.
Hazard mitigation plans provided a space for bureaucrats – the main authors and users of
the documents – to (1) think about what threats they will face from climate change and (2)
explore strategies to adapt. Although they do not always lead to new projects, they represent
local government policy on climate adaptation.
3.3 Other Documents
The final type of document written by bureaucrats that incorporates climate adaptation is
a Water System Report from the City of Yakima, WA, completed in June 2011, it was written by
Thomas Coleman, P.E. Consulting Services with the City of Yakima’s Water and Irrigation

49

Written by Grant County Emergency Management Staff Members: Sam Lorenz (Former Director), Sandi Duffey
(Project Manager), and Joy Reese (Special Project Coordinator) with help from the Tetra Tech, Inc. consultant firm.
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Division Manager Dave Brown. Climate change is briefly included as a stressor on the city’s
water system because it will change water quantities (occasional floods and more frequent
drought spells) and increase water temperatures making the city’s water supply hospitable for the
growth of water-borne diseases (p. 4-44). The document warms that these threats will need to be
dealt with but does not commit to specific strategies to do so.
In conclusion, local bureaucrats bring climate adaptation onto the local agenda by
including it in documents they write. Many of these documents are only read by bureaucrats,50
limiting their agenda-setting power. However, this limit is inconsequential when bureaucrats are
the ones changing policies – either by writing new policies and getting politician approval or
changing policies through implementation decisions.
Additionally, some of these documents are required to contain information about climate
change by the state government (e.g. Washington State requires that hazard mitigation plans
address climate change).51 Although bureaucrats did not independently choose to introduce
climate adaptation on the local agenda, their actions do introduce the idea and can spur action. It
should not be concluded that these bureaucrats will necessarily become advocates for climate
action beyond the bounds of hazard mitigation plans or other documents. Conversely, in areas
where state action prevents local governments from integrating climate adaptation into
documents like hazard mitigation plans or comprehensive plans (e.g. North Carolina), it does not
necessarily mean that local bureaucrats do not use other avenues to get climate adaptation on the
local agenda or shape it once it is introduced – in ways I will address next.

50

This includes mostly local bureaucrats but sometimes state or federal bureaucrats who approve or comment on
these documents so the locality can be eligible for state or federal grant monies.
51
See Chapter 5 for a discussion of intergovernmental relations surrounding local bureaucratic behavior and climate
adaptation policy development.
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4. Bureaucrats Following-Up on Elected Official’s Ideas
If bureaucrats do not introduce climate change adaptation onto the agenda first, it does
not mean that they cannot or do not shape how that issue is presented and addressed on the
agenda. As discussed earlier (see Section 3) local elected officials do not have the equivalent
staff to a governor, or a state/federal legislator. Due to this, they often do not draft their own
complete policies – they ask local bureaucrats to draft these policies. Filling in the details leaves
significant space for bureaucrats to influence policies.
Of the 18 cases, there was one case where local bureaucrats took a suggestion made by an
elected politician as an opportunity to craft comprehensive climate adaptation strategies. While
the local bureaucrats were not the first to introduce the issue of climate adaptation onto the
agenda, their efforts shaped Martin County, FL’s climate efforts since.
According to Anne Murray, the county hydrogeologist, Martin County’s efforts to
address climate adaptation began with the formation of the Southeast Florida Regional Climate
Compact in January 2010. Martin County is just north of Palm Beach – a member of the
compact. The creation of the compact began a broader discussion of the impacts of climate
change and sea level rise in southeastern Florida – a conversation which culminated in the
creation of the Seven50 project which studied the economic future of seven south Florida
Counties (Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe52)
over the next 50 years. This effort was a burst of activity to account for sea level rise:
“And so as part of that effort, we did a vulnerability study - and basically – it’s an
analysis: if sea level rises this much, between 1 and 3 feet - what infrastructure is
going to be affected, where are we hanging out. So it gave us an overview of what

52

Palm Beach, Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe are members of the South Florida Regional Climate Compact
and have been outspoken advocates for climate action (Bump, 2016; Burleigh, 2016).
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that looks like and then what storm surge would look like on top of that sea level
rise.” (Interview with Anne Murray, June 6, 2016)
However, after this initial burst of activity, “it kind of stopped” according to Ms. Murray.
The county was equipped with studies outlining the impacts of sea level rise but no actionable
plans to counter the threat. Ms. Murray worked with a few colleagues – Deborah Drum, an
ecosystem restoration manager, and Kathy Fitzpatrick, a coastal engineer – during this time to
monitor sea level rise threats as well as any actions from other organizations.
Eventually, the elected county commissioners, specifically John Haddox, became
interested in the threat of sea level rise and asked this group of bureaucrats to start developing a
more comprehensive picture of the sea level rise threat and how the county can respond to it.
According to Ms. Murray:
“… one of our commissioners ended up coming to one of these climate change
summits. And he brought us all together and said, "I think we need to do
something about all of this. We've got cities and counties that are more advanced
in our planning at this than we are, and I think we need to start moving on this.
We need to get our communities involved, we need to have more awareness, we
need to have more of a plan." (Interview with Anne Murray, June 6, 2016)
Ms. Fitzpatrick echoed this:
“Yeah, I mean Commissioner John Haddox asked for information to be brought
forward on sea level rise. And I think he's possibly the only commissioner to
publicly express that, although certainly in one way or another it's been mentioned
by other commissioners.” (Interview with Kathy Fitzpatrick, June 14, 2016)
The commissioner’s interest and support led to a more robust effort to address climate
adaptation in the county. According to Ms. Murray and Ms. Fitzpatrick, the county is putting
together a comprehensive adaptation plan involving many county departments (planning, public
works, engineering, growth management, etc.) which addresses direct threats like land loss from
sea level rise to indirect threats like migration of people from southern counties which are
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currently experiencing problems with sea level rise. (Interview with Anne Murray, June 6, 2016;
Interview with Kathy Fitzpatrick, June 14, 2016).
The involvement of the county commissioner expanded the effort from the three
bureaucrats monitoring climate adaptation needs to the development of a comprehensive
adaptation plan. While the commissioner’s requests on sea level rise and climate adaptation
energized the effort, the work of the local bureaucrats shaped the policy itself.
5. Conversations with Co-Workers
Bureaucrats did not use public meetings to introduce climate adaptation. A potential
reason for this is that bureaucrats are more likely to introduce new policy initiatives or advocate
for new ideas in conversations with other government employees away from the public eye.
Once these initiatives generate momentum, they are presented to the public. In this way, the
conversations between government employees are an important facet of the local government
agenda.
While the transition from informal agenda53 to policy is more difficult when an issue is
discussed informally by government employees the likelihood of policy action increases.
Bureaucrats can bring up the issue of climate adaptation with their colleagues and raise the issue
on the personal agenda of other bureaucrats or elected officials. This type of lobbying can help
local bureaucrats build support for the idea of addressing climate adaptation. However, because
this is a more informal path, discussions about climate adaptation are not sufficient for policy
change. Co-workers often discuss a myriad of topics without acting on them. These discussions,
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This is also referred to as a systemic agenda or the universe of issues being discussed at any time (see Cobb and
Elder, 1983; Anderson, 2011)
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on the other hand, are necessary for policies that need cooperation between bureaucrats or
between bureaucrats and politicians.
In nine of the 18 cases in this study, local bureaucrats indicated that they are discussing
climate change and the need for climate adaptation with their coworkers – either fellow
bureaucrats or bureaucrats and elected officials.
Often, local bureaucrats frame the need for climate adaptation in an acausal way, arguing
that it does not matter why climate change is happening. The locality needs to respond anyway.
For instance, Director of the Roza Irrigation District Scott Revell in Yakima County, WA said:
“We talk about it every day. I mean basin-wide, our water plan ... is predicated on
the fact that the climate is changing. And we could debate why it is changing and
what you can do about it ... But, if it is changing, it is changing. It doesn't matter
why, it just is.” (Interview with Scott Revell, September 16, 2016)
Don Donaldson, the Director of Engineering in Martin County, FL made a similar remark about
the impact of climate change and sea level rise:
“Staff-wise, we look at [sea level rise]. I mean I think if you... basically if you
look at the data, the State of Florida and the water level gauges has experienced if I remember the data correctly - about 10 inches of sea level rise in the last 100
years; and the land sank roughly 2 inches. So we had a one foot rise basically in
100 years. And no matter whether we want to believe anything has to do natural
climate effects or not, we're going to see at least that much or more. So the fact is
that, yes, the water levels are incrementally changing.” (Interview with Don
Donaldson, May 26, 2016)
In Greenville County, SC, the local bureaucrats have been discussing climate adaptation
in the context of updating their hazard mitigation plan. The county’s floodplain manager Brian
Bishop had a discussion with members of the South Carolina Emergency Management Division
about the need to eventually include climate change in their hazard mitigation plan. Although
climate adaptation was only briefly mentioned in the document, Mr. Bishop’s recommendation
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to Paula Gucker, the Assistant County Administrator for Community Planning (in charge of
emergency management), and other Greenville County emergency planners led to a discussion
about the impacts of climate change in the region and the need to integrate it into the next hazard
mitigation plan update due to be finished in 2020. As Gucker describes:
“It was discussions our floodplain manager was having with folks down at South
Carolina Emergency Management Division. And then, he had done some research
and he was doing a lot of reading – he's new – so he's been doing a lot of research
to find out, what the heck is this stuff, and what are we doing here, and how are
we doing that, and why? And through his research on EPA's site and other sites
that he went on, and talking to folks, he found out that, "Uh-oh, this is the next
thing that is coming." So we figured we would put it in there.” (Interview with
Paula Gucker, October 29, 2015)
In several cases, discussions about climate adaptation began when a neighboring area
experienced extreme events linked to climate change like sea level rise and flooding in Miami,
Florida and the “mega-drought” in California. For instance, the situation in Miami influenced
conversations in Martin County, FL:
“The other thing is that we've started to have some inquiries from newspaper
reporters, T.V. reporters - "What is your sea level rise program?" And they are
probably feeling a need to have an answer for that. I don't know if they told you,
but the four counties to our south have been extremely proactive on climate
change and sea level rise. And so I think that people are starting to look at the
next county to the north to see what is being done.” (Interview with Kathy
Fitzpatrick, June 14, 2016)
It also came up during discussions with local bureaucrats in the City of Fort Pierce, FL (in St.
Lucie County):
“All we have heard for the three or four years out of South Florida, and we are on
the fringes of south and central Florida, that the sea level rise and the all-time
record tides that we are seeing within 50 miles of us to the South, and the horror
stories that within 20 years a majority of South Florida will be under water. And
that's a real concern. They are receiving, and I thought we had a high tide here
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within the last 18 months that was extremely high.” (Interview with Marc Meyers,
January 29, 2016)
California’s mega-drought raised concerns over drought management in Carson City, NV:
“And the term of 'mega-drought' and what are we going to do 20 years from now
if we have a 20-year drought?” (Interview with David Bruketta, June 9, 2016)
And in nearby Fernley, NV:
“And you know, with California being right next door to us and we see all of the
impacts, those are some indicators that are certainly considered. Because if it is
there, it is not far away from us. And we share a river system, so that is important
for us to consider.” (Interview with NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, June 15, 2016)
In several cases, non-governmental organizations’ work on climate change inspired
conversations about adaptation in the local government. For instance, Fernley, NV is
participating in a program run by researchers at the University of Nevada Reno called “Water for
the Seasons,” which addresses the water shortages expected in the Truckee-Carson drainage area.
“[Climate change] is this big broad concept that they are addressing at the state
level and again through the University of Nevada - that is kind of what that Water
for the Seasons is addressing too - is the climate change and what that means. ...
And part of that process was really looking at what happens if it is a super dry
year and this is what the hydrology looks like and this is what the climate looks
like, and what does that mean? So it has been kind of a team approach and all of
the stakeholders involved are kind of running through those models and figuring
out what that means for the system.” (Interview with NV-Local Bureaucrat-282,
June 15, 2016)
Similarly, the creation of the Yakima Basin Integrated Water Resource Management Plan (or
Yakima Integrated Plan) spurred conversations about climate change in participating localities –
several of which are in this study: Yakima County, WA, the City of Yakima, WA, and Kittitas
County, WA. Responding to a question asking if climate change was part of the discussion
around drought management, David Brown from the City of Yakima, WA said:
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“There is a large program here called the Yakima Integrated Plan. And that is all
of the farmers and the Yakima Nation - that's the Indian Tribe, cities, the Forest
Service, the Fish and Wildlife Agencies. We've all gotten together and put this
plan together about adding more storage, making more conservation available,
doing all of this work. So there is a lot of talk about climate change. That has
become one of the big parts of that plan. We know climate change is going to
happen. We've decided that we don't argue why, we just know it is here. And it
doesn't really, in the end, it doesn't really matter why it is here, it's here. And
we're going... we know we are going to have less snowpack, we're going to have
probably the same amount of water but it will come as rain instead of snow.”
(Interview with David Brown, June 22, 2016)
In these cases, elected officials often participate in these non-governmental organizations
and are part of the discussion about climate adaptation with local bureaucrats. In a way, by
participating in these non-governmental efforts, local governments contract out their adaptation
planning to these organizations.
Occasionally, worries about the politics (i.e. negative citizen feedback) of funding
adaptation projects or imposing additional regulations stop these conversations before any
further adaptation steps are taken. As David Bruketta from Carson City, NV said:
“And we have looked at some of those concepts [like mega-droughts], and it's
really scary because it involves a significant amount of money. So when that
happens, a lot of people don't want to hear that. So we have looked at it, but no
formal plans have been implemented.” (Interview with David Bruketta, June 9,
2016)
This sentiment was also reflected by Craven County, NC Department Head NC-Local
Bureaucrat-823:
“[Sea level rise] is a big level of concern. They are already doing a lot of studies
on it. And there is a group out of Greenville, North Carolina … they've been
doing something about sea level and sea level change and how it is going to affect
local counties and planning and zoning for future development. And they are like,
you maybe better start looking at it now, and might start changing where you
allow and don't allow people to build now instead of having to deal with it in the
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future. But I think when the money washes out, it will go away.” (Interview with
NC-Local Bureaucrat-823, September 23, 2015)
In localities in North Carolina, the attitudes of state politicians regarding climate change stop
conversations about adaptation almost altogether.54 This sentiment came up a few times,
including remarks from Shelley Cox in Pasquotank County, NC:
“I don't know if you follow North Carolina politics, but our legislature the last
few years has become extremely conservative. They have changed a lot of
development regulations, there is a lot less support for water management or any
type of limits on development, so when you are talking sea level rise and sea level
rise policy, it is regulations, and that is also a dirty word right now for our
legislature.” (Interview with Shelley Cox, April 17, 2015)
Landin Holland, a planning consultant who works with several Inner Banks55 communities to
develop hazard mitigation plans and land use plans, said something similar:
“Well, one thing that is quite interesting and intriguing is that, in our mitigation
plans, under this cycle, under our current regime in terms of governor and our
legislature, we are not allowed to acknowledge or discuss in any way shape or
form sea level rise in these mitigation plans. I mean it is basically, I won't use the
word illegal. But we are not allowed to discuss it. And if it is in there, the State of
North Carolina State Office of Emergency Management makes you remove it
prior to submitting it to FEMA.” (Interview with Landin Holland, September 11,
2015)
These conversations with coworkers about climate change adaptation shape the informal
agenda by raising the issue on the personal agendas of other government actors. However, it can
lead to real changes like in the Greenville County, SC case where discussion about climate
adaptation among the emergency management staff led to studying the impacts of climate
change for inclusion in future hazard mitigation plan updates. When these conversations about
climate adaptation include elected officials, bureaucrats can build support for more extensive
For a discussion about why the state’s influence is this strong, see Chapter 5.
North Carolina cases for this study all fall in the Inner Banks area: Craven County, Pasquotank County, New
Bern, Havelock, and Elizabeth City.
54
55
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efforts, like the Yakima Integrated Plan or the effort in Martin County, FL where a team of
bureaucrats is building a comprehensive approach to adaptation.
6. Special-Focus or General-Focus Bureaucrats
Overwhelmingly, bureaucrats identified in this study as influencing the local agenda on
climate change adaptation are bureaucrats with a special focus. They include planners,
emergency managers, floodplain managers, water (and irrigation) managers, engineers, and
public works and utilities specialists. As Table 7 shows, there are 40 bureaucrats mentioned in
this chapter as influencing their respective local agendas on climate change. Of those, only five
are categorized as general-focus bureaucrats.
The large number of special-focus bureaucrats working on climate change indicates that
local climate adaptation efforts are drawing on specific knowledge and research to craft these
policies. These bureaucrats are often seen as experts in their subject areas (see Chapter 4 for
more discussion of bureaucratic expertise) and this expertise is being drawn upon largely to craft
policy rather than implement it for the emerging issue of climate adaptation. Additionally,
special-focus bureaucrats can often avoid the polarized debate around climate change by
focusing on the details of securing an adequate water supply, preventing damage and fatalities
from flooding, and preparing the community for other threats from climate change.
Table 7: Special- or General-Focus Bureaucrats

North
Carolina

State

Case

Name of Bureaucrat

Position

Special or
General Focus

Landin Holland

Consulting Planner

Special

NC-Local Bureaucrat-823

County Department Head

Special

Richard Olson

City Manager

General

Craven County
City of
Elizabeth City
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Table 7: Special- or General-Focus Bureaucrats

State

Case

Name of Bureaucrat

Position

Special or
General Focus

City of
Havelock

Scott Chase

Planning Director

Special

City of New
Bern

Mike Avery

Planning and Inspections
Director

Special

Shelley Cox

Floodplain Manager

Special

Christy Saunders

Emergency Management
Coordinator

Special

Marc Meyers

Director of the Building
Department

Special

FL-Local Bureaucrat-762

Lower Level Bureaucrat

Special

Anne Murray

County Hydrogeologist

Special

Deborah Drum

Ecosystem Restoration Manager

Special

Kathy Fitzpatrick

Coastal Engineer

Special

Don Donaldson

Director of Engineering

Special

Mike Ewing

Emergency Management
Department Manager

Special

Leslie Olson

Planning and Development
Services Director

Special

Bonnie Landry

Planning Manager

Special

William Hoeffner

Local Mitigation Strategy
Coordinator (2010 Version)

Special

Tom Daly

Local Mitigation Strategy
Coordinator (2016 Update)

Special

David Bruketta

Utilities Director

Special

Staci Giomi

Emergency Management
Director

Special

Florida

Pasquotank
County

City of Fort
Pierce

Florida

Martin County

Nevada

St. Lucie
County

Carson City
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Table 7: Special- or General-Focus Bureaucrats

State

Case

South Carolina

City of Fernley

Greenville
County

Name of Bureaucrat

Position

Special or
General Focus

Gary Dunn

Fire Department

Special

NV-Local Bureaucrat-282

City Department Head

Special

Paula Gucker

Assistant County Administrator
for Community Planning

Special

Brian Bishop

Floodplain Manager

Special

Robert Hall

Floodplain Administrator

Special

Teresa Barber

Codes Enforcer

Special

Sam Lorenz

Director of Emergency
Management Department
(former)

Special

Sandi Duffey

Project Manager, Emergency
Management Department

Special

Joy Reese

Special Project Coordinator,
Emergency Management
Department

Special

Tim Culbertson

General Manager for the Grant
County Public Utilities District

General

Dick Erickson

East Columbia Basin Irrigation
District Manager

General

Christina Wollman

Planner, Department of Public
Works

Special

Kirk Holmes

Public Works Director

Special

Jason Eklund

Information Services

Special

Fred Slyfield

Emergency Management
Specialist

Special

Joe Gilbert

Public Health

Special

Urban Eberhart

Kittitas Reclamation Board
Director

General

David Brown

Water and Irrigation Manager

Special

Washington

Grant County

Kittitas County

City of Yakima
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Table 7: Special- or General-Focus Bureaucrats

State

Case

Yakima County

Name of Bureaucrat

Position

Special or
General Focus

Thomas Coleman

Consultant

Special

Scott Revell

Director of the Roza Irrigation
District

General

Note: No bureaucrats were mentioned from the City of Greer, SC, the City of Mauldin, SC, or Oconee County, SC because
climate adaptation was not on the agenda in these three cases.

7. Conclusion
Local bureaucrats occupy a position in local government which allows them to influence
climate adaptation as an issue on local policy agendas. As this chapter demonstrated, bureaucrats
have more influence when they (a) have knowledge elected officials lack or (b) are working on
low salience issue areas like emergency management56 and water management.
While many different actors can be the first to introduce climate adaptation onto the local
agenda, bureaucrats are often the first actors to discuss climate change. In nine cases bureaucrats
were the first to mention climate change. Furthermore, bureaucrats play a large part in raising the
salience of climate adaptation on the local agenda. However, bureaucrats are not the only actors
involved in increasing the salience of the issue, indicating that bureaucrats do not often take on
the role of policy advocate without support from other actors in local policymaking circles.
These findings support hypothesis 1: Front-line local bureaucrats are more likely than
elected officials to introduce climate adaptation into the local agenda. It is important to
understand the ways that bureaucrats bring up the issue of climate adaptation. While bureaucrats
are unlikely to use public meetings with elected officials as a venue to discuss climate

56

Unless there is a recent disaster, emergency management is often a low salience issue. It is only in the wake of
disasters that attention is drawn to disaster mitigation efforts (Birkland T. A., 2006).
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adaptation, they are likely to include climate adaptation in documents they write, in research they
do at the request of elected officials, and in conversations they have with coworkers. Essentially,
bureaucrats work on climate change in venues where they have more control and are not
immediately scrutinized by either elected officials or the public. This happens for several (not
mutually exclusive) reasons:
1. Climate adaptation policy is complex and involves many local departments from
emergency management to public works to engineering to planning (as demonstrated by
Martin County’s attempt at a comprehensive climate adaptation policy). Bringing these
actors together takes time behind the scenes. This work is not accomplished in public
meetings where government presents ideas more than brainstorms them.
2. Polarization around climate change can “chill” conversations about climate adaptation,
but this does not happen everywhere (only in the North Carolina cases in this project).
Often, bureaucrats side-step polarization by arguing that the cause of the problem does
not matter, only the solutions to prevent harm in the community (i.e. Yakima County,
WA and Martin County, FL).
3. Climate adaptation is often seen as an expensive undertaking, which can lead to a lack of
support for adaptation policies among politicians and citizens (i.e. Carson City, NV and
Craven County, NC).
4. Bureaucrats are often responding to the attitudes of superior governments on climate
change (state or federal governments) while writing documents like hazard mitigation
plans. Therefore, their efforts to set the local agenda happen as a response to other
governments rather than bureaucrats deciding independently that climate change is a
concern. (Addressed in Chapter 5 in more depth.)
There is evidence that bureaucrats are shaping the agenda on climate change, and, more
precisely, bureaucrats with specialized knowledge and with special-focus positions in local
government are acting to shape climate adaptation policy. In other words, the data presented here
support hypothesis 2: Bureaucrats with a special area of focus – e.g. water managers, floodplain
managers, etc. – are more likely than general-focus bureaucrats – e.g. city managers – to
suggest integrating climate adaptation into existing policy areas.. This is because most localities
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are still researching what climate impacts they will face and how to address them. Bureaucrats
with specialized knowledge represent important resources for gathering technical information
requested by elected officials or information that local bureaucrats see as important in crafting a
climate adaptation response. Furthermore, the focus on solutions to climate threats rather than
the causes of climate change shifts conversation towards the technical rather than political, which
helps avoid the partisan baggage associated with climate change. There is not just one type of
specialized bureaucrat who works on climate adaptation. Local planners, emergency managers,
floodplain managers, water (and irrigation) managers, engineers, and public works and utilities
specialists all work on climate adaptation in the communities studied in this project. This
indicates that local bureaucrats commonly recognize climate change as a threat and this is not an
issue being pushed by one particular professional association or in the training for a specific type
of position. Additionally, this speaks to the complexity of crafting local climate adaptation
policies.
Building on the findings in this chapter which establish that bureaucrats have raised the
issue on the local government agenda, Chapter 4 describes the tactics, strategies, and approaches
bureaucrats use to develop climate adaptation policy. It looks at five general categories of action:
(1) defiant behavior, (2) cooperative action, (3) politician-led action, (4) non-confrontational
behavior, and (5) no action.
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CHAPTER 4: HOW BUREAUCRATS ACT TO ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THEIR
COMMUNITIES
1. Introduction
Chapter 3 established that local bureaucrats play an important agenda-setting function in
local governments for the issue of climate adaptation. Their efforts to advise local leaders, craft
policy documents, and bring attention to low-salience issues like emergency preparedness shape
the local agenda and introduce the idea of climate adaptation at the local level. However, agenda
setting is only the first step in crafting new policy. This chapter examines if and how bureaucrats
take the second step: creating new policy or changing existing policy to address climate
adaptation.57
First, this chapter describes actions bureaucrats took to craft climate adaptation policy in
their local governments. These are organized by the four forms of action bureaucrats can take:
defiant behavior, cooperative action, politician-led action, and non-confrontational behavior. The
behavior of bureaucrats in the sample who did not act to address climate change is also
discussed. Definitions and examples of these are presented in Table 8.
Second, I look at how bureaucrats act to adapt climate to climate change – either by using
their expertise or crafting arguments about how to create adaptation policy. Hypothesis 3 states:
local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation policy by providing issue-specific expertise about
potential harms. It suggests bureaucrats recognize the power of their expertise and use it to shape
policy. They provide information about risks from climate change in order to encourage adaptive

57

This chapter does not evaluate the benefits or drawbacks of the different approaches bureaucrats take to craft
policy. I acknowledge that some policy approaches may be more successful than others. However, that evaluation is
beyond the scope of this project and will be difficult to accurately assess until climate change has progressed to the
point that adaptation is essential in many communities where different approaches can be compared.
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responses to those risks. This hypothesis was overwhelmingly supported by the data with 15 of
the 16 bureaucrats who addressed climate adaptation acting in this way. Hypothesis 4 states:
local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by arguing that climate change predictions can be
integrated into existing policies rather than suggesting adaptation should be pursued through
new policy areas. Hypothesis 4 suggests that bureaucrats will argue to integrate climate
adaptation into existing policies rather than arguing for entirely new initiatives or programs. This
study finds support for this hypothesis as well, but there were a few bureaucrats working on a
comprehensive plan instead of integrating climate adaptation only into existing policies,
demonstrating that not all bureaucrats are interested in addressing climate change only through
existing policies.
The data also suggest that bureaucrats use more than these two methods (using their
expertise to highlight harms from climate change and arguing for integrating climate adaptation
into existing policy). Bureaucrats also depoliticized climate adaptation by divorcing the causes of
climate change (fossil fuel emissions, deforestation, poor land use practices, etc.) from the need
to prepare for potentially devastating consequences from climate change. This shifts focus
towards risk management conversations anchored in the precautionary principle (Applegate,
2010; UNFCCC, 1992), and argues that the costs of doing something now to respond to climate
change are lower than reacting to disasters like mega-droughts or devastating floods.
Additionally, bureaucrats encouraged local participation in multi-stakeholder groups
whose goals include climate adaptation. The rationale for joining these groups rests on other
goals (like water management, cost-sharing, etc.) instead of climate adaptation. However,
participation in the group encourages the local government to adopt climate adaptation practices
as they cooperate with other stakeholders.
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Third, this chapter evaluates the ability of the model presented in Chapter 1 (Figure 1) to
correctly describe how bureaucrats acted based on their level of autonomy and the amount of
problem definition agreement there is in the policymaking community concerning the need for
climate change adaptation policy. The model presented in Chapter 1 (and replicated below in
Figure 6) proposes that once bureaucrats decide to act to address climate adaptation in their
communities, the form their action takes is shaped by the interaction of (a) their personal
autonomy as a local government bureaucrat and (b) the amount of agreement members of the
policymaking community have concerning the need to adapt to climate change. While the model
correctly predicts the actions of 13 of the 16 bureaucrats, the three incorrect cases reveal flaws in
the model including too much emphasis on bureaucratic autonomy and missing the important
role of multi-stakeholder cooperative organizations. Corrections to the model are suggested for
future research.
Figure 6: Forms of Bureaucratic Behavior to Integrate Climate Change Adaptation into
Existing Policies

Problem Definition Agreement
Low
Low

High

Non-Confrontational
Behavior
example: guerilla bureaucrats,
disgruntled bureaucrats

Politician-Led Action
example: traditional legislative
or executive policymaking

Bureaucratic
Autonomy
Defiant Behavior

Cooperative Action

examples: autonomous agencies,
whistleblowers

example: collaborative
governance

High
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In sum, this chapter demonstrates that bureaucrats act to create and develop climate
adaptation policy even in the conservative and small- to medium-sized communities this study
focuses on. Bureaucrats use a variety of strategies to push climate adaptation policy development
in their local communities with varying levels of success. How bureaucrats act is influenced by
their level of autonomy, agreement with superiors about the need for climate adaptation policy,
and their government’s participation in multi-stakeholder groups which address climate change
adaptation among other goals.
2. How Bureaucrats Act to Address Climate Change Adaptation in their Communities
In this section I describe how the bureaucrats in my sample acted to integrate climate
change adaptation into existing policies. First, I categorize bureaucrats’ behavior into the four
types of action described in the theory chapter of this project: (1) defiant behavior, (2)
cooperative action, (3) politician-led action, and (4) non-confrontational behavior. Those
bureaucrats who did not act are also described.58 An overview of the forms of action are
presented in Table 8.
Second, I evaluate hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 (described above). These hypotheses
address the methods through which local bureaucrats drive climate change adaptation, mainly
through providing issue-specific expertise about potential harms (hypothesis 3) and arguing that
climate change predictions can be integrated into existing policies (hypothesis 4).
2.1 Defiant Behavior
Defiant behavior occurs when bureaucrats disagree with politicians on an issue but act to
address it regardless. The key distinguishing factor here is that bureaucrats are aware of their

58

The theory chapter outlines the first four forms of action in more detail. The option of no action is included here to
include those bureaucrats captured by the sample who did nothing to help their communities address climate change.
More research and theorizing are necessary to explain why some bureaucrats act and others do not.
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Table 8: Forms of Bureaucratic Action

Form of Action

Description
Bureaucrats know that their superiors disagree with the local government
adapting to climate change, but the they act anyway.

Defiant Behavior

Cooperative Action

Examples: write policy documents, change department policy, use discretion
to change implementation of existing policies to make them fulfill adaptation
goal while voicing need to adapt in front of elected officials
Bureaucrats work with politicians to address climate change adaptation
through local government policy. Bureaucrats or politicians can initiate
policy changes. Both bureaucrats and politicians stay involved in policy
development past the initial idea to start addressing climate change.
Examples: politicians work with bureaucrats at monthly meetings to create
adaptation policy, politicians and bureaucrats become involved in a multistakeholder organization to develop regional climate adaptation strategy
Politicians initiate climate change adaptation policy development, but unlike
cooperative action they do not stay involved. In other words, politicians
“assign” climate change adaptation to local bureaucrats and wait for
bureaucrats to finish the policy development on their own.

Politician-Led Action
Examples: politicians pass resolution to raise flood elevation levels to
prepare for increased flooding – then leave to bureaucrats to enforce,
politicians pass resolution ordering expansion of water storage capacity –
leave to bureaucrats to find strategy to achieve this

Non-Confrontational
Behavior

No Action

Bureaucrats take steps to adapt to climate change but try to avoid attention
of politicians. Bureaucrats may avoid drawing the attention of politicians
because they know politicians will disagree or they do not know the
attitudes of politicians but do not want to involve them for other reasons.
Examples: bureaucrats include climate adaptation in a document they write
which politicians do not evaluate in-depth, bureaucrats use discretion to
achieve climate adaptation goals through existing policies but do not
announce to elected leaders
The bureaucrat does not take steps to address climate change adaptation
through role as government employee. Bureaucrats can believe climate
change is a problem. They can also think that their local government should
do something to adapt. However, they are not doing anything themselves
(either initiating or supporting someone else) to address the impacts of
climate change.
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superiors’ disagreement with the potential action, but they act anyway. This type of behavior
includes actions ranging from writing documents which must be approved by superiors (e.g.
planning documents, reports, etc.) which address issues politicians do not want addressed or
disagree with, to bureaucrats changing how they implement existing policies to integrate an
adaptation goal (e.g. enforcing a higher flood standard, seeking more water storage or water
rights). For a bureaucrat to act defiantly, she needs to be aware of politicians’ attitudes on an
issue. This means that her superiors need to have vocal positions – either in public forums or in
conversations with the bureaucrat. Overall, I would not expect defiant behavior to happen often.
Many people are conflict-averse and there is a norm in the US where bureaucrats do not make
policies unless they have democratic support from public opinion or elected officials. The policy
studies literature and the bureaucratic behavior literature demonstrate that this norm
oversimplifies what policymaking is, but the norm discourages bureaucrats from acting in ways
they might think are “political.”
Planning Director Shelley Cox from Pasquotank County, NC was the only bureaucrat in
the sample to demonstrate defiant behavior. Among Ms. Cox’s job responsibilities is floodplain
management (i.e. making sure that homes and businesses are not in the path of frequently or
regularly occurring floodwaters). Climate change is likely to increase flooding in Pasquotank
County through a combination of increased precipitation events and sea level rise. Ms. Cox
acknowledged that sea level rise and climate change are threats to the area:
“We also have sea level rise now to kind of start thinking about because we're
hearing more and more that with sea level rise, particularly for areas like ours
where we are already pretty low, and we could definitely see some tremendous
flooding impacts from that in the future as well. … There has been a little bit of
reluctance politically to even admit that that is even happening. But I think in the
future, that is going to be something that we're going to have to really address.
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It’s not a matter of if; it is a matter of when.” (Interview with Shelley Cox, April
17, 2015)
The local politicians – along with the state government – in 2013 to 201559 were actively trying
to stop efforts to integrate sea level rise predictions into flood management and minimize any
predictions of sea level damages. Ms. Cox was aware of this, she said:
“North Carolina has been a little bit more hesitant to even discuss that issue,
because politically it is kind of a dirty word when you start to talk about sea level
rise and climate change. … It is definitely at the state level, to some degree it is at
the county level too.” (Interview with Shelley Cox, April 17, 2015)
Additionally, the Board of Commissioners unanimously supported a resolution on April
2, 2012 which uses a lower predicted rate of sea level rise (that does not consider climate change
predictions) instead of the original 39-inch prediction released by the North Carolina Coastal
Area Management Commission (Rawlins, 2012; WUNC News, 2014). The resolution cites the
“irreparable economic harm to the coastal plain of North Carolina by adversely changing
land/property values, uses, insurances, and construction/maintenance costs of both private and
public infrastructure,” that the higher sea level prediction would have produced.60
Despite the strong signals sent from the Board of Commissioners, Ms. Cox worked with a
group of UNC Chapel Hill students to complete a study of the impact of sea level rise in
Pasquotank County. She helped the students present their findings to the Board of
Commissioners on November 16, 2015 and advocated for the county to adopt several of their
recommendations. Three weeks after the UNC student presentation, Ms. Cox presented
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As described in the methods chapter (2), bureaucratic action is considered in a limited time frame around the time
the interview took place. This time-frame is 2010 to 2016 for all bureaucrats, although the moment of the interview
is considered as well to contextualize bureaucrats’ remarks. Ms. Cox was interviewed in April 2015.
60
The Pasquotank County Board of Commissioners also had previously been members of the NC-20 advocacy
organization which lobbied against sea level rise and climate change adaptation measures in the state legislature.
They discontinued their membership by 2012 when this resolution was signed, but it does not appear this was done
because the Board of Commissioners disagreed with the organization’s stance on climate change.
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information to the Board of Commissioners about new floodplain maps from FEMA. During this
December 7, 2015 meeting, Ms. Cox lamented that the new maps might lead some residents to
drop flood insurance when they are still at risk due to sea level rise and climate change – two
factors which the maps did not take into consideration.
Ms. Cox’s behavior is defiant because she is aware that the local elected officials do not
support working to address climate change, but she still advocated for local efforts to consider
the impacts of climate change. Her choice to work with the UNC students shows she is willing to
be creative in finding ways to elevate the issue in the county.
The Board of Commissioners did not rebuke Ms. Cox as far as the data show,61 so it is
likely that her position as an expert and a long-standing member of the Pasquotank County staff
helped her act in this way. However, it does not appear that she convinced the board to take up
the issue of sea level rise adaptation because they have not taken any steps to act since her
actions in late 2015.62
2.2 Cooperative Action
Cooperative action occurs when bureaucrats and politicians work together to develop or
change policy. This can include instances where bureaucrats initiate a policy change idea (a new
policy tool, a new approach to a problem, or recognizing a new problem that needs policy
solutions) or instances where politicians initiate the effort. Cooperative action occurs when the
bureaucrats and politicians are involved in discussions, work-groups, etc. to create or change
policy. It is distinguishable from politician-led action in that cooperative action is a collaborative

61

Ms. Cox was interviewed on April 15, 2015 before she helped the UNC students present information on climate
change, so the researcher did not hear Ms. Cox’s personal account of these events.
62
In an email exchange in April 2018, Ms. Cox said that the commissioners’ eyes were opened to the county’s sea
level rise and flooding risk by the students’ presentation. However, the cost and difficulty of taking action meant the
issue was dropped shortly after the students’ presentation.
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effort whereas politician-led action looks more like a teacher giving an assignment to her
students. While students can express creativity, and use their own knowledge in completing the
assignment, they were not responsible for the genesis of the ideas surrounding the assignment. In
cooperative action, a more collaborative approach is used. Bureaucrats and politicians work
together to define the problem and pursue solutions. Since it is a collaborative effort, politicians
are not hands-off here. They stay involved in developing solutions.
There were six bureaucrats from four communities who acted to address climate
adaptation in a cooperative way: NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 and NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 from
Fernley, NV; Public Works Director Mark Cook from Kittitas County, WA; Water and Irrigation
Manager David Brown from the City of Yakima, WA; and Direct of the Roza Irrigation District
Scott Revell and Senior Natural Resource Specialist Joel Freudenthal from Yakima County, WA.
In the four cases in this study where local bureaucrats engaged in cooperative action on
climate adaptation with their superiors, multi-stakeholder partnerships helped facilitate this
cooperation. Highly limited water supplies in Nevada and Washington led to litigation, and two
multi-stakeholder partnerships – Water for the Seasons in Nevada and the Yakima Basin
Integrated Plan in Washington – formed in its wake to help resolve existing litigation and
prevent future lawsuits.
Fernley, NV is a participating local government in the University of Nevada, Reno’s
(UNVR) Water for the Seasons project. The project began in 2014 with funding from the
National Science Foundation and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Its mission is to bring
together scientists from UNVR, community water managers, and water rights holders in the
Truckee-Carson River System to model and develop strategies for responding to drought and
flooding problems that climate change will cause in the basin (Water for the Seasons, 2016).
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Climate change is the principle goal of the group, but its efforts include drought and flood
management strategies that are needed regardless of a changing climate.
Elected officials and bureaucrats from the City of Fernley are active participants in the
Water for the Seasons project in the roles of (a) community water managers and (b) holders of
significant groundwater rights in the basin. Both NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 and NV-Local
Bureaucrat-895 work with the Water for the Seasons group to develop strategies to deal with
significant droughts predicted by climate change models. Additionally, NV-Local Bureaucrat282 and NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 participate in the city’s water team. The city’s water team is
composed of the city manager, water rights manager, public works director, water attorney, and
water engineer. This team meets weekly to address water supply concerns for the city, and every
month they meet with at least two members of the city council to discuss water policy
development.
These two meeting structures keep politicians and bureaucrats in Fernley actively
involved in policy development. The local politicians and the local bureaucrats both feel
responsibility for being involved and crafting successful policy responses to climate change
driven drought in the area. Furthermore, by involving partners in the larger basin area (including
other municipalities and indigenous governments), Fernley benefits from a basin-wide strategy
instead of facing a tragedy of the commons problem where their efforts are undermined by
others’ actions in the basin (Hardin, 1968).
A similar story played out in the Yakima River basin in South Central Washington. The
Yakima Basin Integrated Water Resource Management Plan (referred to commonly at the
Integrated Plan in the region) is a unique collaborative partnership to manage water use,
environmental protection, agriculture, recreation, and historical water rights of the indigenous
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people: the Yakima Nation. The project officially began in 2009 and emerged from the effort of
Ron Van Gundy63 from the Roza Irrigation District64 and Phil Rigdon from the Yakima Nation
who began working together to develop solutions to the area’s long-standing water shortages and
conflicts.
Van Gundy’s and Rigdon’s partnership led to a joint letter addressed to Derek Sandison –
the Washington State Department of Ecology’s Regional Director for the Yakima Area – and
David Kaumheimer – the Federal Bureau of Reclamation’s Director of the Upper Columbia
Office. The March 31, 2008 letter implored the Department of Ecology and the Bureau of
Reclamation to support a comprehensive effort to manage water in the Yakima Basin, bringing
together actors who had been longstanding adversaries in water litigation battles. The letter ends
with the follow recommendation:
“We recommend that Ecology and Reclamation work with Roza, the Yakima
Nation, and others with interest and expertise in water and fisheries management
to construct a package of measures to solve problems of flow, passage, and
habitat in the Yakima basin.”
The letter was signed by Ralph Sampson, Jr. – the Chairman of the Yakima Tribal Council – and
Ric Valicoff – the Chairman of the Roza Irrigation District Board of Directors – but was widely
understood to be the work of Van Gundy and Rigdon.
The next year, the Department of Ecology created the Integrated Plan by bringing
together representatives from the Yakima Nation, irrigation districts, environmental
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Ron Van Gundy served the Roza Irrigation District (one of the largest irrigation districts in South Washington
state) for 40 years. Under his leadership, the area adopted scientific water management systems, low flow irrigation
technology, and began the Integrated Plan. Van Gundy passed away in early 2017 and was widely heralded as a
great water management innovator and local leader. He is credited for helping save the area’s agricultural systems
from disaster during severe droughts during his 40-year tenure (Jenkins, 2017).
64
Irrigation districts are special-purpose governments which help manage water resources, mainly in agriculturally
dependent communities. They are governed by elected boards chosen by water users or water rights holders and
administered by a small staff of local bureaucrats.
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organizations, and federal, state, county, and city governments. The resulting group – the
Yakima River Basin Water Enhancement Project Working Group (referred to as the Working
Group) – has been working since 2009 on creating a balanced water management strategy.
Recognizing the challenge that climate change poses to the basin – and the delicate balance they
have achieved with the Integrated Plan – the Working Group has a committee focused
specifically on climate change adaptation strategies.
Yakima County, Kittitas County, and the City of Yakima are all participating local
governments in the Integrated Plan and send representatives to the Working Group. During
interviews with bureaucrats from these governments, they all referenced the Integrated Plan. Mr.
Brown from the City of Yakima, said:
“There is a large program here called the Yakima Integrated Plan, and that is all
of the farmers and the Yakima Nation… cities, the Forest Service, the Fish and
Wildlife agencies. We’ve all gotten together and put this plan together about
adding more storage, making more conservation available, doing all of this work.
So there is a lot of talk about climate change. That has become one of the big
parts of the plan. We know climate change is going to happen. We’ve decided that
we don’t argue why, we just know it is here. And it doesn’t really, in the end, it
doesn’t really matter why it is here, it’s here.” (Interview with David Brown, June
22, 2016)
This attitude is common among water managers in the region. Mr. Revell from the Roza
Irrigation District, echoed this sentiment:
“We talk about [climate change] every day. I mean basin-wide, our water plan is
predicated on the fact that the climate is changing. And we could debate why it is
changing and what you can do about it, but it is not a phrase that gets a lot of
credibility amongst a lot of our growers. But if it is changing, it is changing. It
doesn’t matter why, it just is.” (Interview with Scott Revell, September 16, 2016)
By divorcing the causes of climate change from the impacts of climate change, it seems
these conservative areas can begin tackling the issue. However, the role of the Integrated Plan
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cannot be understated. Local elected officials from these governments – Yakima County, the
City of Yakima, and Kittitas County65 – are active participants in the development of the
Integrated Plan as well.
The Yakima County Commissioners wrote a joint letter supporting the Integrated Plan,
published on September 28, 2014 in the Yakima Herald-Republic. They argued that the project
helps safeguard the economy of the area from agricultural losses during drought,66 and that
droughts are more of a risk in a world with climate change. They write:
“The governor made it clear that he is concerned about the worsening impacts of
climate change on water supplies. These impacts have become a common refrain
here. City water managers, farmers, and tribal leaders have all told us they have
witnessed summertime water levels decrease as warmer temperatures cause the
snowpack to melt earlier in the spring. Without our proactive water plan and joint
participation, these variations in rainfall and snowpack will leave junior water
rights, instream needs, and even senior water rights at risk.” (Leita, Bouchey, and
Elliot, 2014)
Similarly, in Kittitas County, Commissioner Paul Jewell has become a regular participant
in the Integrated Plan’s Working Group and an advocate for the plan in his county. He regularly
attends meetings of the Working Group. He also wrote a guest column in the local paper: the
Ellensberg Daily Record on March 4, 2016 supporting the plan and arguing that the Integrated
Plan’s efforts led to an easier experience with the 2015 drought season than would have
otherwise occurred.

65

Mr. Brown from the City of Yakima, Commissioner Mike Leita from Yakima County, and Commissioner Paul
Jewell from Kittitas County are the regular representatives from their local governments at the Integrated Plan
Working Group meetings. However, they often bring others from their governments to these meetings as well.
66
The Yakima basin is an incredibly productive and rich agricultural economy. The area produces high value crops
including apples, cherries, grapes (wine), and hops (beer). Many of these crops take years (up to a decade) for the
plants to produce. For instance, a hop vine takes five to eight years to become productive. Grape wines can take
three years to produce. Crop losses from drought in this area have long-lasting negative impacts, especially for
orchards, grape vines, and hop vines.
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Commissioner Jewell’s involvement and knowledge was cited by Mr. Cook as a reason
why their drought management and water management policies are developing well:
“I think, we are benefitting from an elected body that has gone through this
groundwater issue together, for the most part. So they have a good knowledge
base. And so the conversation isn't just being driven on the staff-side. I think we
have a unique situation where we have a fairly educated group of elected officials,
and they are certainly very cognizant - they are very conversant - in the challenge
of drought management in Kittitas County.” (Interview with Mark Cook,
September 21, 2016)
For both the Water for the Seasons project in Nevada and the Yakima Integrated Plan in
South Washington state, local bureaucrats and their elected official superiors worked to address
water management in light of climate change stressors. Through these multi-stakeholder
collaborative organizations, local bureaucrats collaborated with their peers in other governments
as well as with their local elected politicians. The long-term and large-scale nature of these
projects likely inspires continued interest and involvement from elected officials who might
move on from emergency management issues when there is not a current emergency to respond
to. Furthermore, these organizations provide a venue wherein bureaucrats and politicians present
a united front representing their local governments. In other words, it is an outside force that
inspires cooperation within the government.
2.3 Politician-Led Action
Politician-led action describes policy development that is initiated by elected officials.
Bureaucrats are significantly involved in the process, but they are not the actors who initiate the
effort. This includes policies that are developed because a politician asks bureaucrats to
investigate or research a new policy option the elected official has heard about67 or a new policy
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In other words, the elected official is participating in policy diffusion.
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idea. It also includes politicians asking bureaucrats to develop options (policies) to address a
problem. In the case of climate change adaptation, a local politician may ask bureaucrats to
develop solutions to a problem like sea level rise or mega-droughts. While the solution itself is
not specified, the politician initiated the effort to develop policy. The most important element
here is that the politicians initiate the effort to develop policy but are not active in subsequent
efforts to develop policy.
This form of action fits the expected pattern of politicians delegating work to bureaucrats.
However, the local government context changes this dynamic from how it typically works at the
federal level in the U.S. At the federal level, elected politicians write policies then pass them to
bureaucrats to implement and fill in necessary details. Admittedly this is an oversimplified
version of policymaking, but it differs from the local context because in local governments,
bureaucrats are more active in writing policy before it is approved by elected officials. They also
fill in the gaps after the policy is approved by elected officials.
The three bureaucrats demonstrating politician-led action in this study were from one
case (Martin County, FL): County Engineer Kathy Fitzpatrick, Director of Engineering Don
Donaldson, and County Hydrogeologist Anne Murray. In this case, local bureaucrats started
working on climate change adaptation after prompting from one local politician. Commissioner
John Haddox asked three local bureaucrats to begin working on sea level rise adaptation after he
attended a conference on the subject with representatives of other South Florida counties.68 As
Ms. Murray described:
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County Hydrogeologist Anne Murray stated that she and several other local bureaucrats had been aware of the
need to adapt to sea level rise since the publication of the Seven50 report by the southeast Florida Regional
Partnership in early 2013. The partnership comprises seven counties (Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach,
Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe) and is intended to plan for the next 50 years of economic development in the
region. Ms. Murray and several others began monitoring and discussing the threat of sea level rise but did not begin
any concrete planning at that time.
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“There were some staff members including myself that have been following [sea
level rise] because we know it is coming down. … We’ve been kind of checking
in with each other on what has been going on and involving ourselves in other
organizations. So, all of this is to say, one of our commissioners [John Haddox]
ended up coming to one of these climate change summits. And he brought us
together and said, ‘I think we need to do something about all of this. We’ve got
cities and counties that are more advanced in our planning at this that we are, and
I think we need to start moving on this.’” (Interview with Anne Murray, June 6,
2016)
After the encouragement from Commissioner Haddox, Ms. Murray began an inventory of what
the county’s various departments were already doing to address climate adaptation, to serve as a
starting point for crafting a comprehensive plan. She is working predominantly with Ms.
Fitzpatrick and Deborah Drum – the county Ecosystem Restoration Manager. Both Ms. Murray
and Ms. Fitzpatrick stressed that the project is going to require comprehensive planning and a
combination of planning tools to achieve successful adaptation. They mentioned considering a
wide range of issues from addressing loss of coastal land, to property damage for people living in
flood-prone areas, to dealing with migrants from areas further south (e.g. Miami, Puerto Rico,
the Florida Keys). While they do not have any concrete plans, they are beginning to work on
formulating the policy.
While Commissioner Haddox was working with members of the engineering department
to craft a plan, other bureaucrats felt that existing policies were enough, at least for now, to
address climate adaptation. Mr. Donaldson pointed to existing local flood management policies
which can essentially self-update as sea levels rise. For example, local flood ordinances require
homes to sit one to four feet above sea level (depending on their level of flood risk). As sea level
rises, homes in the county will need to be at higher elevations to pass local requirements. This
self-updating mechanism is dependent upon accurate sea level measurements and flood maps.
Unfortunately, flood maps are not updated frequently enough to keep pace with climate-driven
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sea level rise. FEMA acknowledges that their flood map updating process is slowed down
(FEMA, 2014). Additionally, the maps can be challenged by local governments, do not take into
account climate change models, and are built on historical data only which discounts the impact
of climate change (i.e. the floodplains are expanding at a heightened rate) (Skibba, 2017). Mr.
Donaldson described how sea level rise is happening in the county and a few commissioners “are
asking about it,” but that on the whole the issue is still not discussed. Responding to the question,
“Is sea level rise a big concern in Martin County?” Mr. Donaldson said:
“Politically, no, it is not talked about. Staff-wise, we look at it. … We had a one
foot rise basically in the last 100 years. And no matter whether you want to
believe anything has to do with natural climate effects or not, we’re going to see
at least that much or more.” (Interview with Don Donaldson, May 26, 2016)
While the bureaucrats in Martin County were aware of the need to address climate change, they
did not begin to put together a framework to actively address it until support emerged from an
elected official. Ms. Murray said:
“It has more weight when a commissioner gets interested in a program or you get
public input that says "What are we doing on this?" It helps to put legs on it.”
(Interview with Anne Murray, June 6, 2016)
There is a chance that a cooperative relationship will evolve between the local
bureaucrats and the local elected officials – especially if the Seven50 Plan or a different multistakeholder cooperative group becomes more successful in organizing.69 However, without the
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The Seven50 plan faced steep opposition from many community members. In the Martin County and St. Lucie
County meeting minutes analyzed for this project, community members regularly came to speak about the economic
growth that could be deterred by adopting the program, especially the elements that required adapting to sea level
rise.
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encouragement of Commissioner Haddox, it is unlikely the comprehensive approach to climate
adaptation initiated by Ms. Murray, Ms. Fitzpatrick, and Ms. Drum would have begun.70
2.4 Non-Confrontational Behavior
Non-confrontational behavior describes a situation where bureaucrats act but do so in a
way to avoid conflict with politicians. Bureaucrats know or assume they will face disagreement
from elected politicians, so they pursue pathways for policy change using discretion, crafting
departmental policies (which do not require supervisor oversight), and having discussions about
future policy options but tentatively pursuing them.
Non-confrontational behavior can include more overt actions to address climate change
adaptation, but only when they are not presented defiantly to counter politicians’ wishes. For
instance, if the elected officials and city manager in a city government do not voice opinions on
climate change (either publicly or in a way the bureaucrat would be aware of their attitude),
bureaucrats might integrate climate change adaptation into planning documents. Although these
planning documents must be approved by elected officials, the choice from bureaucrats to
integrate them “quietly” is a non-confrontational behavior.
There were six bureaucrats from three cases who demonstrated non-confrontational
behavior: Floodplain Manager Brian Bishop and Assistant County Administrator for Community
Planning Paula Gucker from Greenville County, SC; Director of Building Development Marc
Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 from Fort Pierce, FL; and Deputy County Administrator
Mark Satterlee and Stormwater Program Coordinator Jason Bessey from St. Lucie County, FL.
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After the conclusion of data collection for this study, Commissioner Haddox lost his 2016 re-election bid.
However, the bureaucrats’ efforts do not appear to have stopped. The county submitted an amendment to their
comprehensive plan in September 2017, the entirety of which addressed sea level rise.
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The bureaucrats who engaged in non-confrontational behavior in this study took small
steps towards adapting to climate change but did not start any big new projects or initiatives.
Largely, they acknowledged the threat posed by climate change in their communities but did not
go out on a limb. Additionally, these actions were not significant policy efforts which will likely
make an important difference adapting to climate change.
In Greenville County, SC, Ms. Gucker acted on advice presented by Mr. Bishop to begin
studying the impact of climate change as a hazard multiplier in their area. Mr. Bishop worked
with representatives from federal government agencies including the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
and the National Weather Service (NWS) in the creation of the county’s hazard mitigation plan
2015 update. During his discussions, Mr. Bishop learned that climate change adaptation was
likely to be required in future updates to the hazard mitigation plan. Furthermore, he believes
there is a benefit in being prepared for worst-case scenarios that may arise from climate change.
“Well, it’s just a hazard that whether or not you believe it or not we have to be
prepared for. So if these El Niños and all this other stuff that is happening, and the
water are increasing in temperature and things like that – if all of that comes
about, if it actually comes about, we’ve got to know what the effect would be. …
So its better to plan for something and it not happen than obviously not plan and it
does.” (Interview with Brian Bishop, November 9, 2015)
Mr. Bishop and Ms. Gucker both pointed to the October 2015 storm – Hurricane Joaquin
– that flooded coastal South Carolina area as a case-in-point for being proactive. However,
neither Mr. Bishop or Ms. Gucker made special efforts to bring climate change adaptation to the
attention of elected officials.71 Climate change is not on the agenda of the county commissioners:

71

Hazard mitigation plan updates are shown to elected officials for approval. However, these hundred-page
documents are often “rubber stamped” by elected officials.

113

there have been no mentions in public meetings, neither Mr. Bishop or Ms. Gucker had
conversations with the commissioners about climate adaptation, and there were no mentions of
the issue in conjunction with local government officials in the local newspaper. Furthermore, Mr.
Bishop and Ms. Gucker gave no indication they knew what the commissioners thought about
climate change. Essentially, Mr. Bishop and Ms. Gucker are taking some small steps, but not
advertising them, fitting the definition of non-confrontational behavior.
Similarly, Mr. Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 in the City of Fort Pierce, FL are
taking small steps to address the threat of sea level rise and climate change driven flooding in
their community. Mr. Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 began to worry more about sea level
after hearing predictions coming out of the southernmost communities on the Florida peninsula –
like Miami-Dade and Broward Counties. Mr. Meyers said:
“All we have heard for three or four years out of South Florida, and we are on the
fringes of south and central Florida, that the sea level rise and the all-time record
tides that we are seeing within 50 miles to use to the South, and the horror stories
that within 20 years a majority of South Florida will be under water. And that’s a
real concern.” (Interview with Marc Meyers, January 29, 2016).
Mr. Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 are working with existing policies to start planning.
For example, they are working to use the most up to date sea level data for evaluating home
elevation requirements72 and other flood prevention measures. They discuss how sea level
changes risk with builders and homeowners. FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 said:
“We have discussed the risk of building at the current base flood elevation versus
thinking about the future, and what that means for insurance and what it means in
times of disaster. We have, when customers come in, we try to help them when
they are smart enough to look about the flood zone. [We] try to recommend that
72

To qualify for the National Flood Insurance Program, local governments need to have specific requirements for
structures in the floodplain. One requirement is elevating the first level of a structure a certain number of feet (often
2 feet) above sea level to prevent regular flooding problems. This is referred to as “base flood elevation.” As sea
levels change, the height of this elevation increases.
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they try to find a location that is outside the flood zone.” (Interview with FLLocal Bureaucrat-762, January 29, 2016)
They are exercising discretion in a limited way to educate and encourage smarter, climate aware
development in their community. They are not reaching out to property owners, only discussing
climate risk with those who ask about their flood risk. However, neither Mr. Meyers or FL-Local
Bureaucrat-762 are acting to engage elected officials. When asked if they had any conversations
about sea level rise were with elected officials, Mr. Meyers replied with a flat “No.” The
bureaucrats had no evidence that their actions run counter to the wishes of their superiors as there
are no public mentions of sea level rise or climate change by elected officials in Fort Pierce.
St. Lucie County’s bureaucrats are also engaged in non-confrontational behavior in
addressing sea level rise and climate adaptation. Mr. Satterlee described how the county was a
participant in several regional studies and has incorporated sea level rise into several existing
policies:
“We were part of a - several years ago there was a study that covered the seven
counties of south east Florida called Seven50, and as part of that, we did some
new mapping of projected sea level rise of one, two and three feet. A person on
my staff worked with what is called the South Florida Compact,73 and they were
all sort of doing this as sort of a subset of the Seven50 planning. So we did that
work. And the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council back in 2010 did a
10,000 foot study of what sea level rise might entail.
“And so while we've adopted some policies into our comprehensive plan specific
to sea level rise, but between our flood elevation rules, our drainage rules, FEMA,
NFIP - National Flood Insurance Program, South Florida Water Management
District - all of this sort of web of things that we do. Whether it is a local
mitigation strategy planning. We did a post-disaster redevelopment plan a couple
of years ago. So we are kind of all around it in terms of trying to mitigate the
impact of sea level rise. But certainly the biggest single thing that we do is we
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Its formal name is the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact.
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keep new development out of the floodplain. It is for the best. To the best extent
we can.” (Interview with Mark Satterlee, February 24, 2016)
However, the local bureaucrats are not taking many steps beyond what the regional studies
recommended. Additionally, the county’s stormwater program coordinator – Mr. Bessey – said
any significant action to address climate change would likely follow the state government’s lead.
“So [sea level rise is] on our radar, at least it's on my radar, and it’s something we
have to think about. … And again, we follow the state - whether it is stormwater
or building codes or roads. So it would be a public decision and then the state
would adopt it or argue about it, and over the years it would eventually come
down to us.” (Interview with Jason Bessey, March 10, 2016)
Like in Greenville County, SC and Fort Pierce, FL, the local elected leaders in St. Lucie County
are not discussing climate change. Therefore, the limited steps Mr. Satterlee and Mr. Bessey are
taking to address climate change are not intentionally defying the wishes of the local elected
officials.
Non-confrontational behavior occurred in these three cases where local bureaucrats did
not know that their elected superiors would be upset with acting on climate change. The
generally conservative political leaning of these areas might suggest that climate change is an
unpopular topic, but as many bureaucrats have said in this study, climate adaptation is occurring
despite opposition from some community members to the politics of climate change. Many
localities are preparing for climate change because the consequences of not preparing are worse
than taking some steps now to develop emergency management responses and smart
development patterns.
However, not all bureaucrats are taking this precautionary approach to climate
adaptation. As the next section describes, many local bureaucrats have taken no action to address
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climate change, even though some recognize the threat climate change poses to their
communities.
2.5 No Action
Fourteen bureaucrats representing nine of the 18 cases did not act to address climate
adaptation in their communities. They were (1) NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 and (2) Landin
Holland, a consultant planner from Craven County, NC; (3) City Manager Richard Olson from
Elizabeth City, NC; (4) Planning and Inspections Director Katrina Marshall from the City of
Havelock, NC; (5) Stormwater Engineer Amanda Boone and (6) Director of Public Works Matt
Montayne from the City of New Bern, NC; (7) City Administrator Edward Driggers, (8) SCLocal Bureaucrat-523, and (9) Stormwater Engineer Lillian Hanley from the City of Greer, SC;
(10) Business and Development Services Director74 Kimberly Hamel from the City of Mauldin,
SC; (11) SC-Local Bureaucrat-413 from Oconee County, SC; (12) Utilities Director David
Bruketta and (13) NV-Local Bureaucrat-734 from Carson City, NV and (14) Emergency
Management Department Project Manager Sandi Duffey from Grant County, WA.
The reasons for inaction varied across the 14 bureaucrats. For two bureaucrats – Mr.
Montayne and SC-Local Bureaucrat-413 – they said that climate change was not on the local
government’s agenda implying that it was not their place to introduce the issue. SC-Local
Bureaucrat-413 acknowledged speaking with peers about the issue, but did not believe it was
going to affect Oconee County:
“I mean, global warming and those things making storms more volatile, being
more prepared for tornadoes, flash flooding and stuff. Um, [pause] not publicly.
Not pushing, not a huge public conversation, but more of a say, me and another
person just talking about when we are doing our hazard mitigation plan. Where is
74

The Business and Development Services department in Mauldin is in charge of planning efforts in the community,
which includes flood management.
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it going? Not, [pause] this is the reason why.” (Interview with SC-Local
Bureaucrat-413, March 28, 2016)
Others expressed that climate change was not going to impact their area, or at least not
anytime soon. These bureaucrats were Ms. Marshall, Mr. Driggers,75 Ms. Duffey, Mr. Bruketta,
and NV-Local Bureaucrat-734. Ms. Marshall did not believe that Havelock, NC was or would be
seeing the impacts of climate change anytime soon. Mr. Driggers said that Greer, SC will prepare
for storms, but he is less interested in the reasons why they might be as severe as they are. Ms.
Duffey was confident that Grant County, WA’s water reserves were large enough that climate
change driven droughts would not impact them. Similarly, in Carson City, NV, previous efforts
to secure more access to water (water rights76) in the area77 gave the local bureaucrats confidence
that climate change was not going to be a problem anytime soon. Mr. Bruketta credits the city’s
former elected officials and city managers for helping secure water rights. He said:
“I think that we are very fortunate that we can always improve something, but I
think that, for the most part, there is nothing outstanding – and especially because,
and again I have to give credit to our previous managers and electeds where they
were very proactive in actively going after water rights years ago.” (Interview
with David Bruketta, June 9, 2016)
However, he expressed concern about the cost of preparing Carson City for the type of megadrought that hit California from 2011 to 2017 – the type of drought that is likely to occur more
often with climate change. He said:
“[Climate change] enters the conversation, but a lot of times we – the term ‘megadrought’ has been used a lot here. … And there is not, I mean there has been
75

Mr. Driggers, Ms. Hanley and SC-Local Bureaucrat-523 participated in a joint interview and responded to followup questions individually by email. Neither Ms. Hanley or SC-Local Bureaucrat-523 responded to questions about
climate change.
76
Water rights refer generally to the legal system that governs water use in western states. Senior water rights are
fulfilled before junior water rights when there are water shortages. For more information on water rights, see
Getches, Zellmer, & Amos, 2015.
77
Carson City is a unified city-county government. For this project it will be referred to as a city when a generic
term for local government is used.
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discussions about it, but … there has been mixed feedback because a lot of it
involves money and dollars to secure an infrastructure for future use. And there is
discussion about it, but there is not clear direction.” (Interview with David
Bruketta, June 9, 2016)
Despite being aware of these concerns, both Mr. Bruketta and NV-Local Bureaucrat-734
expressed they would be cautious in developing plans without direction from the Board of
Supervisors. Mr. Bruketta described the culture of policy development in Carson City being
elected leader driven. Should Carson City begin to adapt to climate change, it is likely the
bureaucrats would fit a politician-led action pattern.
There were bureaucrats who did think that climate change was going to be a problem in
their localities but did not see the local government as the appropriate level to respond. Mr.
Holland from Holland Consulting Planners works with local governments in the inner and outer
banks region of North Carolina. He was interviewed specifically about his work helping Craven
County, NC prepare their hazard mitigation plans. During this interview, Mr. Holland referenced
the state government’s stance on climate change as a reason not to address climate change. He
said:
“Well, one thing that is quite interesting and intriguing is that, in our mitigation
plans, under this cycle, under our current regime in terms of governor and our
legislature, we are not allowed to acknowledge or discuss in any way shape or
form sea-level rise in these mitigation plans. I mean it is basically, I won't use the
word illegal. But we are not allowed to discuss it. And if it is in there, the State of
North Carolina State Office of Emergency Management make you remove it prior
to submitting it to FEMA.” (Interview with Landin Holland, September 11, 2015)
He also acknowledged that many areas in the coastal area were not capable of preparing for sea
level rise:
“I think one of the reasons why sea level rise is very controversial in Eastern
North Carolina is there are a lot of these counties, if you want to talk about sea
level rise, there is nothing they can really do. What are they going to do? They
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don't have the money locally to address it in a manner that will ensure the sound,
the establishment of a sound and stable environment years down the road. From
an engineering perspective, I don't know how they would do it, and secondly, I
don't know how they would ever pay for it. So to go out there and talk about sea
level rise in this plan or in their land use planning documents, is kind of cutting
your own throat as it relates to economic development, because who would ever
want to build something somewhere they are being told is going to be underwater
in 15 to 20 years.” (Interview with Landin Holland, September 11, 2015)
Ms. Hamel from the City of Mauldin, SC echoed this sentiment: state governments are
better situated to take the lead on climate change action because they have more resources. She
acknowledged that local governments could do something in terms of crafting a strategy in the
hazard mitigation plan or planning department documents. However, she has not seen any action
in Mauldin to address climate change.
In the City of New Bern, NC, Ms. Boone does not think that the local government can
adapt to climate change. She said:
“I would say that we are not having a conversation related to climate change, and
I don't know that there is, I don't know how much of that we would be having a
discussion about because we can't control that, I think is probably... A town of
approximately 30,000 is certainly not going to impact climate change. So I don't
know that I've heard anybody having a conversation about climate change.”
(Interview with Amanda Boone, September 24, 2015)
Ms. Boone said the city government was aware of how climate change will impact the
community, but she pointed to initiatives to prepare for the threat from hurricanes as their best
chance to prepare for any sea level rise or climate change impacts.
For the remaining two bureaucrats, lack of support from local politicians and belief that
the policies would not be supported led to inaction. NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 in Craven County
worked in the county government for over two decades, but constantly faces a battle between
flood prevention and economic development:
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“And one of the issues I've dealt with is the balancing act between the elected
officials who want all of the taxable property they can have as far having taxable
property, but we look at the strain that it puts on us as far as emergency response
and also the threat of someone losing their life. So I've been very strong verbally
over the years for when we have an event to participate in the mitigation programs
[inaudible] like property acquisition. … That's how you keep people out of harm’s
way.” (Interview with NC-Local Bureaucrat-823, September 23, 2015)
NC-Local Bureaucrat-823’s struggle to implement emergency management practices generally
makes addressing climate adaptation even more of an uphill battle. The bureaucrat expressed
frustration throughout the interview that economic development won out over emergency
preparedness most of the time. They emphasized the need to “pick my battles” in order to make
meaningful advances in emergency management, much less adding climate adaptation to the
mix.
In Elizabeth City, NC, it was actually the city manager who acted to stop a climate
adaptation process before it could develop. Mr. Olson from Elizabeth City, NC does not believe
that sea level rise (he calls it “ocean rise”) would impact his community anytime soon, and if it
did there would be consequences closer to the coast first giving them time to prepare. Mr. Olson
pointed to disagreement in the scientific community, saying “the scientists debate and disagree
on what is causing that issue,” as another reason not to address climate change. In early 2015, the
same group of UNC Chapel Hill students who presented an evaluation of sea level rise in
Pasquotank County, NC presented their findings to the Elizabeth City Council (Elizabeth City is
the county seat of Pasquotank County). Following this presentation, several council members
asked how sea level rise might impact areas of the city that were already struggling with
flooding. Mr. Olson’s response to this was to investigate and present the finding that flood
management and stormwater management policies already in place were satisfactory to address
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flooding concerns. There were no follow-ups on the issue from the council members, and no
further action on climate change from the local bureaucrats in Elizabeth City, NC.
2.6 Observed Forms of Behavior from Bureaucrats Who Acted
Figure 7: Observed Form of Behavior organizes the 16 bureaucrats (from nine cases) who
took action on climate change into the categories theorized in Chapter 1. (The model does not
predict inaction, so the 14 bureaucrats who chose not to act are not included.) These placements
are based on observed data, and do not reflect the bureaucrats’ levels of autonomy or the amount
of agreement they have with elected officials.
In the next section, I discuss the two factors which are theorized to predict how these
bureaucrats have acted: (1) the amount of agreement there is between bureaucrats and their
elected official superiors on the need to adapt to climate change and (2) the level of autonomy
local bureaucrats have to act on their own preferences. As discussed in Chapter 1, this builds on
principal agent theory which argues that agents (local bureaucrats) can act in accordance with
their own wishes when they have sufficient autonomy78 (Carpenter, 2001; Lin, 2000; Lipsky,
2010; Teodoro, 2011). However, this project adds a new dimension, arguing that when principals
and agents have shared beliefs, the elected official principals can contribute by either leading or
partnering with their bureaucratic agents to craft more effective public policy (describing the
politician-led and cooperative behavior categories).
Additionally, this project takes the position that bureaucratic policymaking is not
necessarily a subversion of democratic values, especially for issues that are avoided by
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Much of the political science literature on bureaucracy focuses at the federal level and is concerned with political
control over the bureaucracy. The principal problem appears to be that bureaucracies are not easily controlled by
politicians (for some of this debate see Gailmard & Patty, 2012; Balla, 1998; Gailmard, 2002; Waterman & Rouse,
1999; Whitford, 2002).
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politicians due to partisan commitments, ideological commitments, or because the issue is lowsalience at the time. Emergency management policy receives little attention from elected
officials and members of the community, leaving local bureaucrats to think about and address
disaster risk. By including climate change as a risk, bureaucrats are doing their job of preparing
the community for disaster risk.
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Figure 7: Observed Form of Behavior Based on Observed Behaviors from Interviews and Documents
Agreement

Low Independence

Disagreement

Paula Gucker
Brian Bishop
FL-Local Bureaucrat762

Mark Satterlee
Jason Bessey

Anne Murray
Don Donaldson
Kathy Fitzpatrick

Marc Meyers

Non-confrontational behavior

Politician-led action

Defiant behavior

Cooperative action

David Brown

Scott Revell

High Independence

Shelley Cox
NV-Local Bureaucrat282

Mark Cook

Joel Freudenthal

NV-Local Bureaucrat895
Bureaucrats who did not act on climate adaptation: NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 and Landin Holland from Craven County, NC; Richard Olson from Elizabeth
City, NC; Katrina Marshall from the City of Havelock, NC; Amanda Boone and Matt Montayne from the City of New Bern, NC; David Bruketta and NVLocal Bureaucrat-734 from Carson City, NV; Edward Driggers, SC-Local
124Bureaucrat-523, and Lillian Hanley from the City of Greer, SC; Kimberley Hamel
from the City of Mauldin, SC; SC-Local Bureaucrat-413 from Oconee County, SC, and Sandi Duffey from Grant County, WA.

2.7 Bureaucratic Action
Table 9 (below) outlines how local bureaucrats who took action to address climate
adaptation in their communities acted, specifically if they provided expertise or if they argued to
integrated climate adaptation into existing policies. This information is used in sections 2.7a to
evaluate hypothesis 3 (local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by providing issue-specific
expertise about potential harms) and 2.7b to evaluate hypothesis 4 (local bureaucrats drive
climate adaptation by arguing that climate change predictions can be integrated into existing
policies.)

Table 9: Bureaucrats Influencing Policy Change

City of Fort Pierce, FL

Pasquotank
County, NC

Locality

(hypothesis 3)

Argue to Integrate
Climate Adaptation
into Existing Policy

Shelley Cox,
Planning Director

Worked with UNC Chapel
Hill students on sea level rise
vulnerability study, argued for
paying attention to sea level
rise risk in floodplain
management

Yes

Yes

Marc Meyers,
Director of the
Building
Department

Used up-to-date sea level data
in flood management;
encouraged local builders and
property owners to be aware
of future threats from climate
change

Yes

No, acted using
discretion for integrating
into policy

FL-Local
Bureaucrat-762,
Lower level
bureaucrat

Used up-to-date sea level data
in flood management;
encouraged local builders and
property owners to be aware
of future threats from climate
change

Yes

No, acted using
discretion for integrating
into policy

Bureaucrat

Short Description of
Action or Inaction
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Provided
Expertise

(hypothesis 4)

Table 9: Bureaucrats Influencing Policy Change

Locality

Bureaucrat

Martin County, FL
St. Lucie
County, FL

Provided
Expertise
(hypothesis 3)

Argue to Integrate
Climate Adaptation
into Existing Policy
(hypothesis 4)

Worked with group of county
bureaucrats (engineers) to
develop a comprehensive
approach for climate
adaptation planning

Yes

No, interested in
creating a
comprehensive plan

Worked with group of county
bureaucrats (engineers) to
Kathy Fitzpatrick,
develop a comprehensive
Coastal Engineer
approach for climate
adaptation planning

Yes

No, interested in
creating a
comprehensive plan

Yes

Yes

Anne Murray,
Hydrogeologist

City of Fernley, NV

Short Description of
Action or Inaction

Don Donaldson,
Director of
Engineering

Incorporated latest sea level
rise data into existing flood
management

Jason Bessey,
Stormwater
Program
Coordinator

Incorporated latest sea level
rise data into existing flood
management

Mark Satterlee,
Deputy County
Administrator

Incorporated latest sea level
rise data into existing flood
management

Yes

No, acted using
discretion for integrating
into policy

NV-Local
Bureaucrat-282,
City Department
Head

Worked with the Water for
the Seasons Project to develop
climate adaptation solutions
to predict drought; purchased
water rights and developed
water use strategy to deal with
shortages

Yes

Yes

NV-Local
Bureaucrat-895,
Lower level
bureaucrat

Worked with the Water for
the Seasons Project to develop
climate adaptation solutions
to predict drought; purchased
water rights and developed
water use strategy to deal with
shortages

Yes

Already in progress
when joined, supports
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Yes

No, acted using
discretion for integrating
into policy

Table 9: Bureaucrats Influencing Policy Change

Bureaucrat

Paula Gucker,
Assistant County
Administrator for
Community
Planning

Supported Floodplain
Manager Brian Bishop when
he argued to incorporate
climate change into hazard
mitigation predictions and
management strategies

Worked with Yakima
Integrated Plan to incorporate
climate models into drought
Mark Cook, Public
management practices;
Works Director
increased water storage
capacity; encouraged water
conservation practices
Worked with Yakima
Integrated Plan to incorporate
David Brown,
climate models into drought
Water and Irrigation
management practices;
Manager
increased water storage
capacity; encouraged water
conservation practices

Yakima County, WA

Kittitas County,
WA

Argued for incorporation of
Brian Bishop,
climate adaptation into hazard
Floodplain Manager mitigation plan (for future
updates beyond 2015 draft)

City of Yakima,
WA

Greenville County, SC

Locality

Short Description of
Action or Inaction

Worked with Yakima
Integrated Plan to incorporate
Joel Freudenthal, climate models into drought
Senior Natural
management practices;
Resource Specialist
increased water storage
capacity; encouraged water
conservation practices
Worked with Yakima
Integrated Plan to incorporate
Scott Revell,
climate models into drought
Director of the Roza
management practices;
Irrigation District
continued to implement lowflow irrigation systems
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Provided
Expertise
(hypothesis 3)

Argue to Integrate
Climate Adaptation
into Existing Policy
(hypothesis 4)

Supported
subordinate’s
expertise

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Supporting efforts that
are already underway;
suggesting new
policies/strategies when
appropriate

Yes

Supporting efforts that
are already underway;
suggesting new
policies/strategies when
appropriate

Yes

Supporting efforts that
are already underway;
suggesting new
policies/strategies when
appropriate

Yes

Supporting efforts that
are already underway;
suggesting new
policies/strategies when
appropriate

2.7a Bureaucrats Providing Expertise to Encourage Adaptation

Of the 16 bureaucrats who acted, 15 used their expertise to provide information about the
potential harms from climate change (hypothesis 3). The only bureaucrat who did not provide
her own expertise for changing adaptation policy was Ms. Gucker from Greenville, SC who used
information collected by her subordinate Mr. Bishop. There is overwhelming support for
hypothesis 3: local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by providing issue-specific expertise
about potential harms.
While almost every bureaucrat did use information to influence policy, they did not all do
so in the same manner. There were three ways local bureaucrats provided information about the
potential harms from climate change: (1) giving information to their superiors, (2) giving
information to peers in government, and (3) giving information to community members.
Nine bureaucrats provided information to their superiors: Ms. Cox, Ms. Murray, Ms. Fitzpatrick,
NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, NV-Local Bureaucrat-895, Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Freudenthal,
and Mr. Revell. (These nine bureaucrats represent six cases.)
Ms. Cox from Pasquotank County presented information on the damage sea level rise
could cause in the county to her superiors and helped UNC Chapel Hill students complete a
comprehensive study of the problem and present their results to the county commissioners. Ms.
Murray and Ms. Fitzpatrick in Martin County were working to compile information about the
full spectrum of impacts. They produced information at the request of Commissioner Haddox
that covered sea level rise, potential drinkable water shortages,79 and climate migrants from

Florida’s freshwater reserves are at risk of becoming contaminated with saltwater as sea levels rise. Additionally,
climate change is likely to result in less rainfall, which is instrumental in refilling freshwater reserves in the area.
79
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South Florida and Puerto Rico. They have not formally presented their results but shared their
expertise with Commissioner Haddox.
Additionally, the two bureaucrats involved in the Water for the Seasons project (NVLocal Bureaucrat-282 and NV-Local Bureaucrat-895) and the four bureaucrats working on the
Yakima Integrated Plan (Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Freudenthal, and Mr. Revell) provided
information to their superiors and the other participants in these projects about local harms likely
under climate change. For these six bureaucrats, providing information about local harms was
their way of advocating for their localities’ needs within the group.
Ten bureaucrats provided information to their peers: Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Bessey, Mr.
Satterlee, NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, NV-Local Bureaucrat-895, Mr. Bishop, Mr. Cook, Mr.
Brown, Mr. Freudenthal, and Mr. Revell. (These bureaucrats are from seven cases.) This type of
information provision is often more informal, representing discussions between peers in
government. As Mr. Donaldson (Martin County, FL) and Mr. Revell (Yakiam County, WA)
said, they often speak with other staff members about climate change.
Sharing information with other local bureaucrats can occur more formally. For example,
Mr. Bishop was tasked with collecting information on threats from natural disasters for
Greenville County (SC)’s most recent hazard mitigation plan update by his boss: Ms. Gucker.
During his research, Mr. Bishop became aware of the county’s climate change risk and the need
to address it in future hazard mitigation plans.
Similarly, information sharing is a formalized process in the Water for the Seasons
project and the Yakima Integrated Plan Working Group. However, in these cases, bureaucrats
share information with members of their own local government as well as peers in other
participating local governments.
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Six bureaucrats provided information to community members: Mr. Meyers, FL-Local
Bureaucrat-762, Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Freudenthal, and Mr. Revell. (They are from four
cases.) In these instances, bureaucrats are either communicating with individuals who have
contacted their department for a service or they are advocating for their department’s actions to
the community at large.
Mr. Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 communicated directly with property owners
in Fort Pierce, FL who approached them about risks from sea level rise and flooding due to
climate change. Mr. Revell from the Roza Irrigation District in Yakima County regularly speaks
with the growers in his community about water conservation strategies they can use to respond to
climate induced drought. Mr. Revell both speaks to growers who approach him and he actively
seeks out growers to speak to.
Also, local bureaucrats participate in broader education or advocacy efforts to address
risks related to climate change. Mr. Freudenthal and Mr. Brown both run water use conservation
campaigns in their communities (Yakima County and the City of Yakima respectively) to reduce
overall water consumption so droughts will have less of an impact.
Those bureaucrats who worked cooperatively to address climate adaptation provided
expertise in several ways to several groups. NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, NV-Local Bureaucrat895 worked with the Water for the Seasons project and provided information to both the elected
officials in Fernley, NV and to their peers (the other bureaucrats working in Fernley
government). The bureaucrats involved in the Yakima Integrated Plan also provided information
to elected officials, other bureaucrats, and community members. For both of these projects,
bureaucrats served as ambassadors from their community in the group and ambassadors from the
group when presenting to their communities.
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2.7b Bureaucrats Crafting Arguments about How Communities Should Adapt to Climate Change

Bureaucrats provided information based on their expertise, but they also framed
arguments about how policies should look. They did not just present information. Bureaucrats
crafted arguments and presented information that supported a specific policy approach, like
developing a comprehensive plan or integrating adaptation into existing policies.
Hypothesis 4 states that local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by arguing that climate
change predictions can be integrated into existing policies. Among the bureaucrats who acted,
four bureaucrats from four cases80 argued (to their superiors or peers) that climate predictions
can be integrated into existing policy (Ms. Cox, Mr. Donaldson, NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, and
Mr. Bishop).
Ms. Cox presented arguments to the Pasquotank County Board of Commissioners with
the support of the UNC Chapel Hill student’s study and followed up with remarks about how the
flood risk maps issued by FEMA and subsequent county flood management policy needed to
address the risks of climate change. Mr. Bishop presented information about the need to adapt to
climate change, but rather than speak directly to the elected officials, he presented the
information in a report to Ms. Gucker (his boss). His argument focused on the need to include
adaptation planning in the hazard mitigation plan because it might eventually be required by
FEMA and because climate change was likely to cause problems because of increasingly severe
storms.
Mr. Donaldson and NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 also presented arguments that climate
change adaptation should be included in existing policies, but largely spoke to their peers. While

80

Bureaucrats from the same community argued for different approaches. For instance, Mr. Donaldson argued to
integrate climate adaptation into existing polices in Martin County, FL while Ms. Murray and Ms. Fitzpatrick were
working to develop a comprehensive plan to address climate adaptation.
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Mr. Donaldson’s subordinates in Martin County, FL (Ms. Murray and Ms. Fitzpatrick) were also
working on climate adaptation, Mr. Donaldson presented a different argument. Ms. Murray and
Ms. Fitzpatrick thought that climate adaptation needed comprehensive planning, while Mr.
Donaldson was confident that existing flood management policies could be updated to reflect
current sea levels to help the community respond to sea level rise. NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 in
Fernley, NV focused on expanding water storage to address climate change driven droughts
while working on the city’s water team. The water team included NV-Local Bureaucrat-282’s
superiors as well as elected leaders who met occasionally with the water team. Additionally, NVLocal Bureaucrat-282 was with the city government long enough to advocate for participation in
the Water for the Season’s project. According to their interview, NV-Local Bureuacrat-282
helped convince the local elected leaders to participate.
An additional five bureaucrats benefitted from other actors having already incorporated
climate adaptation into existing policy. Rather than argue that it should be integrated, they
supported these ongoing efforts (NV-Local Bureaucrats-895, Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr.
Freudenthal, and Mr. Revell). NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 joined the Fernley, NV government too
late to help initiate the water team efforts or the city’s participation in the Water for the Seasons
project, although they did support it. Similarly, Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Freudenthal, and Mr.
Revell supported the efforts of the Yakima Integrated Plan and pre-existing water storage
projects in their local governments but did not initiate them.
The group of bureaucrats from Martin County – Ms. Murray, Ms. Fitzpatrick, and Ms.
Drum – believed that a comprehensive approach to adaptation was necessary. They might
support limited instances of integration, but they argued for new policies and approaches to deal
with the climate threat.
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Five bureaucrats in three communities used climate change predictions while exercising
their discretion. In this way, they integrated climate adaptation into existing policies, but did not
present an “argument” for doing so, they just did it. They are Mr. Meyers, FL-Local Bureuacrat762, Ms. Gucker, Mr. Bessey, and Mr. Satterlee. As described above, Mr. Meyers and FL-Local
Bureaucrat-762 said they spoke with property owners about flood risks changing with sea level
rise and climate change. Ms. Gucker made the decision as head of her department to add climate
adaptation language to the county’s hazard mitigation plan. Mr. Bessey and Mr. Satterlee used
their discretion to update flood policy based on the most recent sea levels to account for sea level
rise.
2.7c Other Ways Bureaucrats Act to Address Climate Adaptation

Bureaucrats acted in other ways than providing information about potential harms and
arguing for integrating policy into existing initiatives. The bureaucrats in this study also (1)
argued that the cause of climate change does not matter, but we should act anyway to prevent
potential harms, and (2) encouraged participation in multi-stakeholder groups whose goals
include climate adaptation. Each is discussed in turn.
The bureaucrats in this study commonly expressed the sentiment that the cause of climate
change was not important, what was important was preparing for potential harms and being
proactive. Greenville County, SC bureaucrats Ms. Gucker and Mr. Bishop repeatedly said they
were proud of how proactive their disaster management policies were. Similarly, the bureaucrats
in South Washington state relied on the argument that the causes of climate change were less
important that the consequences. By focusing on minimizing the negative consequences of
climate change, bureaucrats like Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Revell, and Mr. Fruedenthal
justified the need for adaptation in a largely conservative area.
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This approach relies on the precautionary principle which argues that minimizing
potential future harms is preferable to inaction to save resources or time in the present
(Applegate, 2010). It is captured in the colloquial saying “better safe than sorry” and is prevalent
in economics, environmental conservation, and risk management.81 The argument combines the
precautionary principle with the depoliticization of climate change policy by arguing that the
causes of climate change are not as important as the consequences. Focusing on potential harms
divorces the problem of climate change from the debates around the cause of the problem. Often
pro-climate actors lay responsibility on the shoulders of high-carbon emitters including fossil
fuel energy producers, the agricultural sector, and energy users in developed countries.82 It is
unsurprising, then, that this argument was popular in areas like South Washington state which
has an agriculture-dependent economy and any community where people use cars for
transportation, heat their homes with natural gas, and consume electricity from coal or other
fossil fuels like most of the United States.
Bureaucrats in this study also advocated for local government participation in multistakeholder groups. While the Water for the Seasons project and the Yakima Integrated Plan
provided important examples, there are also initiatives in South Florida like Seven50 and the
Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact which have led to climate adaptation
initiatives. Seven50 partially inspired Martin County’s effort to craft comprehensive climate
adaptation planning. While none of the cases in this study are members of the Southeast Florida
Regional Climate Change Compact, the organization’s success in helping Miami-Dade,
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The prevalence of the precautionary principal in these fields makes it unsurprising to see the bureaucrats in this
study embracing it. These bureaucrats include emergency managers, resource managers, and environmental
managers who likely encountered this attitude in their training and professional societies.
82
There are some efforts to discredit climate adaptation rooted in conservative political circles in the United States.
However, adaptation that does not lay blame for climate change avoids some of the most passionate political
debates.
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Broward, Monroe, and Palm Beach counties (and 30 municipalities in those counties) create
adaptation plans is widely cited as a successful multi-stakeholder climate adaptation organization
(US Department of Energy, 2018; Georgetown Climate Center, 2017).
Participation in these groups presents several advantages to bureaucrats. First, it allows
bureaucrats to benefit from the efforts of many participants, essentially outsourcing some of the
work. For instance, in the Water for the Seasons project, the UNVR researchers are measuring
climate risk and mapping basin-wide water storage capacity, water flows, and water uses.
Similarly, the Yakima Integrated Plan spreads work across a wide range of participants allowing
individual bureaucrats to benefit from a more comprehensive look at the problem. These projects
can also lead to more creative solutions generated by the participants. Solutions that were too
expensive (in terms of time or resources) might not have been considered by a single locality but
are possible with a larger group. For instance, the Yakima Integrated Plan is developing large
storage reserves like the Kachess Drought Relief Pumping Plant (Yakima River Basin Integrated
Water Resource Management Plan, 2015) and the Cle Elum Fish Passage Facility and fish
reintroduction effort (US Bureau of Reclamation, 2016) which would be too expensive for any
one jurisdiction to afford on its own.
In sum, bureaucrats act in a wide variety of ways to address climate adaptation in their
communities. They provide information about potential risks, argue that climate adaptation can
be achieved by integrating it into existing policies, emphasize the precautionary principal,
divorce the causes of climate change from the discussion about adaptation, and encourage
participation in multi-stakeholder groups. The next section tests the model presented in Chapter 1
which posits that bureaucratic autonomy and problem definition agreement shape bureaucratic
action.
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3. Explaining the Variation in Bureaucratic Action
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 1 argues that bureaucratic action is influenced
by the interaction of two variables: (1) problem definition agreement between bureaucrats and
their superiors, and (2) bureaucratic autonomy or independence. This section tests the
applicability of this model with the 16 bureaucrats in the study who acted to integrate climate
adaptation into local policy. First, problem definition agreement and bureaucratic autonomy are
described independently. I address how they were measured and the variation present in the
sample. Then, the model is presented with the predicted form of action each bureaucrat should
have taken. The predicted model is juxtaposed with the actual type of action each bureaucrat
took (presented in section 2.6) to determine the accuracy of the model. Throughout, alternative
explanations and critiques of the model are discussed.
3.1 Problem Definition Agreement
Problem definition in the policy studies literature refers to the way a problem is described
and understood in the policymaking community. It involves dimensions like problem severity,
how soon the problem will occur (or if it is currently occurring), who is responsible for solving
the problem, and if the problem will occur nearby (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994).
Measuring problem definition agreement for each bureaucrat who acted to address
climate adaptation requires examining both the stated attitudes of the local bureaucrats and their
superiors. Only bureaucrats who had been interviewed by the researcher were included in the
study. Their attitudes were discerned primarily through interviews. Bureaucrats’ statements in
public documents were also used to supplement their interview statements. Although it would
have been ideal to also conduct interviews with all of the elected officials in these cases, most
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local elected officials83 did not respond to requests for interviews. Instead, local elected officials’
attitudes were determined by looking at their public statements, newspaper coverage, and how
bureaucrats described the elected officials.
Five questions were asked to develop a full picture of the bureaucrats’ and elected
officials’ attitudes about climate adaptation. They were:
1. Is climate change the cause for needing to change local flood or drought management
policy?
2. Is the local government the appropriate scale for addressing climate adaptation? (As
opposed to the state or federal government level.)
3. Will climate change be an issue for this locality? In other words, is the problem
geographically close?
4. Will climate change be an issue soon? In other words, is the problem temporally
proximate?
5. Will climate change lead to severe problems for the local community?
Answers to each question were written for each bureaucrat and the local elected leaders as a
group.84 Then, where bureaucrats and the elected leaders had different answers, it was labeled as
disagreement. When the opinions were similar, it was labeled as agreement. In several cases,
local elected officials made no statements on climate change or made statements which could
only answer a few of the five questions. In these cases, no opinion was treated as slight
disagreement. This was done because disagreement is a fairer evaluation than agreement. Local
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The researcher only conducted interviews with Commissioner Paul Jewell in Kittitas County, WA and
Commissioner Cindy Carter in Grant County, WA.
84
Bureaucrats often respond to the elected officials as a group. Grouping the opinions of elected officials provides
the best measure of agreement between the bureaucrat and their superiors.
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bureaucrats who want to act on climate change and face elected leaders with no opinions on
climate change are likely to need to convince the local leaders. (If a local bureaucrat faced
disagreement, she would have to work to convince leaders.) Additionally, according to data from
Leiserowitz’s climate opinion study (Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016), the
counties in this study have low percentages of residents who believe climate change will harm
them personally (30% to 36% range). Similarly, climate change is often understood as a national
or global issue meaning it would be more likely that a bureaucrat would have to convince elected
officials that they need to act. (Data for each country can be found in Appendix D, Table D4.)
Agreement between bureaucrats and their superiors on the issue of climate change
adaptation ranged in the sample from mostly disagreeing (Ms. Cox) to complete agreement (Ms.
Murray, Mr. Cook, Mr. Revell, and Mr. Freudenthal). (Responses for each bureaucrat are listed
in Appendix E, Table E1.)
In three cases, the local elected officials did not present any public attitude on climate
change and the local bureaucrats were not aware of their attitudes either. These were the City of
Fort Pierce, FL, St. Lucie County, FL, and Greenville County, SC. In all three cases, the local
bureaucrats generally believed climate change was a severe problem that the local government
could and would have to address. However, a few did think that the consequences from climate
change would take a while to reach them (Mr. Satterlee, Ms. Gucker, and Mr. Bishop). As
discussed above, these were coded as disagreement.
Furthermore, in Fernley, NV the local officials only presented enough of an opinion on
climate change adaptation to say it would impact local policies but did not go beyond that. This
is largely because of the city’s involvement in the Water for the Seasons project. The elected
officials were informed but did not have any strong opinions on climate adaptation.
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3.2 Autonomy
Autonomy is measured in the literature in a variety of ways: structural autonomy
(Carpenter, 2001; Whitford, 2002), the ability or opportunity to use discretion (Lipsky, 2010;
Lin, 2000; Teodoro, 2011), and expertise (Altfeld & Miller, 1984; Gailmard, 2002; Teodoro,
2014). This study sought to capture this variety of ways to understand autonomy and build a
combined measure. For all components, autonomy was considered in relation to local elected
officials and the government’s manager or head administrator.
Structural autonomy describes bureaucratic independence in relation to the organizational
structure of government. Bureaucrats who run departments can make decisions about how policy
is implemented, how budgets are distributed, and what takes precedence when there are
competing priorities. Department heads also influence department culture: can lower level
bureaucrats innovate in their work? Are they allowed to approach the elected council directly or
does information flow through department heads and the government manager?
In this study, structural independence is measured as low, moderate, or high based on the
bureaucrat’s position in the local government’s organizational chart. Bureaucrats with low
structural independence answer to more superiors than those with high structural independence.
Structural independence was also captured using hiring and firing power. If a bureaucrat can be
hired and fired only by the city council, they have more structural independence than a
bureaucrat who can be fired by the city manager or county administrator as well.
Discretion describes how many opportunities a bureaucrat has to make decisions (i.e. on
a case-by-case basis). As Lipsky (2010) described in his study of street-level bureaucrats,
bureaucrats who interact with community members have more opportunities for discretion than
those at the top of the organizational chart who work more on management of other bureaucrats.
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While it is often true that bureaucrats with higher levels of structural independence have fewer
opportunities for discretion, it is not always the case. For instance, Ms. Cox runs her own
department and works directly with property owners to enforce flood management policy.
In this study, discretion is categorized into three groups: many opportunities, a moderate
number of opportunities, or a few opportunities. Categories were assigned based on descriptions
bureaucrats gave of their work during interviews, the description of their position on local
government websites, and the description of their position in government ordinances. Ms. Cox
has both high structural independence and many opportunities to exercise discretion.
A third way the literature measures autonomy is by bureaucratic expertise. Expertise
gives bureaucrats an information advantage85 over their superiors, allowing them to make
decisions based on their knowledge. Forms of bureaucratic expertise cover a wide range. For this
project, expertise was generalized to five categories: (1) emergency management, (2) FEMA
policies, (3) state emergency management policies, (4) local conditions (present and past
flooding or drought events), and (5) local politics.
Expertise was coded based on knowledge demonstrated during the interview, area of
training (e.g. someone who has a master’s degree in emergency management has expertise in that
area) and demonstrated knowledge in government documents (e.g. testifying at a city council
meeting or writing a technical report). This was determined for both the bureaucrats and their
superiors because areas of common expertise do not represent information advantage. The
difference in expertise was measured by the number of areas where superiors and bureaucrats
had shared expertise. For example, if there are people on the elected board with backgrounds in
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In principal-agent theory, this is referred to as information asymmetry. Information asymmetries are unavoidable
and often the reason principals seek out agents: people with expertise they do not have to help them accomplish their
goal (Eisenhardt, 1989).
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emergency management, bureaucrats have less of an information advantage on emergency
management.
Expertise was also captured by determining if bureaucrats had specialized training or
general training. Described in more detail in Appendix B, (section 3a), specialized training refers
to degrees or training in technical areas like engineering, land management, forest management,
biology, conservation, water management, and disaster management. General training refers to
administrative or public policy training: areas like political science, law, public administration,
public policy, or government management.
The last measure in the combined measure of independence is the number of years a
bureaucrat worked in local government in their position because bureaucrats are the source of
institutional knowledge in local government. To protect the identities of those bureaucrats who
requested confidentiality, this measure was categorized as either 0 to 5 years to indicate low
levels of institutional knowledge or 5 or more years to indicate high levels of institutional
knowledge.
These six measures were combined (added together), yielding an overall possible score
between four and 22. A score of four indicates low autonomy and a score of 22 is high
autonomy. The range of autonomy scores among the bureaucrats in this study was 7 to 16.86 A
score of 12 or higher was considered high and 11 or lower considered low. This cut-off point was
chosen because it was the median of the actual scores.87 (For the scores for each bureaucrat, see
Appendix E, Table E2; for coding of these measures, see Appendix B, sections 3 and section 4.)
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Scores were calculated for bureaucrats who did not act as well as those who did. The scores for the bureaucrats
who did not act are not used to test the model because the model is not meant to be applied to inaction. However, the
scoring system for autonomy is applicable to both bureaucrats who acted and those who did not.
87
The theoretical scores of 4 and 22 are extremes and using the mid-point of that scale would distort the data. For
example, a bureaucrat with a perfect 22 (high) autonomy score could not be fired by the local government, would
run the entire local government without oversight, and has no shared expertise with her superiors. This bureaucrat
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Half of the bureaucrats who acted to address climate adaptation had high autonomy
scores. Eight bureaucrats scored a 12 or higher for their autonomy level. They are Ms. Gucker,
Ms. Cox, Mr. Meyers, Mr. Brown, NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, Mr. Cook, Mr. Freudenthal, and
Mr. Revell. The combination of factors that led to these scores varied; there is not one area
where all eight had high scores or low scores. This speaks to the need to capture multiple
dimensions of autonomy.
The remaining eight bureaucrats had low autonomy scores (11 or lower). They are FLLocal Bureaucrat-762, Ms. Murray, Ms. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Bessey, Mr. Satterlee,
NV-Local Bureaucrat-895, and Mr. Bishop. These bureaucrats did share a few commonalities:
all had low or moderate levels of structural independence and were hired and could be fired by
both the city manager or county administrator and elected officials. There was variation on the
other dimensions of autonomy.
3.3 Predicted Forms of Bureaucratic Action
To evaluate how well my theory explains the observed outcomes, the bureaucrats who
acted88 to address climate adaptation in their communities were plotted on the theorized 2x2
table. I then looked to see which bureaucrats were correctly predicted and which were not by
comparing their observed action (shown in Figure 7) with their predicted action (shown in Figure

cannot exist. Conversely, a bureaucrat with a score of 4 for low autonomy would have no expertise, could be fired
by the manager and the council or board of commissioners, and has no structural independence. Again, this
bureaucrat does not exist in reality.
88
Those bureaucrats who took no action are not included because this is meant to help describe how bureaucrats
decided to act. Considering that nearly half of the bureaucrats in this study chose not to act, future research should
investigate explanations which discern between those who do act and those who do not. Appendix F shows the local
bureaucrats who thought climate change was happening but decided not to act plotted on the 2x2 theorized table.
They are not included in Section 3 of this chapter because they did not act. However, including their autonomy and
agreement scores provides an additional dimension of the model. Three bureaucrats should have acted in a nonconfrontational way (NV-Local Bureaucrat-734, Mr. Bruketta, and Ms. Boone). Two bureaucrats should have acted
defiantly (NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 and Mr. Holland).
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8). The bureaucrats who were correctly predicted are in green and those who are incorrectly
predicted are in red.
Hypothesis 5 is broken into four subparts – one for each type of behavior in the 2x2 table.
Each subpart will be evaluated separately and then all four will be considered together to
evaluate hypothesis 5 overall which states if a bureaucrat acts to integrate climate change into
existing policy, the form her action takes will depend upon her level of autonomy and the extent
of problem definition agreement in the policymaking community.
The first subpart of hypothesis 5 addresses defiant behavior. It says: when the bureaucrat
is autonomous and there is low problem definition agreement in the policymaking community,
she will act defiantly. Only one bureaucrat was observed to act defiantly: Ms. Cox from
Pasquotank County, NC. According to the measures for autonomy and problem definition
agreement, the model correctly predicts Ms. Cox’s behavior. She has high autonomy and faces a
policymaking community where her superiors disagree with her that climate change adaptation
should be integrated into existing policies. Therefore, there is support for this hypothesis, but
with only one data point, so more data are required to make a strong conclusion.
According to the model, Ms. Gucker from Greenville County, SC and Mr. Meyers from
the City of Fort Pierce, FL should also act defiantly. Both Ms. Gucker and Mr. Meyers have
high levels of independence and they do not face policymaking communities that agree on the
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Figure 8: Predicted Forms of Bureaucratic Action, Based on Observed Autonomy and Agreement Measures
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need to include climate adaptation in existing policy. However, both Ms. Gucker and Mr. Meyers
were observed to have non-confrontational behavior. In these cases, it is possible that the lack of
expressed opinion on climate change led both Ms. Gucker89 and Mr. Meyers90 to choose not to
exercise their available autonomy by taking a more defiant stance. While neither Ms. Gucker nor
Mr. Meyers expressed trepidation about addressing climate change, neither attempted to draw
attention of elected officials in their communities to their climate adaptation efforts.
The second part of hypothesis 5 addresses cooperative behavior. It posits that when there
is high agreement in the policymaking community and the bureaucrat has high autonomy, we
should see bureaucrats cooperating and working with politicians to address climate change. Six
bureaucrats were observed demonstrating cooperative behavior, but according to the model only
five were predicted to be acting cooperatively. In other words, the model correctly predicted the
actions of Mr. Brown, Mr. Revell, Mr. Freudenthal, Mr. Cook, and NV-Local Bureaucrat-282,
but missed for NV-Local Bureaucrat-895.
NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 was predicted to be in the politician-led action quadrant but
acted cooperatively. It is possible that the Water for the Season’s organization imposed a
cooperative structure which overcame the limits that NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 might otherwise
have encountered due to their low level of autonomy. Future studies should look at the influence

89

Data on the political leanings and climate change attitudes of residents of Greenville County, SC suggest that the
county is conservative. In 2008, 37.2% of voters chose the Democratic candidate: Barack Obama for president. In
2012, 35.2% supported Obama and in 2016, 34.7% voted for Clinton (New York Times, 2009; New York Times,
2013; New York Times, 2017). However, there is concern about climate change (59% believe climate change is
happening, 44% are worried about it, and 32% believe it will hurt them personally (Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, &
Leiserowitz, 2016).
90
Data on political leanings of the residents of Fort Pierce, FL and attitudes on climate change for the city are
unavailable because they are aggregated at the county, not city, level. However, the county level data for St. Lucie
County (where Fort Pierce is located) suggest a moderate population. Fifty-six percent (55.7%) voted for Obama in
2008, 53.5% voted for Obama in 2012, and 47.5% voted for Clinton in 2016 (New York Times, 2009; New York
Times, 2013; New York Times, 2017). Additionally, 62% of St. Lucie County residents believe climate change is
happening, 51% are worried about climate change, and 34% think it will hurt them personally (Marlon, Howe,
Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016).
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of organizations like Water for the Seasons and the Yakima Integrated Plan which change local
policymaking dynamics (for work on cooperation in public admininstration generally, see Ansell
& Gash, 2007; McGuire, 2006). It is likely that participation in these organizations by lowautonomy bureaucrats gives them more equal footing with their superiors to present ideas and
work collaboratively when they might not have otherwise.
Overall, the model correctly predicted five of the six incidents of cooperative behavior.
The model could be improved by including a dimension measuring the existence and influence
of an external organization like Water for the Seasons and the Yakima Integrated Plan, especially
because these organizations often have multiple goals. Individuals and governments may choose
to become involved because one goal is especially important to them but end up adopting the
other goals as a byproduct of their involvement. Additionally, this can lower the potential
political costs for elected officials who might be unwilling to break with their partisan or
ideological commitments. And this project finds some evidence that politicians who identify as
conservative are taking action on climate change and working cooperatively with their
bureaucratic staff to address the issue – like Commissioner Jewell in Kittitas County or
Commissioner Leita in Yakima County.
Part three of hypothesis 5 addresses politician-led action. It predicts that politician-led
action will occur when bureaucrats have low levels of autonomy in a policymaking community
with high levels of agreement on climate change adaptation. In the model, four bureaucrats were
predicted to demonstrate politician-led action: NV-Local Bureaucrat-895, Ms. Murray, Ms.
Fitzpatrick, and Mr. Donaldson. (Ms. Drum was also a participant in this project but is not
included as a case because she could not be reached for an interview to confirm her actions and
attitudes as reported by her coworkers.) As discussed above, NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 actually
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worked cooperatively to address climate change. The model was mostly accurate for this form of
action, predicting three of the four bureaucrats correctly.
The final form of action was non-confrontational behavior. As the fourth part of
hypothesis 5 says, we expect to see non-confrontational behavior to occur when bureaucrats have
low levels of autonomy and they face a policymaking community that disagrees about the need
to adapt. The model predicts that four bureaucrats will engage in non-confrontational behavior:
Mr. Bishop, Mr. Satterlee, Mr. Bessey, and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762. However, six bureaucrats
were observed engaging in non-confrontational behavior. As discussed above, Mr. Meyers and
Ms. Gucker were predicted to behave defiantly but instead acted in a non-confrontational way.
Another interesting thing to note: for all six bureaucrats who engaged in nonconfrontational behavior, their elected officials did not take a public position on climate change.
It is possible, then, that defiant behavior emerges in the face of true disagreement but nonconfrontational behavior is more likely when the elected leaders and the bureaucrat’s superiors
are apathetic on the issue. This inspired a closer look at the power of bureaucrats to shape local
climate responses without involvement from elected officials. It appears that limited progress can
be achieved by bureaucrats on their own without help from elected officials or other sources of
support.
While the model correctly predicted the behavior of 13 of the 16 bureaucrats in the study
who acted to address climate change, the inaccurate predictions exposed flaws in the model
which are worth examining. First, bureaucratic behavior appears to be better predicted by the
bureaucrat’s understanding of support from other policymakers. Even though the bureaucrats in
the defiant behavior and non-confrontational behavior categories acted to address climate
adaptation, they were less committed than those in the politician-led and cooperative action
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categories. The involvement of elected officials seems to lend a legitimacy (possible a sense of
democratic accountability) which allows local bureaucrats to make changes in policy.
Furthermore, non-confrontational behavior was best predicted by an apathetic attitude on
the need for climate adaptation among elected leaders rather than disagreement that climate
change adaptation is needed. Many local elected officials did not even comment on climate
adaptation. It is possible, then, that local elected officials as a group (on average) do not see the
local level as the correct scale for addressing adaptation. Future studies should examine how
widespread this sentiment is among local elected officials, because this is potentially a large
barrier to local adaptation. Additionally, cooperative action was better predicted by the presence
of a collaborative partnership project than by the bureaucrat’s level of autonomy. This makes
sense because the partnership externally imposes a cooperative structure which inspired elected
official involvement and equalizes bureaucratic involvement in the partnership.
Even though the model had a high accuracy rate: 13 of 16, it should be improved before
being applied to a larger sample. It revealed the need for including more variables which change
the dynamic between bureaucrats and their superiors. For instance, including the role of resource
availability might help explain why some bureaucrats chose to act and others did not as well as
why some acted in one way and not the other.
4. Conclusion and Implications
The central questions of this chapter were (1) do local bureaucrats influence and create
local climate adaptation policy (in small- to medium-sized cities and counties in conservative
areas) and (2) how do they achieve this? From a sample of 30 bureaucrats from 18 cities and
counties, 16 bureaucrats took action (in nine cities and counties) to develop climate adaptation
policy in their communities.
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The approach these 16 bureaucrats took varied. Most (15 of 16) used their area of
expertise to provide information about the risks their community will face as the climate changes
(supporting hypothesis 3). Many, but not all, thought that integrating climate change into existing
policies would be the way to begin adapting (supporting hypothesis 4). Four bureaucrats
presented this argument to their superiors or peers. Five more supported ongoing efforts to
address climate change they did not initiate themselves. Two bureaucrats thought a
comprehensive policy approach is needed to address climate change and began working with a
third co-worker to create one. And five bureaucrats used their discretion to add climate
adaptation to existing policy.
Bureaucrats commonly used the precautionary principal to support adaptation. In this
way, they separated local adaptation efforts from larger debates on cause and blame related to
climate change. By separating these arguments, they could more easily gain the support of
conservative politicians who do not believe climate change is the fault of humans (McCright &
Dunlap, 2011).
This study also shows the importance of multi-stakeholder organizations which
encourage cooperation between groups and between politicians and bureaucrats in local
governments. Projects like Water for the Seasons in Nevada and the Yakima Integrated Plan in
Washington state provide structures for local governments to address an otherwise expensive and
overwhelming issue like preparing for sea level rise or mega-droughts.
Chapter 4 tested the model shown in Figure 1 that argued bureaucratic action – defiant
behavior, cooperative action, politician-led action, or non-confrontational behavior – is
influenced by the interaction of bureaucratic autonomy and problem definition agreement. The
model correctly predicted the behavior of 13 of the 16 bureaucrats. Despite this high success
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rate, I argue that there is only partial support for the model (and therefore hypothesis 5). The
three bureaucrats the model did not correctly describe revealed the need for revising the model.
Bureaucratic autonomy did not interact with problem definition agreement entirely as expected.
First, defiant behavior is the product of disagreement and high autonomy as expected, but
this combination is necessary but not sufficient. There were bureaucrats who had high
disagreement levels and high autonomy who did not act at all: NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 and Mr.
Holland from Craven County (see Appendix F). Therefore, something else is necessary to
explain the choice to act defiantly rather than not at all. Potentially the bureaucrat needs to feel
like she has support for her actions from outside the local government. For Ms. Cox in
Pasquotank County, this came in the form of UNC Chapel Hill students who completed a sea
level rise vulnerability analysis and presented it to the local elected officials. It could also have
resulted from a change in state leadership (see Chapter 5 for a longer discussion of the role of the
state in local climate adaptation).
Second, two bureaucrats who were predicted to act defiantly engaged in nonconfrontational behavior instead (Ms. Gucker and Mr. Meyers). Looking at the six bureaucrats
(from three local governments) who acted non-confrontationally, their behavior is better
explained by politicians’ non-engagement with climate change adaptation as an issue. This
supports the idea that bureaucrats can be an alternative policymaking pathway (see Klyza and
Sousa, 2008). Bureaucrats can act on low salience issues with real consequences for the
community that elected leaders are uninterested in (due to limited attention, ideological
commitments, partisan consequences, etc.). Considering this, non-confrontational behavior has
less to do with autonomy than the model suggests. Instead, the ability to influence policy using
discretion was the only necessary element in the autonomy measure. In short, non-
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confrontational behavior is better understood as the outcome of (1) unengaged politicians, (2)
bureaucrats thinking the issue is pressing, and (3) bureaucratic discretionary ability.
Cooperative action is also underexplained. While bureaucratic agreement with superiors
is necessary, high autonomy is not. The existence and influence of multi-stakeholder
organizations does more to explain cooperation than high autonomy. While there is a great deal
of research looking at collaboration and networks in public administration (see Ansell & Gash,
2007 for an overview of collaboration and Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004 for an
overview of networks), none to date examines how these structures influence the relationship
between bureaucrats and the elected officials they serve or how collaborative structures and
networks alter bureaucrats’ level of autonomy. The data in this project suggest that multistakeholder organizations shape bureaucrat-elected leader relationships by encouraging them to
cooperate more, becoming partners representing their locality instead of principal and agent.
While the politician-led action category fit the model well, this does not provide insight
into bureaucratic behavior because it represents the straightforward elected-leader-as-principal
and bureaucrat-as-agent model expected in politician-bureaucrat relationships. This category just
represents those bureaucrats who agree with the politicians they serve, so moral hazard is not a
problem.91
Overall, this chapter demonstrates that bureaucrats play a significant role in the
development of local climate adaptation policy. They move policy through exercising discretion,
arguing that potential costs of inaction outweigh the costs of preparedness (precautionary
principal), and participating in multi-stakeholder organizations to share costs and tackle larger

91

Moral hazard is a frequently studied concern in the bureaucratic politics literature. Moral hazard describes the
situation where agents do not share the same values as their principals, forcing principals to create incentive
structures so agents will act in line with principal’s values (Eisenhardt, 1989).
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projects. Not all bureaucrats who thought climate adaptation was important acted, but the
majority did (16 of 21).
In the next chapter, I examine how policymaking dynamics for climate change adaptation
change when we look at states as the principals and bureaucrats as agents representing their
localities.
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CHAPTER 5: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONTEXT AROUND DISASTER MITIGATION AND
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
1. Introduction
Local government bureaucrats’ actions are shaped by their intergovernmental context in
addition to the preferences of local political leaders. This chapter seeks to describe the
intergovernmental signals bureaucrats receive on climate adaptation and understand how those
signals shape bureaucratic action in the realm of disaster management policy.
Disaster management policy is largely set by the federal government through FEMA and
administered by local governments. FEMA provides resources, sets standards, and encourages
local participation in its programs through a mix of grants and funding incentives. State
governments set additional standards and serve as an intermediary between FEMA and local
governments. Local governments who participate in FEMA’s programs – including hazard
mitigation planning and floodplain management – can receive grants and other fiscal benefits.
While local governments have effectively ceded authority over the shape of disaster
management policy to the federal government, scholars have described this as a willing trade by
local governments who lack the resources to act on their own (Birkland & Waterman, 2008).
This arrangement is described by Conlan (2006) as opportunistic federalism instead of the more
cooperative federalism that dominated intergovernmental relations at the close of World War II.
In an opportunistic federalism system, individual governments work to pursue their best interest
without concern for institutional arrangements and effective policy implementation. For disaster
management, local governments must cope with a system that encourages them to craft disaster
management policies in the hope of pleasing multiple principals in order to secure the funds and
other resources they need to prepare for and respond to disasters. When an agent responds to
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multiple principals, they are responding to a dynamic and often competitive environment where
their principals are jostling for power – and in this case policy outcomes (Whitford, 2005).
Local bureaucrats tasked with disaster management are then left to interpret a
complicated intergovernmental environment. As Figure 9 (below92) shows, FEMA crafts policy
requirements and provides funding for disaster mitigation policy to state governments,
specifically state emergency management agencies. Those agencies then set additional

Figure 9: Principal-Agent Relationships for Local Implementation of Disaster Mitigation
Policy
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Agent to principal
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92

hires and pays
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expertise on how to craft local
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federal requirements

This is also described in Chapter 1, Section 7.
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Local Bureaucrat
(agent, answerable to
local, state, and
federal governments)

requirements and potentially add extra money to FEMA funds, but they do not implement
disaster management policy. The role of implementer is left to the local government, which in
this case is specifically the local bureaucrat in charge of disaster management. The local
bureaucrat is the individual who crafts local policies and ensures they are aligned with state and
federal requirements so that the local government can receive funding in the event of a disaster
or for completing projects to minimize the impacts of predictable disasters.
Local bureaucrats, therefore, are answerable to three sets of principals: FEMA, state
emergency managers, and local elected officials. As it pertains to climate change adaptation, all
three sets of principals are not likely to be pleased by the same action. For this study, cases were
chosen specifically so that conflict would be likely between these principals. As this chapter will
show, FEMA and state governments often send conflicting signals which are compounded by
local principals’ anti-climate attitudes or apathy for disaster management policymaking (except
in times of crisis, as described in Chapter 4).
Taking into account this complex intergovernmental arrangement, this chapter tests the
hypothesis that money talks in deciding how local bureaucrats navigate the disagreements
between their various principals. Since bureaucrats must follow the chain of command where
they must first interact with state governments before accessing resources from FEMA, I test the
following: When state governments oppose climate change action, local bureaucrats are less
likely to act for fear of losing an important source of disaster mitigation or relief funding
(Hypothesis 6).
To test this hypothesis, this chapter is organized as follows: In section 2, I describe the
signals from the federal government on climate change, focusing on President Barack Obama93
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President Obama was in office for the entirety of the data collection for this study, and therefore the President
whom local bureaucrats would be responding to.

155

and FEMA. Then, in section 3, I look at state governments’ attitudes on climate change. Section
4 describes the status of local climate policy for each case as well as how local bureaucrats’
actions are understood vis-à-vis state principals. Finally, in section 5, I evaluate hypothesis 6 and
find that only one local government chose not to address climate change because it might
endanger their relationship with the state and subsequent opportunities to receive disaster
mitigation funding. Although bureaucrats are responding to multiple principals, it does not
appear that they craft disaster management and climate adaptation policy to please state
principals. This may be due to the low salience of disaster management policy, the highly
technocratic (bureaucrat-expert controlled) nature of disaster management policy, and the
relative freedom many local governments have in creating their own policy free from state
oversight. These reasons are described in more detail in the conclusion.
2. Signals from the Federal Government on Climate Change
This section considers the signals sent by President Obama and FEMA about climate
change adaptation in disaster management policy. First it addresses President Obama’s
leadership on climate change because it shapes FEMA’s policy priorities. Second, it examines
FEMA’s climate adaptation and disaster management policies.
2.1 President Obama’s Administration and Climate Change Adaptation
During his presidency, President Obama issued several executive orders directing federal
agencies to consider climate change mitigation and adaptation. Executive Order 13514 –
“Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance” – established
climate mitigation as an important goal of the Obama Administration and federal agencies.
Section 16 of this order addressed climate adaptation, saying:
“In addition to other roles and responsibilities of agencies with respect to
environmental leadership as specified in this order, the agencies shall participate
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actively in the interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, which is
already engaged in developing the domestic and international dimensions of a
U.S. strategy for adaptation to climate change, and shall develop approaches
through which the policies and practices of the agencies can be made compatible
with and reinforce that strategy.” (Executive Order No. 13514, 2009).
Four years later on November 1, 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13652 –
“Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change.” This order instructed agencies
to promote:
“(1) engaged and strong partnerships and information sharing at all levels of
government, (2) risk-informed decision-making and the tools to facilitate it, (3)
adaptive learning in which experiences serve as opportunities to inform and adjust
future actions, and (4) preparedness planning.” (Executive Order No. 13652,
2013)
This Executive Order also established the State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on
Climate Preparedness and Resilience, a body representing all levels of U.S. government and
indigenous governments. The Task Force was charged with making recommendations to the
president for how federal government agencies could help communities respond to climate
change. They issued their recommendations to the President in a public document published in
November 2014 and a subsequent update in July 2015.
The Executive Order and recommendations from the Task Force pushed federal agencies
to develop climate adaptation plans and, where possible, encourage and support local efforts to
adapt to climate change. The next section describes how FEMA addressed climate change
adaptation under the Obama Administration.
2.2 FEMA Climate Change Adaptation Policies
First, it is important to understand how FEMA’s policies are administered to understand
how they address climate change adaptation. FEMA’s policies are administered at the local level
(see Figure 9). While FEMA does employ some of their own emergency responders who help
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local emergency responders, most FEMA employees work at an administrative level: drawing
flood maps, approving local hazard mitigation plans, and helping develop disaster response and
mitigation measures. While FEMA relies on local bureaucrats to implement their policies, the
agency rarely has a direct relationship with local bureaucrats. Instead, they work through state
governments and interact with local governments only in the aftermath of disasters or during
specific projects (like disaster preparation efforts). FEMA, then, largely provides resources to
local governments. With these resources, FEMA provides information and sets standards which
encourage local governments to approach emergency management in a certain way – in this case
in a way that is sensitive to climate adaptation.
The federal government addresses flooding and drought through two FEMA programs:
Hazard Mitigation Planning (disaster preparation and response programs94) and the National
Floodplain Insurance Program (NFIP). Both programs are structured so that local governments
implement large portions of the programs. I will briefly describe the role local governments play
in implementing these policies. First, I describe hazard mitigation plans. Second, I describe the
NFIP.
Local governments craft their own disaster preparedness plans – called hazard mitigation
plans – which outline steps they will take to minimize potential damage from likely disasters
(e.g. severe storms, hurricanes, floods, droughts, and earthquakes) and how they will respond
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Hazard mitigation plans address drought as well, but mostly focus on the frequency of drought. These plans are
not necessarily equipped to address the complex water storage solutions needed to truly address drought. Instead,
water storage is addressed through the Bureau of Reclamation which addresses drought management in the U.S.
west by attempting to store enough water for agriculture, commercial, and domestic use in aquifers and reservoirs.
Hazard mitigation plans do not address expanding these storage basins, but rather include plans for responding to
drought like enforcing water restrictions (not watering lawns every day, rationing water, etc.). This project does not
address the Bureau of Reclamation because it does not have the same principal-agent relationship to local
governments that FEMA does. The Bureau of Reclamation works in partnership with local governments, but it only
maintains water storage on federal land. Local governments have an interest in how much water is stored on federal
land because that water eventually leaves federal land and is used by localities. However, localities do not
implement the Bureau of Reclamation’s policies in the same way they implement FEMA’s policies.
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should a disaster strike. If FEMA approves a local government’s hazard mitigation plan,95 the
local government qualifies for increased levels of federal government support in the aftermath of
a disaster and is eligible for disaster mitigation grants (i.e. preventing the worst impacts of
predictable disasters).
Although FEMA has some first responders who arrive on the scene of major disasters –
like Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, etc. – local governments’ first responders are the first
on the scene and the last to leave. Furthermore, local government bureaucrats (in departments
like engineering, land management, zoning enforcement, building code enforcement, and
emergency management) work to implement disaster preparedness programs. These programs
include strategies like setting up early warning systems, keeping buildings out of flood-prone
areas, and setting up evacuation plans and shelters. Most of the time, FEMA’s role is to support
local government bureaucrats with data, best practice suggestions, and other resources so that
local bureaucrats can effectively implement disaster management efforts.
Similarly, the NFIP is implemented by local actors. FEMA employees provide guidelines
for local flood ordinances that local governments must meet to qualify for insurance and issue
flood maps to help them determine areas where flooding is most likely to occur.96 FEMA also
developed a ranking system called the Community Rating System which evaluates the strength
of flood management policies in a community. Higher rankings for the Community Rating
System lead to lower insurance rates for members of a community. However, local governments
are responsible for enforcing flood ordinances which address things like how high buildings need
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State governments approve the plans before they are sent to FEMA. This means that both the state government
and FEMA have veto power over local government hazard mitigation plans.
96
Flood maps are complex, negotiated political documents as much as they are reflections of a scientifically
measured flood risk. FEMA issues maps based on flood models and satellite imaging, but local governments can
appeal the maps. Sometimes these changes are motivated by a greater understanding of local conditions. However,
they are also motivated by economic or political reasons which distort objective flood risk (Pralle S., 2017).
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to be above base flood elevation and where habitable structures can be built. Flood policy is
enforced through a combination of zoning rules, building codes (and inspections), and land use
planning documents. While FEMA sets policy parameters, they do not engage in implementation
of flood insurance policy.
FEMA began to incorporate climate adaptation into their policies following President
Obama’s Executive Order 13514. In January 2012, FEMA Administrator W. Craig Fugate and
FEMA Office of Policy and Program Analysis Director David J. Kaufman signed and released a
new administrative policy on climate change adaptation. The policy’s purpose was:
“…to establish an Agency-wide directive to integrate climate change adaptation
planning and actions into Agency programs, policies, and operations.”
In line with this policy, FEMA’s guidebook for local hazard mitigation planning was updated to
include climate change adaptation. In the October 1, 2011 edition, the guide first mentioned
climate change as a factor local governments could include in their plans. The guide said that
including extra elements like climate change adaptation signals that the community is genuinely
interested in hazard mitigation and that these communities “will be better positioned to receive
FEMA technical and financial assistance to implement their actions or projects,” (p. 6). In the
March 2013 update to the guidebook, FEMA took this a step further by encouraging local
governments to address climate change adaptation and giving more guidance on how to do so:
“The planning team may decide to include a discussion of the impacts of climate
change in the risk assessment. This is not required by federal mitigation planning
regulation, but can provide a better understanding of how risk may change in the
future. Climate change in and of itself may not be a hazard, but it may change the
characteristics of the hazards that currently affect the planning area. The planning
team can include climate change as a separate section in the plan or within
descriptions of the existing hazards, such as severe storms, flooding, wildfire, and
drought.” (p. 5-8)
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Similarly, the NFIP and Community Rating System programs encouraged communities
to consider climate change and sea level rise in their planning. NFIP went through several policy
changes and revisions since Hurricane Katrina revealed serious flaws in the program.97 To
address climate change, FEMA began incorporating sea level rise into their flood modeling
(although it did not make it into the official maps sent to communities) and added climate change
as a dimension for local communities to consider in crafting their flood plans. The agency also
announced that applications for community flood ratings and hazard mitigation programs that
take climate adaptation into account are more likely to be funded. While they are not requiring
climate adaptation planning, they are sending strong signals encouraging it.
FEMA’s strategic plan (2014-2018) included several references to the importance of
climate adaptation for disaster management. The document called for the emergency response
community to take the risks from climate change seriously. They wrote:
“A changing climate is already resulting in quantifiable changes to risks
communities face, showing that future risks are not the same as those faced in the
past. State, tribal, territorial, and local demands for climate-enabled risk
management information and tools are expected to rise and evolve as the need to
adapt to climate change increases.” (p. 29)
FEMA developed climate adaptation resources and made them available on its website.98
They included tools for (1) sea level rise mapping, calculators, and a guide for sea level rise
adaptation, (2) a new process for threat and hazard identification which includes climate
modelling, (3) access to climate.gov – a large federal data repository for climate data, and (4)
links to other government agencies’ efforts on climate adaptation.

For a complete history of these changes, see “A Broke, and Broken, Flood Insurance Program” in The New York
Times (Walsh, 2017)
98
Data collection for this project ended in November 2016. All conclusions reflect Obama-era only FEMA climate
actions. Since then, several of these resources have been removed from FEMA’s website.
97
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FEMA also launched several pilot programs to encourage climate adaptation innovation
including the Community Resilience Innovation Challenge. This program funded 30
communities’ climate adaptation projects. It is a public-private partnership, funded by the
Rockefeller Foundation and administered by the Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness
Foundation.
In sum, under the Obama Administration, FEMA began to incorporate climate adaptation
into their policies and encouraged local governments to start considering how they might need to
adapt to climate change. It incorporated climate adaptation goals into its hazard mitigation plan
program and its flood insurance program, sending strong signals that climate adaptation is
important for local governments.
3. State Government Climate Change Attitudes
In this section, I describe the attitudes of each state government on climate change and
the signals they send to local governments about the issue. First, however, it is useful to
understand the different forms of state-local relationships. State-local relations are often
described as Dillon’s rule or home rule states. These classifications do not come from the U.S.
Constitution, it does not mention local governments. Instead, the evolution of state-local
relationships has been largely left up to interpretation by the courts. Two court cases in particular
defined the spectrum of state-local relations. Both were written in the aftermath of the Civil War
when the courts began ruling on questions pertaining to state-local relationships as city
governments grew in size and influence. Judge John Dillon from Iowa wrote in an 1868 ruling
(Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and the Missouri River Railroad, 1868) that local governments were
subordinate to state governments. They could not craft their own policies independent of state
approval. In contrast, Judge Thomas Cooley from Michigan ruled in 1871 that local governments
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had an inherent right of self-governance (People v. Hurlbut, 1871). These two perspectives –
commonly known as Dillon’s Rule and home rule (Cooley’s ruling) – came to define the
spectrum state-local relationships (Richardson, Jr., 2011).
However, modern scholars of federalism argue that juxtaposing Dillon’s Rule and home
rule is an oversimplification of state-local relationships (Richardson, Jr., 2011; Grumm &
Murphy, 1974; Wolman, McManmon, Bell, & Brunori, 2008). Instead, home rule and Dillon’s
Rule represent two different and not entirely conflicting interpretations of state-local
relationships. According to Richardson (2011), Dillon’s Rule is a statutory interpretation used by
courts to clarify legislative intent whereas home rule is a way to clarify the separate spheres of
state and local power and responsibility. Grumm and Murphy (1974) argue that over time the
move towards or away from Dillon’s Rule or home rule interpretations of state-local
relationships is less meaningful than the concentration of power in bureaucracies over elected
politicians.
Wolman et al. (2008) constructed a measure of state-local relationships to describe the
amount of autonomy local governments have in each state to create and implement their own
policies, going beyond the home rule-Dillon’s Rule dichotomy. Their measure attempts to
capture the range of areas where local governments have influence over policy and fiscal
freedom to achieve those policy goals. As the authors describe, the measure:
“define[s] local government autonomy conceptually as a system of local
government in which local government units have an important role to play in the
economy and the intergovernmental system, have discretion in determining what
they will do without undue constraint from higher levels of government, and have
the means or capacity to do so.” p. 377
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Wolman et al. build their measure based on: (1) local government importance in the
intergovernmental system, (2) policy discretion,99 and (3) local government capacity. According
to their measure, the five states in this study range from high local autonomy in Florida to lowto-moderate local autonomy in Washington State. Wolman et al.’s scores range from the highest
local autonomy in New York State (score = 0.845) to the lowest autonomy in Delaware (score =
-0.982). The scores for the five states in this study below are:
Table 10: Wolman et al. Scores for Local Autonomy
State
Florida
South Carolina
North Carolina
Nevada
Washington

Score
0.378
0.201
0.131
0.103
-0.073

Low or High Local Autonomy
Moderate-high autonomy
Moderate-high autonomy
Moderate autonomy
Moderate autonomy
Moderate-low autonomy

Although not representing the extremes of high- and low-autonomy, Wolman et al.’s
scores show that there is variation in local autonomy across the five states in this study. As this
chapter will demonstrate, local governments in moderate-high autonomy states (Florida and
South Carolina) are more able to act without worrying about state attitudes.
Next, I discuss the attitudes of each state government on climate adaptation. The states
are arranged from most anti-climate change adaptation to pro-climate change adaptation.
3.1 North Carolina
North Carolina’s government alternated between Democratic control and Republican
control since 2010. During periods of Democratic control, the state encouraged climate
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Discretion is used by Wolman et al. (2008) slightly differently than by scholars focused on bureaucratic action
(like Teodoro (2011) and Lipsky (2010)). In this chapter, Wolman et al.’s version of discretion is referred to as
“policy discretion” and street-level bureaucratic discretion is referred to as “implementing discretion”. Both
represent important aspects of local bureaucrats’ autonomy as representatives of their local government (agents) to
the state government (the principal).
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adaptation and during periods of Republic control, the state actively discouraged climate
adaptation. The reversals of policy in 2012 which continued until 2016 drew national attention –
including that of comedian and satirist Stephen Colbert100 - for changing policy to downplay the
threat of sea level rise along the state’s vulnerable coastline.
In 2010, the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission released a sea level rise
assessment which determined that the coast will experience 39-inches in sea level rise by the
year 2100. This analysis was completed by a panel of scientists and engineers who generated
predictions using historical trends and climate change prediction models (N.C. Coastal
Resources Commission's Science Panel on Coastal Hazards, 2010). The 39-inch rise in sea level
rise would devastate the coast – washing away most of the Outer Banks and flooding cities in the
Inner Banks region, as Figure 10 shows.
The report drew opposition from the newly created NC-20 advocacy group.101 NC-20
represents the 20 coastal counties in North Carolina and is comprised of public officials, county
managers, and business leaders (Dewitt, 2014). In 2010, the state legislature (the General
Assembly) was controlled by Democrats and the Governor – Beverly Perdue – was a Democrat.
During Purdue’s tenure as governor, NC-20’s initial lobby efforts made no changes in the
Coastal Resources Commission’s conclusions on sea level rise or state policy.

On June 4, 2012, Stephen Colbert’s Colbert Report news-comedy-satire program drew national attention to a law
which prevented the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission from using climate change models to predict
future sea level rise. This move was mocked by the comedian who said, “I think this is a brilliant solution, if your
science gives you a result that you don’t like, pass a law saying the result is illegal. Problem solved.”
101
According to the group’s website, NC-20 formed to oppose new state stormwater regulations proposed by the NC
Department of Environmental Quality’s Environmental Management Commission. The group saw the new
regulations as onerous. It quickly turned its advocacy efforts to fighting the Coastal Resources Commission sea level
rise estimates when they were released as well.
100
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Figure 10: Map of Predicted Sea Level Rise along North Carolina Coast
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However, in 2011 Republicans won a majority of seats in the General Assembly. In 2012,
the legislature passed a four-year moratorium on new sea level rise reports and directed the
Coastal Resources Commission to revise its prediction based on a 30-year limited outlook
(Dewitt, 2014). This policy change was welcomed by members of the NC-20 organization. The
changes drastically limited the predicted sea level rise to 8 inches by privileging historical data
over climate modeling (Rawlins, 2012).
By 2013, when Republican Governor Pat McCrory took office, sea level rise had become
a hot button issue in the state. As Governor, McCrory supported appointments to the Coastal
Resources Commission who were interested in protecting economic development over providing
sea level rise predictions and included members of NC-20 on the Commission.102 When the
commission met in spring 2014, it voted to limit sea level rise studies to a 30-year outlook
corresponding with the term of a typical home mortgage (WUNC News, 2014).103
Governor McCrory repeatedly attributed climate change to natural cycles and questioned
the extent to which humans were causing changes in global temperature and climate (Associated
Press, 2014). Therefore, from 2011 to 2016, North Carolina’s local governments received strong
signals from the legislature and the governor to avoid discussion of climate change or sea level
rise.
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The Coastal Resources Commission members (13 total) are appointed by the Governor, Speaker of the House,
and Senate President Pro Tempore. During this period of Republican control in North Carolina government (20132014), two thirds of the Coastal Resources Commission were replaced (WUNC News, 2014).
103
At the end of the data collection phase of this study, no new sea level rise predictions had been issued. However,
the election of Democratic Governor Roy Cooper led to changes in the state’s climate change and sea level rise
policy. Governor Cooper joined the US Climate Alliance in September 2017 to address climate change in-lieu of the
federal government withdrawing from the Paris Agreement (Bennett, 2017; Friedman & Plumer, 2017).
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3.2 Florida
Florida’s state government similarly changed positions on climate change adaptation. It
initially supported action under Governor Charlie Crist, and then rescinded this support under
Governor Rick Scott. However, the policy changes matched changes in the governorship more
than changes in partisan control of state government. (Florida has been dominated by Republican
legislators and Republican governors since 2010.) Charlie Crist became Governor of Florida in
2007 (as a registered Republican, but he later switched to be an Independent in 2010, (Lazar,
Konstantinides, Rossoll, & Greve, 2013)) and made climate change an immediate priority. He
addressed it in his first State of the State address, convened a summit in Miami to discuss climate
risks, and signed legislation encouraging renewable energy and greenhouse gas emissions
reductions. In direct contrast to Crist’s actions, Governor Rick Scott began his term in 2011 and
started deprioritizing the issue and dismantling Crist’s efforts (Dennis & Fears, 2017; Dearen &
Kay, 2015). According to Associated Press writers Jason Dearen and Jennifer Kay,
“[Florida state government] has yet to offer a clear plan or coordination to address
what local officials across Florida’s coast see as a slow-moving emergency.
Republican Gov. Rick Scott is skeptical of man-made climate change and has put
aside the task of preparing for sea level rise, an Associated Press review of
thousands of emails and documents pertaining to the state’s preparations for rising
seas found.” (Dearen & Kay, 2015)
Governor Scott’s administration also banned state environmental bureaucrats from using
the phrases climate change, global warming, or sustainability (Korten, 2015). While the
governor’s office has denied that this is an official policy – unwritten or otherwise – critics of the
governor point to quotes from former state bureaucrats and a hearing where Brian Koon (Chief
of the Florida Division of Emergency) engaged in verbal gymnastics to avoid saying “climate
change” during questioning from the Florida Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
Transportation, Tourism, and Economic Development (Elfrink, 2016). Furthermore, scientists
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working on a wide range of reports for the state have confirmed they were encouraged or
pressured to remove references to climate change from reports they were working on (Allen,
2015).
However, Florida’s state legislature took steps to address climate change and sea level
rise, albeit small ones, during Governor Scott’s tenure. In May 2015, the legislature passed, and
Governor Scott signed, a bill which mandated local government comprehensive plans include sea
level rise as a cause of flood risk (Florida Sea Grant, 2015). The law targeted flood risk planning
generally, and the inclusion of sea level rise as a required element expands on earlier versions of
the law that allowed and encouraged local governments to consider sea level rise but did not
require it.
While Florida’s governor is not actively working to address climate change, the 2015 sea
level rise requirement for comprehensive planning demonstrates he is not trying to stop all
climate action. However, neither the state Division of Emergency Management nor the
Department of Environmental Protection (two agencies most likely to address climate change in
Florida) have resources to help local governments adapt to climate change on their websites.
3.3 South Carolina
The South Carolina state government largely stayed silent on climate change. Governor
Nikki Haley has made no public comments on climate change104 but has often pointed to the
efforts her state made to protect the environment (Phillips, 2014). Even during Hurricane
Joaquin, which dumped up to 20 inches of rain in parts of South Carolina (Weather.gov, 2015),
leading to historic flooding in October 2015, Governor Haley did not address the potential link

104

As Governor, Haley was largely silent on the issue. However, in her new role as United Nations Ambassador for
the United States, she has spoken on the issue representing President Trump’s position on the issue (Skiba, 2017).
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between the storm’s unusual severity and intensity and climate change. Instead she focused on
emergency response efforts.
The state legislature has not directly addressed climate change either. Conservationists in
the state characterize the body as catering to special interests instead of addressing
environmental concerns. Nancy Cave – the north coast director of South Carolina’s Coastal
Conservation League – spoke about a bill, which on its face was responding to sea level rise for
the community of Debordieu Beach, saying:
“I don’t think our legislature has acknowledged climate change in any way, shape,
or form, so I don’t think that’s something they really think about as they make
decisions and vote on issues. I think that this is special interest legislation that a
group of wealthy and influential voters are able to influence.” (Atkin, 2014)
Debordieu Beach is a wealthy coastal community. The bill approved building a sea wall around
beach houses. Environmental and climate advocates argue that this is a band-aid solution because
the sea wall will encourage erosion and provide a false sense of security for beach residents
against rising sea levels and storm surges.
South Carolina’s only government report addressing climate change was written by the
state’s Department of Natural Resources in 2011. The report outlined the expected rate of
warming in South Carolina and the consequences this warming will have on ecosystems and
species. The report generated some controversy because it was not immediately released when
finished. According to environmental and climate advocates, the report was shelved for more
than a year.
The report was finished in November 2011 under the leadership of Department of Natural
Resources Director John Frampton. Shortly after its completion, Frampton said he was pressured
to leave his position as director by an administrative appointee of Governor Haley (who was in
her first year as governor). Although Frampton believed the report was ready for public release,
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it was not released until after an article came out on February 23, 2013 in The State newspaper in
Columbia, SC. The article, written by Sammy Fretwell, said:
“A team of state scientists has outlined serious concerns about the damage South
Carolina will suffer from climate change – threats that include invading eels,
dying salt marshes, flooded homes and increased diseases in the state’s wildlife.
“But few people have seen the team’s study. The findings are outlined in a report
on global warming that has been kept secret by the S.C. Department of Natural
Resources for more than a year because agency officials say their ‘priorities have
changed.’”
The document was released but has not appeared to influence state policy.
3.4 Nevada
The State of Nevada has done very little to address climate change – neither encouraging
nor discouraging local governments to prepare for the impacts of climate change. Governor
Brian Sandoval became Nevada’s governor in 2011 and has been taking the drought problems in
Nevada seriously while in office, although he is not linking them to climate change. California’s
drought problems were more dramatic than those in Nevada,105 but the same drought system was
impacting both states. In 2015, Governor Sandoval organized a drought summit and a panel of
eight experts called the Nevada Drought Forum to develop solutions to the chronic water
shortages in the state (Rindels, 2015; Snyder, 2015; Associated Press, 2015).
When asked about climate change, Governor Sandoval carefully avoided addressing its
cause (mainly human driven greenhouse gas emissions), but he also committed his state to
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by investing in renewable energy. In an interview with

105

California experienced a historic mega-drought which devastated water supplies in the state. The drought spurred
serious questions about sustaining California’s thirsty agricultural economy, if people have the right to buy extra
access to water, and how to govern extreme water shortages which may become more common with climate change
(Fountain, 2015; Nagourney, Healy and Schwartz, 2015).
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RealClearPolitics, Governor Sandoval was asked if humans were the main driver of climate
change. He responded,
“I’m not qualified to answer that question… let me tell you what we’ve done,
without getting to whether it’s human-caused or whatever that may be.” (June
2014)
While the Governor was unwilling to take a firm stance on the causes of climate change, in 2017
he supported several state bills to encourage clean energy development in the state.106
Additionally, Governor Sandoval fought to attract Tesla’s battery factory to the Reno-Sparks
area in 2014 (Ward, 2014).
The only state document to address climate change comes from the Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources’ Nevada Natural Heritage Program. The report – “State
Wildlife Action Plan” – was published in 2012 and acknowledges the threat climate change
poses to wildlife and ecosystems in Nevada.
Overall, Nevada’s state government is neither encouraging nor discouraging local
government action on climate change, and it is not taking any definitive steps of their own to
address the issue.
3.5 Washington State
Washington State, unlike the other four states in this project, is actively working on
climate change mitigation and adaptation. These efforts are driven by the state’s Democratic
leadership and liberal population centers around Seattle.107 Washington State began its efforts in
2008 after Governor Christine Gregoire issued Executive Order 07-02 which ordered state
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The Nevada legislature meets once every two years. A search of the 2013, 2015, and 2017 legislative sessions
revealed only one bill which identified climate change as a reason to change state or local policy. Senate Joint
Resolution No 10 in 2017 addressed the problems with overconsumption and water shortages in the Colorado River
Basin. It identified climate change as an additional stressor on the river.
107
King County was the first county to publish an adaptation plan in 2007 (Georgetown Climate Center, 2015).
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agencies to mitigate climate change and develop adaptation strategies (Washington State
Executive Order, No. 07-02, 2007). A year later, the legislature approved the State Agency
Climate Leadership Act (SB 5560) which ordered state agencies to craft an integrated response
to climate change to “better enable state and local agencies, public and private businesses,
nongovernmental organizations, and individuals to prepare for, address, and adapt to the impacts
of climate change.”
Since becoming governor in 2013, Jay Inslee worked to maintain Washington State’s
reputation as a climate leader. He introduced several mitigation initiatives, including a
controversial carbon tax. His efforts faced opposition in the legislature (Brunner, 2015).
Members of the legislature cited the costs of these programs and the potential harm they might
cause to the economy as reasons to oppose them. According to the Seattle Times, opposition is
coming from both the Republican-controlled state Senate and moderate Democratic members of
the state House of Representatives (mostly from rural areas) (Brunner, 2015).
Governor Inslee took several steps on his own including traveling to the UNFCCC
COP21108 meeting in Paris where he signed agreements committing his state to greenhouse gas
reduction agreements with other nations (Governor Jay Inslee's Office, 2015a; Governor Jay
Inslee's Office, 2015b; Bernton, 2015). He also supported projects related to climate adaptation.
As Mr. Revell from Yakima County, WA said, climate change projects almost always draw the
governor’s attention. He said,
“If you are going to get a hold of the Governor's attention, just talk about carbon
reduction and climate change. He came up to look at our reservoir, and that was
the price of his visit. He wanted to talk about climate change. Which we agreed
because if in fact the climate is changing and getting warmer, we need to be more
drought resilient.” (Interview with Scott Revell, September 16, 2016).

108

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties 21
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The state’s agencies, especially the Department of Ecology, are developing and
implementing their own climate adaptation strategies. Reports from various state agencies cover
sea level rise, ecosystem and habitat health, and transportation vulnerability (Georgetown
Climate Center, 2017). However, the most inclusive report was published by the Department of
Ecology in April 2012. The report – “Preparing for a Changing Climate: Washington State’s
Integrated Climate Response Strategy” – addresses how existing policies and programs can be
updated to prepare the state for the likely impacts of climate change.
4. Local Governments Climate Policy
Sections 2 and 3 established that local bureaucrats are responding to many (often
conflicting) signals on climate change. Local governments in North Carolina are actively told not
to adapt to climate change. Florida is sending signals that climate adaptation is not their policy
priority, but because of home rule and local policy autonomy rules, they cannot forbid local
action. In South Carolina and Nevada, climate adaptation is not on the state agenda and state
leaders’ avoidance of the subject does not encourage (or, to be fair, explicitly discourage) local
action. In only one state – Washington – are local governments actively encouraged to address
climate adaptation. As hypothesis 6 suggests, local governments respond to signals from state
governments so they can access money from the state and money from the federal government
funneled through state governments.
To evaluate hypothesis 6, this section covers two things. First, it gives an overview of the
status of climate adaptation policy in each case. Chapter 3 addressed if climate adaptation was on
the agenda and which actors brought the issue onto the agenda. Chapter 4 described local
bureaucrats’ actions to integrate climate change into existing policies. However, this project has
thus far not outlined the status of any local policies. It is important for evaluating hypothesis 6 to
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understand the status of climate adaptation policy, especially because many localities in this
study are addressing climate adaptation through hazard mitigation plans that are required by
FEMA to be eligible for disaster management grants.109
The second part of this section re-examines bureaucratic action in light of state attitudes.
It employs the same five categories of action used in Chapter 4 but changes the principal in the
principal-agent relationship from local elected leaders to state governments. If bureaucrats were
acting as hypothesis 6 suggests, they would avoid conflict with the state because we would
expect to see fewer bureaucrats acting in a defiant way110 and more seeking to follow the state’s
lead (state-led/politician-led action), cooperating with the state’s wishes (cooperative action), or,
if they choose to act against the state’s wishes, trying to minimize any potential harm by acting
in a non-confrontational way.
4.1 Climate Change Policy Status for Each Case
The status of climate change policy across these 18 cases varies a great deal; in some
cases, it is not on the agenda and in others, climate adaptation policies are in the implementation
stage. Each case is described in Table 11. Each locality’s climate change adaptation policy status
was labeled as either (1) not on the agenda, (2) on the agenda, (3) policy formulation, (4) policy
adoption, or (5) policy implementation.111

109

To be clear: local governments are not (yet) required to include climate adaptation in documents they submit to
FEMA. They are required to evaluate their disaster risk and outline steps for minimizing risk before disasters and
responding to disasters should they occur to minimize harm. FEMA has encouraged the inclusion of climate
adaptation in these documents.
110
Considering only one bureaucrat acted defiantly, as identified in Chapter 4, we should see no bureaucrats acting
defiantly.
111
These categories are based on Anderson, Brady and Bullock III’s model of the policy process in Public Policy
and Politics in the United States (1978). Where Anderson, Brady and Bullock III have five categories, they slightly
differ from those presented here. The authors use five categories: agenda setting, formulation, adoption,
implementation and evaluation. Here, the evaluation stage is dropped because adaptation policies are new, and few
are being evaluated. The fifth category used here is “not on the agenda”.
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Additionally, this project recognizes the difference between policies that are adopted
awaiting implementation (i.e. the strategies for implementing the policy are not yet in place) and
policies that are adopted but are largely unimplemented. In a few cases, climate change
adaptation was included in a policy document, but the local bureaucrats and politicians are not
aware of the policy. Therefore, it has been adopted, but that adoption is not changing how the
government operates.
As Table 11 shows, climate change adaptation is not on the agenda in three cases, four
cases have climate adaptation on the agenda but there is no further action, two cases are
formulating policies, four cases have adopted policies but these policies are not implemented,
two cases have adopted policies that are awaiting implementation, and three cases are
implementing their climate adaptation policies.
Table 11: Status of Local Government Climate Change Adaptation Policy
Case

North Carolina

Craven
County

Policy Status

Evidence

Adoption of
policy, but
unimplemented

There was action in 2009 by integrating climate adaptation into the Land Use
Plan (October 2009), but these actions were for “monitoring” and “cooperation”
with other governments. There were no independent efforts except one project:
a bulkheading project. Interview indicated that this action was not actively
implemented. In many ways the local government was not committed to the
plan.
They are currently doing nothing to address threat of climate change, and not
including climate change in any updated plans.

City of
Elizabeth
City

City of
Havelock

On the agenda,
but no action

Adoption of
policy, but
unimplemented

The issue has been discussed, but there is no discussion about policy responses
or efforts to formulate a policy.
Heard from group of students about need to adapt to sea level rise, but not
crafted any response.
Climate adaptation is on the agenda and even incorporated into the
comprehensive land use plan from 2009. However, interview indicated that this
is not something that is being actively pursued. There is no evidence that
Havelock is doing anything about this aspect of the plan. In many ways the plan
is unimplemented.
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Table 11: Status of Local Government Climate Change Adaptation Policy
Case

Policy Status

Evidence

On the agenda,
but no action

Interviews and documents show climate adaptation is being discussed, and an
EPA grant was used by UNC students to do a study and make recommendations
about policy change. Interviews indicate that climate change is not being
actively considered to be integrated into existing policy.

Pasquotank
County

Policy
formulation

Climate adaptation has been discussed and elected officials are not signaling
support for sea level rise studies/climate action. However, climate adaptation
has been introduced into the Albemarle Regional HMP which included
participation from two Pasquotank bureaucrats. Additionally, Shelley Cox
assisted UNC students in their study of sea level rise issues in Pasquotank
County. Cox and Christy Saunders (Emergency Management) are making some
efforts to work on climate adaptation, but the elected officials’ stances are likely
preventing any action.

City of
Fort Pierce

On the agenda,
but no action
(governmentwide)

Local bureaucrats are using discretion to discourage development in areas
threatened by climate-driven flooding. There is no government-wide policy.

Martin
County

Adoption of
policy, but no
implementation
yet

Climate adaptation was integrated into the Local Mitigation Strategy as a
hazard to be considered, but there are no steps to respond. Also, there are efforts
by bureaucrats in the engineering department about creating a separate policy
for adaptation, but again no concrete steps to implement.

St. Lucie
County

Adoption of
policy, but no
implementation
yet

Climate adaptation (especially to sea level rise and increasingly severe tropical
storms) is included in their hazard mitigation documents – the old and the
updated. They have a long section on sea level rise. However, there are no
indications that implementation is happening in any way for adaptations to
these threats. They are being studied, recognized, and incorporated into
documents that would allow for concrete steps, but there is no indication of
building infrastructure, hiring adaptation planners, or creating adaptation
systems.

Carson
City

Adoption of
policy, but
largely
unimplemented

Climate change is included in the hazard mitigation plan, including lengthy
descriptions of the hazards posed by climate change. However, no concrete
actions have been taken to implement the policy. During interviews, climate
change was not acknowledged as part of their drought management strategy.

City of
Fernley

On the agenda,
but no local
government
action

The city is working with the Water for the Seasons project but have not
integrated any of the project’s recommendations into their own policy efforts.

Nevada

Florida
Florida

North Carolina

City of
New Bern
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Table 11: Status of Local Government Climate Change Adaptation Policy

South Carolina

Case

Policy Status

Evidence

Greenville
County

Policy
formulation

Local bureaucrats are discussing climate adaptation, but not taking any action to
integrate it into existing plans. Discussion about putting climate adaptation into
the update for hazard mitigation plan but it did not make it into existing plan
beyond a brief mention that it should be studied. It is possible that forward
progress would be stopped if FEMA did not require climate adaptation to be
considered.

City of
Mauldin

Not on the
agenda

Climate change is not mentioned in meeting minutes, planning documents,
media coverage of local government, or interviews with bureaucrats.

City of
Greer

Not on the
agenda

Climate change is not mentioned in meeting minutes, planning documents,
media coverage of local government, or interviews with bureaucrats.

Oconee
County

Not on the
agenda

Climate change is not mentioned in meeting minutes, planning documents,
media coverage of local government, or interviews with bureaucrats.

Adoption of
policy, but
unimplemented

Climate change is included in the hazard mitigation plan, including lengthy
descriptions of the hazards posed by climate change. However, no concrete
actions were taken to implement the policy and the current emergency
management program coordinator and county commissioner did not
acknowledge it when asked about climate change policy. This is an instance
where the document reflected unimplemented policy.

Implementation
of policy

Climate change is fully integrated into the Kittitas County Hazard Mitigation
Plan with action items. Interviews indicate there are steps being taken to meter
water and require low-flow fixtures. Not all of this is solely driven by climate
change (there was an over-allocation problem in the county for groundwater
supplies) but worry about climate change is integrated in the need for action.
Additionally, the county is a full participant in the Yakima Integrated Plan,
which takes climate change seriously and is taking concrete steps to deal with
climate change-drought.

Implementation
of policy

There is a budget line for aquifer storage and delivery to address climate
adaptation. Additionally, the city is a full participant in the Yakima Integrated
Plan, which takes climate change seriously and is taking concrete steps to deal
with climate change-drought.

Washington

Grant
County

Kittitas
County

City of
Yakima

Yakima
County

Implementation
of policy

The city’s water utility is attempting to address climate change. They are also
participants in the Integrated Plan which has taken concrete steps to adapt to
climate change. Interviews indicated participation in the Integrated Plan is
important for the irrigation districts and the county.
The Roza Irrigation District in the county is also pursuing many projects to
increase water storage as a precaution against drought from climate change.
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4.2 Local Governments’ Actions Vis-à-vis State Bureaucrats
Table 12: Types of Bureaucratic Action, with State Governments as Principals

Form of Action

Description
Bureaucrats know that the state government does not want the local government
adapting to climate change, but the bureaucrat acts anyway.

Defiant Behavior

Cooperative
Action

Politician-Led
Action

NonConfrontational
Behavior

No Action

Examples: write policy documents, change department policy, use discretion to change
implementation of existing policies to make them fulfill adaptation goal while voicing
need to adapt so that state leaders can be aware of their actions
Local bureaucrats work with the state government to address climate change adaptation
through local government policy. Local bureaucrats or the state government can initiate
policy changes. Both bureaucrats and the state government stay involved in policy
development past the initial idea to start addressing climate change.
Examples: state government representatives work with bureaucrats at regular meetings
to create adaptation policy, state government representatives and bureaucrats become
involved in a multi-stakeholder organization to develop a climate adaptation strategy
The state government initiates climate change adaptation policy development, but
unlike cooperative action they do not stay involved. In other words, the state
government “assigns” climate change adaptation to local governments, and bureaucrats
in local governments take up the issue.
Examples: state government requires climate change adaptation included in planning
documents then leave to bureaucrats to enforce, state government requires local
governments to consider the impacts of sea level rise on their communities and create
an action plan to prepare then leave to local governments to find strategy to achieve
this
Local bureaucrats take steps to adapt to climate change but try to avoid attention of the
state government. Bureaucrats may avoid drawing the attention of the state government
because they know the state government will disagree or they do not know the attitudes
of the state government but do not want to involve them for other reasons.
Examples: bureaucrats include climate adaptation in a document they write which the
state government does not evaluate or review, bureaucrats use discretion to achieve
climate adaptation goals through existing policies but do not announce to the state
government
Local government and the local bureaucrat do not take steps to address climate change
adaptation through role as government employee. Bureaucrats can believe climate
change is a problem. They can also think that their local government should do
something to adapt. However, they are not doing anything themselves (either initiating
or supporting someone else) to address the impacts of climate change.
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Local bureaucrats’ action (or inaction) to address climate change is viewed differently
when state politicians and agencies are the principals instead of local politicians. Furthermore,
inaction in several cases might be the local bureaucrat following the wishes of politicians. In this
section, local bureaucrats’ efforts on climate change are reconsidered in light of state principals’
attitudes about climate change.112 This uses the five categories of action: (1) defiant behavior, (2)
cooperative action, (3) politician-led action (here also called state-led action for clarity), (4) nonconfrontational behavior, and (5) no action. Table 12 describes these five categories considering
state politicians and agencies as the principals.
4.2a Defiant Behavior

Seven bureaucrats in three cases – all in Florida – acted defiantly to a limited extent. St.
Lucie County, the City of Fort Pierce, and Martin County all took small steps to start addressing
climate adaptation, including adding it to their hazard mitigation plans. However, their efforts to
address climate adaptation outside the hazard mitigation plans is not defiant because the state
government does not review bureaucrats’ discretionary behavior or local policies.
As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.4, Marc Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 from
Fort Pierce, FL acted non-confrontationally vis-à-vis their local principals. They encouraged
local property owners and developers to be aware of the threats sea level rise and climate-driven
flooding posed in the city. This behavior is also non-confrontational in regard to state principals
because the state of Florida cannot review the independent discretionary actions of local
bureaucrats. However, the inclusion of sea level rise and climate adaptation in the St. Lucie
County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan (that Fort Pierce was a participant in) is a

112

See Section 3 of this chapter for state principals expressed attitudes and Section 2.7 in Chapter 4 for a description
of local bureaucrats’ actions vis-à-vis local principals.
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defiant behavior. The state government reviews these plans before they are sent on to FEMA for
review.
Similarly, the actions of Mark Satterlee and Jason Bessey from St. Lucie County were
non-confrontational vis-à-vis their local principals. As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.4, they
used existing policies to adapt to sea level rise – making sure to update sea levels so that flood
management policies reflect increased risk. Again, this action is non-confrontational both for
local principals and state principals because they are using their discretion and implementation
power to achieve climate adaptation. However, including climate adaptation and sea level rise in
the St. Lucie County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan is a defiant action.
The bureaucrats from Martin County took more defiant actions overall compared to their
peers in Fort Pierce and St. Lucie County. Their efforts vis-à-vis their local principals were
politician-led, as described in Chapter 4, Section 2.3. Anne Murray, Kathy Fitzpatrick, and
Deborah Drum were asked by Commissioner John Haddox to begin developing a comprehensive
sea level rise plan. Director of Engineering Don Donaldson’s efforts to keep flood management
policies up-to-date also contributed to this effort, although Mr. Donaldson did not begin acting
upon the request of Commissioner Haddox. In a way, he took initiative on his own, but his
efforts did fit the larger goal set by Commissioner Haddox. When the state government is the
principal, however, Martin County’s efforts are defiant. They are aware of the state
government’s policy preferences (to not address climate change) but began a comprehensive
planning effort. Additionally, Martin County included sea level rise and climate change as
threats in their hazard mitigation plan. By acting in defiance of the state’s preferences, Martin
County’s efforts firmly fit the defiant behavior category.
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While bureaucrats in all three Florida cases acted defiantly, they did so at lower risk than
in other states. Florida local governments have a great deal of autonomy over policymaking.
Because of the state’s home rule structure (high local autonomy), local governments do not need
the permission of the state to take on new policy objectives like sea level rise. This was
confirmed in an interview with Jamie Leigh Price, the Mitigation Planning Manager for the
Florida Division Emergency Management:
“… we have what is called a home rule state in Florida, which means the counties
have more power than the state, so we cannot tell them what to profile or how …
we can suggest, but we can't tell them how or what to do.” (Interview with Jamie
Leigh Price, February 26, 2016)
She went onto say that the Division of Emergency Management also sees its job as to support
local efforts, even if those are to include climate change as a hazard:
“A lot of our local counties have profiled sea level rise. Some of them as an
effect, and some as their own hazard. Oh, especially our southeast counties. They
have always been very proactive in general. They have a Southeast Florida
Climate Change Compact - that's not the right name of it, that's the vague name of
it. So they have been focusing on and looking at these types of effects and the
changes moving forward for quite some time now. And we've recently approved
multiple plans that have sea level rise as an option. … We do support the counties
doing whatever they want to do, and we will help them find the information they
need for whichever hazard they want to profile, how they want to profile them regardless of what any state legislature might say, the locals govern themselves so
we support the way they want to do things.” (Interview with Jamie Leigh Price,
February 26, 2016)
Interestingly, Ms. Price’s statements confirm the contradictory nature of Florida’s state
climate change adaptation policies. The state government – both the governor and the legislature
– are not supporting state-wide climate adaptation. However, state agencies whose job it is to
work with local governments are supporting those governments who choose to take on climate
adaptation.
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While the actions of Florida counties still fit the categorization of defiant behavior, their
defiance is “safer.” They are receiving support from the state agency which reviews plans before
they are sent to FEMA, and the other actions they have taken are not reviewable by the state
government partially because they rely on bureaucratic discretion and partially because Florida is
a home rule state.
4.2b Cooperative Action

Four bureaucrats’ actions (from three cases) are cooperative with the state government,
and all four also fit the cooperative action category when local politicians are the principals.
They are Mark Cook from Kittitas County, WA, Joel Fruedenthal and Scott Revell from Yakima
County, WA, and David Brown from the City of Yakima, WA. As described in Chapter 4,
Section 2.2, these local bureaucrats worked cooperatively to integrate climate change adaptation
into their drought management policies through the Yakima Integrated Plan. Through the
Integrated Plan, local bureaucrats work cooperatively with a variety of actors to address drought
management and climate adaptation: their local principals, other local bureaucrats, state
bureaucrats from the Washington Department of Ecology, federal bureaucrats from the Bureau
of Reclamation, representatives from the Yakima Nation, and representatives from advocacy
organizations.
The Yakima Integrated Plan is unique and grew out of decades of conflict over water in
the Yakima Basin. Before the Integrated Plan, stakeholders were embroiled in litigation over
water use, eventually leading them to seek a way to break the litigation-driven gridlock. Mr.
Fruedenthal from Yakima County described the unusually cooperative atmosphere around
drought management in the area:
“With the Integrated Plan there is a great deal of cooperation, and that is unusual.
And so it is painful for folks to get approval to certain things - the regulations and
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the ordinances are set up in an adversarial way, and we are not totally adversarial
here.” (Interview with Joel Fruedenthal, September 19, 2016)
This was echoed by Mr. Cook from Kittitas County:
“Kittitas County is part of the Yakima Basin Integrated Water Plan, so Yakima
County, the Yakima Nation, Kittitas County, Kittitas Conservation District,
Ellensburg Water Company, all these private irrigators, all these various
municipalities, we all pulled together in and are all managed comprehensively
under a multi-county, multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional plan. So it is unique in
the country.” (Interview with Mark Cook, September 21, 2016)
When describing the history and origins of the Yakima Integrated Plan, Mr. Van Gundy also
pointed to the unusually cooperative nature of the project:
“We developed a lot of trust - mutual trust - and started pulling together this
program that we've got now. “And it's being looked at nationwide as being pretty
much a historically successful process that everybody can do. And they are
spreading the word among areas where there is a lot of controversy and legal
action and so forth, and telling them, 'Look at the Yakima Project and what
they've done, and that's what you need to do.' And to help promote that, we are
getting a tremendous amount of state support and a tremendous amount of federal
government support to make it a success, so they can continue to promote it
among everybody else.” (Interview with Ron Van Gundy, September 26, 2016)
This cooperation – across jurisdictions, levels of government, and public and private
organizations – has enabled the region to attempt and to finish projects that would otherwise be
unachievable by individual local governments, including projects addressing climate adaptation.
As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.2, the structure of the Yakima Integrated Plan also
encourages bureaucrats to take on politically charged or unpopular issues in addition to other
more politically palatable and popular goals. As several people expressed, the causes of climate
change are not important in their discussions relative to the need to respond to the changes:
“And we could debate why it is changing and what you can do about it, ... But, if
it is changing, it is changing. It doesn't matter why, it just is.” (Interview with
Scott Revell, September 16, 2016)
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Furthermore, the structure and scope of the Yakima Integrated Plan makes it somewhat insulated
from changes in state or federal government climate change attitudes and priorities. As Mr. Cook
said:
“And I think, to [the organization’s] credit, that the Integrated Plan is such a big
animal, that it is kind of moving along with or without the state.” (Interview with
Mark Cook, September 21, 2016)
The institutional path dependency literature supports this, showing that organizations like the
Integrated Plan set up institutions and systems that are difficult to change after they become
established (Pierson, 2000; Pierson 2004). Climate change was incorporated into the Integrated
Plan at its conception, so it is likely the organization will maintain its commitment to addressing
climate change.113
4.2c Politician- or State-Led Action

Of the 16 bureaucrats who acted to address climate change adaptation, zero did so
because states led the way. This result should not be interpreted as evidence that states cannot or
do not encourage, force, or coerce local bureaucrats to adopt climate adaptation policies. Rather,
this result is likely due to the purposeful selection of cases where local bureaucrats faced an anticlimate change political environment. With the exception of Washington State, all of the state
governments in this study were either apathetic to climate adaptation or actively sought to
discourage climate adaptation efforts in their states.
In Washington State, the local governments who acted to address climate adaptation did
so cooperatively through the structure of the Integrated Plan. The one local government in
Washington State that did not act on climate change was Grant County. To some extent, Grant
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The first test of this was the transition from the Obama Administration to the Trump Administration. The Trump
Administration’s move away from climate change has not led to the Integrated Plan removing climate adaptation
from their priorities, although the lack of funding for the project has led to delays (Yakima Basin Integrated Plan,
2018)
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County did respond to pressure from the state government to adapt to climate change: they
incorporated climate change into their hazard mitigation plan published in 2013. The
Washington State Department of Ecology reviews local hazard mitigation plans before they are
submitted to FEMA and encouraged local governments to include climate change. However,
when interviewed, neither Emergency Management Department Project Manager Sandi Duffey
nor County Commissioner Cindy Carter were aware of climate adaptation or drought
management efforts. This indicates that inclusion of climate adaptation in the hazard mitigation
plan was more lip-service rather than an actual policy commitment. Thus, Grant County is most
appropriately labeled as no action.
4.2d Non-Confrontational Behavior

With state governments as the principals, the second largest group of bureaucrats fit in
the non-confrontational behavior category. Five of the 16 bureaucrats who acted to adapt to
climate change through their flood or drought management policies acted non-confrontationally
vis-à-vis their state principals. They were from three cases: Greenville County, SC, Fernley, NC,
and Pasquotank County, NC. There is a great deal of variety in how these bureaucrats acted:
ranging from low-effort/low-impact to high-effort/high-impact approaches.
Of the five, two were also in the non-confrontational behavior category when local
politicians are the principals: Brian Bishop and Paula Gucker from Greenville County, SC. Two
had been in the cooperative action category: NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 and NV-Local
Bureaucrat-282 from Fernley, NV. One had been in the defiant behavior category: Shelley Cox
from Pasquotank County, NC. In the following paragraphs, I describe the range of actions these
five bureaucrats took, why they are non-confrontational vis-à-vis their state principals, and why
the three bureaucrats who changed categories did so.
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As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.4, Paula Gucker and Brian Bishop from Greenville
County, SC took minimal steps to incorporate climate change adaptation into their local flood
management efforts. They added a line to Greenville County’s hazard mitigation plan
acknowledging that climate change is a threat multiplier for existing natural disasters like
flooding, and they committed to study climate adaptation for inclusion in future iterations of the
plan. This action is non-confrontational because Ms. Gucker and Mr. Bishop had no reason to
expect mentioning climate adaptation would go against the wishes of the state government
because the South Carolina government does not have a strong or clear position.114 Furthermore,
neither mentioned potential opposition from the state government in their interviews.
In Fernley, NV, NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 and NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 worked to
address their city’s climate change-driven drought risk by working cooperatively with local
elected officials and other local entities through the Water for the Seasons project (see Chapter 4,
Section 2.2 for a full description). However, when the state is the principal, the local bureaucrats’
efforts are no longer cooperative because the State of Nevada is not an active participant in the
Water for the Seasons project. The group is comprised of local water rights holders, local
governments, indigenous governments115, and researchers from the University of NevadaReno.116 Furthermore, Fernley’s participation in the Water for the Seasons project to address
their climate-driven drought risk is not defiant for two reasons. First, the state government does

South Carolina’s state government has to approve hazard mitigation plans before they are submitted to FEMA, so
the state government had the opportunity to see and object to the inclusion of climate adaptation. The key for
labeling this action as non-confrontational is that the local government did not expect the state to be upset by this.
115
The indigenous groups are the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, the Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California, and
the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.
116
The group has one representative from the Nevada Division of Water Resources – Kevin Hickenbottom – listed
as a participant stakeholder on its website. However, unlike the Washington Department of Ecology playing an
active role in the Yakima Integrated Plan, the Division of Water Resources is not running the group or playing a lead
role in the group, as far as the Water for the Season’s website and publications show. Personal communication
between Loretta Singletary and the author did not emphasize a large role of the Division of Water Resources as well.
114
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not review the Water for the Seasons project outcomes. Second, the state government does not
have any clear anti-climate change policies. If anything, the governor and legislature are
ambivalent on the topic. Therefore, the Water for the Seasons project and its participants are
neither following the state’s lead or defying the state’s preferences by addressing drought and
climate change.
Shelley Cox – the Planning Director from Pasquotank County – acted nonconfrontationally by limiting her action to the local level. She worked to address climate
adaptation by bringing up the potential threats from climate change in the county and supporting
a group of local students who researched the impacts of sea level rise in the county. As described
in Chapter 4, Section 2.1, Ms. Cox’s actions were defiant vis-à-vis her local principals because
she acted to address climate change fully aware the local politicians did not support climate
adaptation. Although Ms. Cox’s actions were taken with full knowledge of the state’s
disagreement, she did not act in a way that the state could review or comment on her actions. Ms.
Cox’s efforts focused on presenting information to local officials on the need to adapt. Her
behavior would have been defiant if she incorporated climate adaptation into a document that
North Carolina state government officials would review – like a hazard mitigation plan.
4.2e No Action

The same bureaucrats who were in the category of “no action” vis-à-vis local principals
are in this category for state principals: their lack of action does not change based on who the
principal is. (While an argument could be made that not acting to address climate change could
fit the state-led/politician-led action category, this label means not acting on climate adaptation.)
Why bureaucrats chose not to act, however, is important. Only one of the bureaucrats in this
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category did not act because he expected the state to object and prevent them from addressing
climate adaptation.
As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.5, there is one bureaucrat who did not act because
he felt the state would prevent any climate adaptation efforts: Landin Holland, a consultant
planner for Craven County and other coastal North Carolina local governments. Mr. Holland
pointed directly to the North Carolina state government’s anti-climate adaptation attitudes as a
reason not to act. He said:
“Well, one thing that is quite interesting and intriguing is that, in our [hazard]
mitigation plans, under this cycle, under our current regime in terms of governor
and our legislature, we are not allowed to acknowledge or discuss in any way
shape or form sea-level rise in these mitigation plans. I mean it is basically, I
won't use the word illegal. But we are not allowed to discuss it. And if it is in
there, the State of North Carolina State Office of Emergency Management makes
you remove it prior to submitting it to FEMA.” (Interview with Landin Holland,
September 11, 2015)
Since he is a consultant for many local governments, other local governments (beyond the cases
in this study) also held back from acting on climate adaptation because of Mr. Holland’s
understanding of the political climate in the state.117
None of the other bureaucrats who did not act to address climate change pointed to state
pressure as a reason they did not act. Two acknowledged that the state would have more
resources and therefore would be a better level of government to address climate change:
Kimberly Hamel from the City of Mauldin, NC and Amanda Boone from New Bern, NC. The
remaining 11 bureaucrats in the study who did not act on climate change did so for other reasons
including not thinking climate change would be a problem for them or feeling the issue would

117

Mr. Holland spoke specifically about Craven County for most of the interview he gave for this project. However,
on this topic he broadened his comments to more areas in coastal North Carolina.

189

never reach the local government’s agenda (see Chapter 4, Section 2.5 for a more complete
description).
As stated at the beginning of Chapter 5, we would expect to see fewer bureaucrats acting
defiantly if they were worried about the state government blocking access to disaster
management funding. However, more bureaucrats’ actions are considered defiant from the
perspective of a state principal than from the perspective of a local principal. Thus, the way
bureaucrats chose to act on climate adaptation does not support hypothesis 6 which states that
bureaucrats will avoid climate change if the state government is against climate change
adaptation efforts.
Next, I turn to look at federal grant data to see if receiving federal grants or having the
potential to receive federal grants makes a local government less likely to choose to adapt to
climate change if their state government does not support climate adaptation efforts.
5. Local Government Reliance on State and Federal Grants for Disaster Management
This section evaluates hypothesis 6 by looking at which localities rely on federal grant
money for disaster mitigation and which local governments have included climate adaptation in
the hazard mitigation plans they submit to FEMA to be eligible for federal disaster funding. If
local governments have received federal grant money, we would expect them to understand the
importance of satisfying the state government in order to access federal dollars. Additionally,
state governments must approve hazard mitigation plans before they are submitted to FEMA.
Due to this, local bureaucrats might seek to avoid climate adaptation in their hazard mitigation
plans to avoid drawing the ire of state governments and improve their chances of securing grant
funding.
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5.1 FEMA Grants and Hazard Mitigation Plans
Grants are one of the most common tools FEMA uses to encourage states and localities to
prepare disaster mitigation plans. As the literature on fiscal federalism shows, the federal
government’s large budget (relative to state and local governments) allows it to use the promise
of funding and grants to shape subordinate governments’ actions (Oates, 1999). FEMA provides
grants through their hazard mitigation planning programs to states and localities so they can
prepare for and minimize the potential damage of natural disasters. As the federal government
moved to embrace climate adaptation, they encouraged grant applicants to address climate
change in their applications.
Not all local governments have received grants from FEMA for disaster preparation.
Table 13 (below) indicates the FEMA grants received since 2000.

Florida

North Carolina

State

Table 13: Grants from FEMA

Case

Budget Size in
FY2016
(Summer 2015Summer 2016)˚

Number of Grants from
FEMA since 2000†

Total Dollar Amount
in Grants from
FEMA

$7,461,587

Craven County

$101,527,342

22
(Years: 2002, 2007, 2008, 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015,
2016, 2017)

City of Elizabeth City

$64,923,424

0

$0

City of Havelock

$15,466,475

0

$0

City of New Bern

$37,774,254

0

$0

Pasquotank County

$41,217,450

0

$0

City of Fort Pierce

$35,853,263

0

$0

Martin County

$370,733,628

9
(Years: 2002, 2004, 2008)

$12,006,241

St. Lucie County

$472,621,450

14
(Years: 2004, 2008, 2010, 2013)

$16,840,081
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Washington

South Carolina

Nevada

State

Table 13: Grants from FEMA

Case

Budget Size in
FY2016
(Summer 2015Summer 2016)˚

Number of Grants from
FEMA since 2000†

Total Dollar Amount
in Grants from
FEMA

Carson City

$118,011,039

3
(Years: 2005, 2014)

$237,037

City of Fernley

$9,665,060

0

$0

Greenville County

$252,695,643

5
(Years: 2004, 2006, 2008, 2014,
2015)

$5,622,547

City of Mauldin

$3,137,491

0

$0

City of Greer

$20,605,900

0

$0

Oconee County

$41,848,004

4
(Years: 2006, 2014, 2015 2016)

$474,704

Grant County

$861,478

2
(Years: 2005, 2009)

$91,446

Kittitas County

$91,778,331

4
(Years: 2001, 2009 2015, 2016)

$562,317

City of Yakima

$228,105,939

0

$0

Yakima County

$70,142,907

5
(Years: 2006, 2009, 2011, 2016)

$3,720,804

˚ This is the most recent fiscal year for all the cases before interviews concluded in November 2016. Budget size
generally does not fluctuate year to year, except in the case of unusual circumstances like an influx of jobs from a
new business moving in or a loss of property value from a significant disaster. The only cases where this is possible
are Carson City, NV and Fernley, NV which were affected by the new Tesla plant outside Reno, NV.
†FEMA grant programs include Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Severe Repetitive Loss (from flooding),
Repetitive Flood Claims Program, Pre-Disaster Mitigation, and Flood Mitigation Assistance.

As shown in Table 13, not all local governments received hazard mitigation grants from
FEMA. Nine of the 18 cases received zero grants from FEMA: The City of Elizabeth City, NC,
the City of Havelock, NC, the City of New Bern, NC, Pasquotank County, NC, the City of Fort
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Pierce, FL, the City of Fernley, NV, the City of Mauldin, SC, Greer, SC, and the City of Yakima,
WA. In interviews with bureaucrats in these cities, several pointed to resource limitations which
prevented them from even drafting grant proposals. For instance, Amanda Boone from New
Bern, NC said:
“I love grants, I wish I could get grants. Grants kind of come with their own
problems. First of all, it takes a lot of time to even put in an application for a
grant. That is something that is very challenging for local governments to do,
because they don't have extra staff just sitting around doing nothing to write up
grant proposals. ... And then of course most of them require some sort of financial
match and working with the financial portions of the city to make sure that even
though you have that all put together the way it needs to be put together. So,
grants are difficult also because many, many, many places are underfunded.”
(Interview with Amanda Boone, September 24, 2015)
Six of the nine cases that did receive FEMA grants received five or fewer grants. The
remaining three cases – Craven County, NC, Martin County, FL, and St. Lucie County, FL –
received many grants. Craven County received 22 grants, Martin County received nine grants,
and St. Lucie County received 14 grants. Most of the grants for these counties were for
purchasing property in the floodplain to turn into parks or green space118 or raising existing
properties above the base flood level.119 St. Lucie County, FL received the highest dollar value in
grants at $16.8 million. Most of this money funded flood management through storm water
management systems.120 retrofitting public buildings to withstand high winds, and elevating
structures above the floodplain.
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The acquisition of property in floodplains minimizes flood risk in two ways: (1) it reduces the number of people
in the path of floods, and (2) it allows water to soak into permeable ground instead of pooling on impermeable
surfaces like parking lots.
119
This describes the expected height of a 100-year flood, expressed in terms of feet above sea level.
120
Storm water systems in Florida were not included in original subdivision plans (Interview with Jason Bessey,
March 10, 2016). Therefore, these systems need to be installed through retrofitting. This process of installing storm
water drainage pipes, digging ditches, and installing pumping systems is an expensive endeavor.
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As Table 13 shows, FEMA granted significant quantities of money to minimize the
impact of future disasters in several cases. While local government budgets are large, these
grants demonstrate how expensive disaster mitigation – not just climate adaptation specifically –
is for local governments. (Local budgets for FY2016 are given as context.) This point was
underscored by several bureaucrats. Commenting on the cost-benefit ratio for elevating houses,
SC-Local Bureaucrat-413 from Oconee County, SC said:
“That [elevating a home] is a great concept, but when you look at cost and
feasibility, so often it is more feasible and cost-effective for someone to have their
house destroyed than it is for them to have it raised. So, you are making someone
raise their home which costs more money than if it was to be destroyed during a
disaster.” (Interview with SC-Local Bureaucrat-413, March 28, 2016)
Due to the high number of cases in which local governments received no grant money
from FEMA, it is difficult to evaluate hypothesis 6 (“When state governments oppose climate
change action, local bureaucrats are less likely to act for fear of losing an important source of
disaster mitigation or relief funding”) solely on this data. Therefore, I also consider the potential
for grant funding. This is expressed in the form of having approved hazard mitigation plans. As
described above, FEMA approves hazard mitigation plans for local governments. If a locality has
an approved plan, they are eligible for financial assistance in the wake of disasters and have
access to specific disaster mitigation grants.
Table 14 shows the approval date of each locality’s most recent hazard mitigation plan or
plan update and indicates whether the plan addresses climate adaptation. It also shows whether
the locality’s action on adaptation would defy the state government’s wishes on climate change.
In total, there were 12 hazard mitigation plans that included climate adaptation. This reflects in
part the high risk of climate change these areas face – especially in coastal areas where they are
already experiencing sea level rise. However, the high number of hazard mitigation plans that
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address climate change also captures the proactive attitude of many of these communities who
are working to include a new threat (or threat multiplier) that FEMA encouraged them to
consider121.
The inclusion of climate change adaptation in three plans went against the expressed
preferences of the state government (shown in bold in Table 14). They are Pasquotank County
(the Albemarle Sound Regional plan, also covers the City of Elizabeth City), Martin County, FL,
and St. Lucie County (which includes the City of Fort Pierce, FL as well). As described above,
local Florida governments have high policy autonomy. Ms. Price from the Florida Division of
Emergency Management emphasized that this autonomy limits the state’s ability to dictate the
terms of a local government’s hazard mitigation plan.

North Carolina

State

Table 14: Hazard Mitigation Plans

Case

Date Hazard
Mitigation Plan
Approved

Does the Hazard
Mitigation Plan
Address Climate
Adaptations?

Would the State
Government Disapprove
of the Inclusion (or
Exclusion) of Climate
Change

Craven County

2015 (Pamlico Sound
regional plan)

No

No

City of Elizabeth
City

Included in the Pasquotank County plan (Pasquotank is in the Albemarle
Region plan)

City of Havelock

Included in the Craven County plan (Craven is in the Pamlico Sound plan)

City of New Bern

Included in the Craven County plan (Craven is in the Pamlico Sound plan)

Pasquotank
County

2015 (Albemarle Sound
regional plan)

121

Yes

Yes

It is not possible to determine if the high number of hazard mitigation plans with climate adaptation included is
reflective of a greater trend or an anomaly of the cases studied here. The author is not aware of any research that has
systematically studied if local hazard mitigation plans are increasingly addressing climate change.
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State

Table 14: Hazard Mitigation Plans

Case

Date Hazard
Mitigation Plan
Approved

South Carolina

Nevada

Florida

City of Fort Pierce

Washington

Does the Hazard
Mitigation Plan
Address Climate
Adaptations?

Would the State
Government Disapprove
of the Inclusion (or
Exclusion) of Climate
Change

Included in the St. Lucie County plan

Martin County

2015

Yes

Yes

St. Lucie County

2016

Yes

Yes

Carson City

2015

Yes

Governor ambivalent

City of Fernley

2013 (Included in the
Lyon County plan)

Yes

Governor ambivalent

Greenville County

2015

Yes

Governor ambivalent

City of Mauldin

Included in the Greenville County plan

City of Greer

Included in the Greenville County plan

Oconee County

2012 (Part of the
Western Piedmont plan)

No

Governor ambivalent

Grant County

2013

Yes

No

Kittitas County

2012

Yes

No

City of Yakima
Yakima County

Included in the Yakima County plan
2015

Yes

No

The inclusion of climate adaptation in the Albemarle Sound plan (which also covers
Pasquotank County and the City of Elizabeth City) seems strange considering North Carolina
localities have limited autonomy. Moreover, Mr. Holland acknowledged that the North Carolina
196

government would reject any plans that mentioned climate change and would ask for revisions
before it sending it to FEMA for approval. Upon examination of the document, the low-lying
Outer Banks communities at extremely high risk from sea level rise drove the inclusion of
climate change in the document. Sea level rise and climate change are identified as hazards for
the entire region, but only the low-lying Outer Banks communities mention plans to address
them. It is possible that these communities saw the threat as significant enough to include climate
adaptation anyway.
5.2 Are Bureaucrats’ Decisions Shaped by State Government Attitudes on Climate Change?
By considering both actual grants received and the potential for grants received, ensuring
access to disaster mitigation funding is important. However, the fear of potential state
displeasure does not determine whether local governments address or neglect climate change
adaptation. As shown in Table 15 below, three cases support hypothesis 6. The authors of the
Pamlico Sound Hazard Mitigation Plan chose not to address climate change in the document (the
Pamlico Sound plan includes Craven County, New Bern and Havelock, NC) because the North
Carolina government does not want localities to work on climate change. However, during the
interview, NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 acknowledged that there was little local political support
for addressing climate change as well.
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Table 15: Support for Hypothesis 6

Case

Florida

North Carolina

Craven County

Nevada

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Partially – plan does not
mention climate change, but
does not receive grants

No

Partially – plan does not
mention climate change, but
does not receive grants

Yes

No

Yes

No

2015

Yes

No

2016

Yes

No

2015

Yes

No – state government
ambivalent on climate change

Included in the Lyon County
plan

Yes

No – state government
ambivalent on climate change

2015

Yes

No – state government
ambivalent on climate change

Yes

No – state government
ambivalent on climate change

Yes

No – state government
ambivalent on climate change

No

No – state government
ambivalent on climate change

2015
Pamlico Sound regional plan

City of
Havelock

No

City of New
Bern

No

Pasquotank
County

No

City of Fort
Pierce

No

Carson City

Supports Hypothesis 6

Yes

No

Martin County

Includes
Climate
Adaptation

Hazard Mitigation Plan
Approved

$7,461,587

City of
Elizabeth City

St. Lucie
County

South Carolina

Grants from
FEMA

Yes
$12,006,241

Yes
$16,840,081

Yes
$237,037

2015
Albemarle Sound regional plan

2015
Pamlico Sound regional plan

2015
Pamlico Sound regional plan

2015
Albemarle Sound regional plan

2015
In the St. Lucie County plan

2013
City of Fernley

No

Greenville
County

$5,622,547

City of Mauldin

No

Included in the Greenville
County plan

City of Greer

No

Included in the Greenville
County plan

Yes

2015

2015

Oconee County

Yes
$474,704

2012
(Part of the Western Piedmont
plan)
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Table 15: Support for Hypothesis 6

Case

Washington

Grant County
Kittitas County

Grants from
FEMA
Yes
$91,446

Yes
$562,317

Hazard Mitigation Plan
Approved

Includes
Climate
Adaptation

Supports Hypothesis 6

2013

Yes

No

2012

Yes

No

Included in the Yakima County
plan

Yes

No

2015

Yes

No

2015
City of Yakima

Yakima County

No
Yes
$3,720,804

Grant County, WA presents an interesting example of a local government that chose to
include climate change, potentially to appease the state governments’ enthusiasm for climate
adaptation planning. Grant County’s hazard mitigation plan includes an extensive discussion of
adaptation, but the local bureaucrats and politicians interviewed for this project were not aware
of it when asked about local climate change policy. This does speak to hypothesis 6 but does not
provide direct support because the local government’s actions fit Governor Inslee’s wish to adapt
to climate change. Their lack of implementation efforts demonstrates that they were not
committed to the policy change because they saw climate change as a threat they needed to adapt
to.
However, for the remaining 14 cases, local bureaucrats and their governments did not act
in a way that indicates they wanted to conform to the state’s wishes or attitudes on climate
adaptation. It is more likely that local governments are picking up on the signals sent from
FEMA on climate adaptation and working to make their relationship with FEMA stronger. It is
also possible that state emergency managers who review local hazard mitigation plans and grant
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applications to FEMA agree that climate adaptation is becoming an important part of disaster
planning. The state bureaucrats might be engaging in non-confrontational behavior – approving
local documents to be sent to FEMA even though the Governor or legislature may prefer not to
act on climate change.
6. Conclusion
This chapter tested the hypothesis that local governments, and specifically local
bureaucrats working on flood and drought management, would make strategic decisions about
climate change adaptation in order to secure funding from FEMA. Funding from FEMA must
pass through state governments to reach local governments, so we might expect local
governments to align with state governments to secure this funding source. However, the data do
not support this conclusion. Most local governments in this sample did not avoid the subject of
climate change, even when their state governments had clearly expressed preferences that
climate adaptation not be addressed. In only one instance did local actors consciously make the
decision not to include climate adaptation in a document that would be reviewed by their state
government because they were aware of state disapproval: that is the Pamlico Sound Regional
hazard mitigation plan (which covers three cases: Craven County, NC, New Bern, NC, and
Havelock, NC). Craven County received a large number of grants from FEMA in the past 10
years, suggesting that they might be more likely to avoid touchy subjects in order to maintain
access to this funding. Additionally, the local consulting planner who helped craft the Pamlico
Sound Regional plan acknowledged they did not address climate change out of concern for state
censorship.
However, no other cases in this study expressed similar concerns about the state
interfering with their disaster management planning due to the existence of climate adaptation
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provisions. There are a number of factors which help explain this pattern. First, disaster
management policy is generally a nonpartisan policy area (in contrast to climate change
adaptation policy which is highly polarized). In part, this is because disaster management is a
low-salience issue until a disaster strikes. During the periods between events, it is only technical
experts (in this case bureaucrats) who are concerned with the issue (May, Koski, & Stramp,
2016). When politicians become involved, it is often to provide relief to constituents affected by
the disaster. Generally, this is a politically beneficial activity, and politicians “enjoy” the ability
to provide aid (Birkland & Waterman, 2008).122
Second, disaster management policy is largely a technocratic exercise where policy
development and implementation are dominated by bureaucrats trained in emergency
management. Emergency management as a discipline relies heavily on the precautionary
principle. A colloquial phrase captures the precautionary principle well: “An ounce of prevention
is worth a pound of cure.” Disaster management experts often work to minimize the impacts of
disasters before they happen. Similarly, many climate change policy debates are rooted in the
precautionary principle (Applegate, 2010). It is no surprise that a similarly structured argument –
prevent the worst impacts of climate change through pre-disaster adaptation efforts – is
appealing to disaster managers.
Third, only one state government – North Carolina – had both (1) an active anti-climate
adaptation agenda and (2) control over local government policy development (i.e. local
governments had low levels of policy autonomy). In Florida, the state government discouraged
action on climate adaptation and sea level rise adaptation, but local governments have high
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I do not intend to suggest that politicians look forward to disasters or hope they happen. However, disaster
management policy in the US is structured so politicians can take on a “hero” role by providing aid, going to the site
of a disaster, and generally be seen providing comfort (Birkland & Waterman, 2008).
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autonomy. In Nevada and South Carolina, the state government neither encouraged nor
discouraged action on climate adaptation. In Washington State, the governor actively encouraged
climate adaptation. Future research would benefit from the inclusion of more cases where state
governments actively discouraged local action on climate adaptation and local governments have
low policy autonomy. However, the results from this study question the notion that a
combination of anti-climate adaptation signals from the state government and low local
autonomy is enough to prevent local adaptation efforts. Even during the state of North Carolina’s
most active anti-sea level rise efforts, the Albemarle Sound’s Regional hazard mitigation plan
addressed climate adaptation and sea level rise. This piece of evidence lends more support to the
argument that disaster management is controlled by expert bureaucrats trained in emergency
management who are less worried about the political ramifications of their work and more
interested in acting on their best judgment.
These findings speak to the larger point made by this dissertation: local bureaucrats exert
a great deal of influence over the shape of local climate adaptation policy. While only about half
of the bureaucrats acted to include climate change adaptation in local flood or drought
management policy, it was the bureaucrats who acted to integrate climate adaptation in local
policy. Even in the context of intergovernmental relationships, local bureaucrats are important
actors. Their efforts should not be minimized.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Throughout this dissertation, I sought to answer the question: What role do bureaucrats
play in shaping local policy, especially local climate adaptation policy? Bureaucrats are not
typically seen as policymakers, but at the local level they are uniquely situated to shape climate
adaptation policy. They are knowledgeable about the needs of the community, local
policymaking channels, and intergovernmental relations. Additionally, they are isolated from the
partisan (electoral) consequences of taking a position on climate change, so they can be more
open to addressing climate adaptation when elected leaders might shy away.
I show that not all bureaucrats took on the issue of climate adaptation – even in areas
where the risk of climate change flooding or drought was high. However, half of the cases in this
project did have bureaucrats working to address climate change adaptation in their communities.
They were agenda setters, worked to craft new policies with and without support from
politicians, used discretion to encourage community members to take climate risk seriously, and
worked with other governments (local, state, and federal) and community groups to take on large
climate adaptation projects.
I also sought to comment on why bureaucrats would be interested in stepping out of their
role as implementers and take on an issue as controversial and partisan as climate change. The
answer to this question is in two parts. First, local bureaucrats are not only implementers. They
hold institutional knowledge which makes them invaluable advisors to elected officials,
especially because elected official turnover is significantly higher in local government than
bureaucratic turnover. They are accustomed to being involved in policymaking, so stepping into
this role for one issue is not breaking significantly with their role in local governments. Since
they are motivated to be successful at their jobs, and increasingly their work in emergency
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preparedness involves climate change adaptation, bureaucrats in this study talked about
responding to climate change like it was just the next step. Climate change was going to be a
problem, so they needed to come up with a response.
Local bureaucrats are key players in the development of these policies, and climate policy
scholars, climate policy advocates, and others need to pay attention to them. As several cases
demonstrated (Martin County, FL, St. Lucie County, FL, Fort Pierce, FL, Greenville County, SC,
and Pasquotank County, NC), local bureaucrats are working on climate adaptation without the
active involvement – or even awareness – of elected officials. Bureaucrats are running the show
in developing climate adaptation policy. They are paying attention, when few others (if any) in
local government are working on this threat.
Second, bureaucrats are concerned with addressing on-the-ground problems in their
communities. Bureaucrats also acted because they are members of these communities and they
care about their communities. Bureaucrats in Washington State were worried about the impact a
drought would have on their neighbors – the farmers in the area. Florida bureaucrats worried
about how their communities would react to both the next storm and the potential wave of
migrants they would absorb from places harder hit to the south.
In summary, this project shows that local governments – driven by the efforts of local
bureaucrats – are beginning to address climate change adaptation. Although these efforts are
constrained by limited resources and occasional hostility from superior governments, some local
governments are taking climate adaptation seriously. Broadly, this demonstrates that local
bureaucrats, and the governments they work for, are important players in the development of
climate adaptation policy. While bureaucrats are not the only actors – and they were more
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successful when they acted with the assistance or partnership of others – they are important
players in the development of local policy.
1. Bureaucrats Drive Local Climate Adaptation Policy Development
As this project showed, local bureaucrats are active players in the development of local
climate change adaptation policy – from setting the agenda to implementing policies. In some
cases, local bureaucrats dominated the development of climate adaptation policy from start to
finish. In other cases, local bureaucrats drove the process, but worked with politicians, interest
groups, and other policy makers throughout.
Chapter 3 showed that local bureaucrats acted as policy agenda-setters. In nine of the 18
cases, local bureaucrats were the first actors in their respective governments to introduce climate
adaptation to the agenda. In seven of the 18 cases, local bureaucrats raised the salience of the
issue after it was first mentioned by others. Although bureaucrats rarely used public meetings to
discuss climate adaptation, they shaped the local agenda by (1) writing policy language and
crafting entire policy documents like land use plans and hazard mitigation plans with sections
that addressed climate adaptation, and (2) having conversations with other bureaucrats and
elected officials about the need for climate adaptation.
In addition to being agenda setters, local bureaucrats were active players in the
formulation of policy.123 Bureaucrats are vital players in local policy formulation for several
reasons. First, bureaucrats often have more institutional knowledge in local government than
elected officials. Those that have been in the same government for many years understand how
local systems work, are familiar with the culture of the local government, and understand
intergovernmental obligations and requirements. For instance, NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 worked
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Agenda-setting and policy formulation overlap. For instance, writing emergency management plans to address
climate change adaptation both sets the agenda and formulates new policy.
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in Craven County, NC’s government for more than 20 years and spoke about being patient and
picking your battles when dealing with new elected officials. Mr. Van Gundy worked for the
Roza Irrigation District for 40 years and initiated the Yakima Integrated Plan as well as Yakima
County’s groundbreaking drought management strategies. Many bureaucrats do not have the
impressive tenure of Mr. Van Gundy and NC-Local Bureaucrat-823, but they often outlast
elected officials. As many bureaucrats pointed out, they are regularly approached by elected
officials for both their specific expertise (e.g. flood management) and knowledge of systems in
local government. Bureaucrats also used their expertise to encourage the citizens they served to
take climate change threats seriously. As the bureaucrats from St. Lucie County, FL indicated,
when citizens or developers came to them to discuss flood risk they would emphasize that flood
risk is impacted by climate change as well. These (rare) informal conversations changed the
expression of policy even if they did not change the written policies.
Second, local bureaucrats have area-specific expertise which elected officials, city and
county managers, and other bureaucrats call upon and defer to when policies are written. This
dynamic represents an important difference between local governments and state or federal
governments. State and federal legislators and executives are more likely to have professional
staffs that can advise them on policy and draft new policies. The elected officials themselves also
have more time to study policy (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2017; Boushey &
McGrath, 2017). (There are some exceptions: some states have volunteer legislators and some
large cities or county governments can afford staff assistants who serve legislators. However,
this is not common.) Therefore, in local governments, bureaucrats work both to craft policy
language and implement it. This happened in several cases in this project. The team of
bureaucrats in Martin County was asked by an elected official, Commissioner Haddox, to

206

research policies to address sea level rise. Commissioner Haddox did not write the policy or do
his own research, he delegated it to the bureaucrats. In every case with an emergency
management plan that addressed climate adaptation, local bureaucrats – not elected officials –
wrote the policy. For instance, in Greenville County, SC, climate adaptation was added to the
emergency management plan by bureaucrats without consulting elected officials; Ms. Gucker
and Mr. Bishop felt no need to consult with them.
This project also showed that bureaucrats occasionally had informal conversations with
members of the public to make climate-friendly choices. In St. Lucie County, FL, local
bureaucrats encouraged property owners and developers to be aware of their climate-related
flood risk. In Yakima County, the Director of the Roza Irrigation District worked with local
farmers to reduce their water use to minimize the impacts of drought. However, this did not
happen often. More often, bureaucrats worked on climate adaptation by including it in existing
policies and plans like hazard mitigation plans.
Local bureaucrats are involved at every stage of local policy development. We fully
expect them to be policy implementers and evaluators, matching what bureaucrats at the state
and federal level do. However, as this project shows, they are also active agenda setters and
policy implementers. Elected officials at the local level set the general direction of policy but are
much more hands off – at least for climate adaptation, flood management, and drought
management.
This finding demonstrates that principal-agent modeling provides a useful tool for
focusing on important aspects of politician-bureaucrat relationships, but it is a limited picture of
local bureaucratic influence in policymaking. Moving towards a stewardship model of
bureaucratic behavior might help (e.g. Van Slyke, 2006). Stewardship models of principal-agent
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behavior cast bureaucrats and their superiors as cooperative partners in the implementaiton of
policy (i.e. they both believe in the same goal so principals do not need to use coercive measures
to ensure bureaucratic buy-in). However, this approach again is not a complete picture because
bureaucrats can act non-confrontationally or defiantly to change policy.
I am not arguing for moving away from principal-agent theory for the study of
bureaucrats. Instead, this project demonstrates that it should be considered in addition to other
theories of bureaucratic behavior inclduing treating bureaucrats as independent policy actors
with their own motivations, policy preferences, and institutional capacity to shape policy.
Furthermore, when principal-agent theory is employed, we need to take Whitford’s argument
about multiple principals (2005) to heart and acknowledge that bureaucrats are often making
choices between their bureaucratic superiors, elected officials, and the publics they serve.
2. Climate Change Adaptation Is a Low Salience Issue
Climate change adaptation policy is strongly tied to emergency management and natural
disaster policy in all nine cases where it is being addressed. While this is a product of case
selection (I deliberately looked at flood and drought management), climate adaptation is often
framed as a way to prevent damage from new and increasingly severe natural disasters caused by
climate change. The IPCC Working Group on Adaptation looks at natural disasters like droughts,
floods, heat waves, fires, and severe storms (IPCC, 2012; IPCC Working Group II, 2007).
Similarly, the US EPA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
reference natural disasters in their work on climate adaptation (NASA, 2018; EPA, 2018).
Emergency and natural disaster management are issues where salience is low until an
emergency occurs (Birkland T. A., 2006). Most people, most of the time, do not think about
emergency or disaster management. This includes emergency preparedness, what they would do
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in the case of an emergency, or how to recover from an emergency. The bureaucrats who work
on these issues think about emergency and disaster management in their day-to-day work. The
bureaucrats that I spoke with noted that they are often the only people thinking about the
community’s flood and drought management, and they expect to be the only ones because it is
their job. They would bring it up with elected officials and even members of the public
(encouraging them to take their climate risks seriously), but few said they were approached by
elected officials, their bureaucratic superiors, or members of the public with concerns about
emergency management much less climate change adaptation. People do not usually associate
natural disaster response with local governments, even though they expect local firefighters,
EMTs, and police officers to respond in the case of a disaster. People tend to connect disaster
response with FEMA even though FEMA is not involved in most natural disasters – they only
step in during disasters that are large enough or severe enough to warrant a federal disaster
declaration.
These two factors combine to mean that – in a local government – the only people who
are consistently thinking and talking about emergency and disaster management are bureaucrats.
My research supported this. When I contacted local government officials to speak about their
flood and drought policies (and how those policies related to climate adaptation), I was
redirected to one or two bureaucrats whose job focused on emergency management. The few
people I spoke with whose work was unrelated to emergency management had little or nothing to
say on the topic and pointed me to the bureaucrats who were tasked with it. Even the bureaucrats
who were not pursuing climate adaptation acknowledged that climate change could make floods
or droughts worse (although maybe not in their area). Several admitted that elected officials
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largely ignored emergency management until a disaster occurred and indicated that as
bureaucrats they would be tasked with climate adaptation in their communities.
Bureaucrats in areas that experienced repeated floods or droughts – like the droughts in
the Yakima Basin (Yakima County, Kittitas County, and the City of Yakima), floods and
hurricanes in coastal North Carolina, and floods and hurricanes in Florida – had an easier time
raising the issue with elected officials, although they often had to justify their actions by
mentioning negative economic impacts. When emergency management and economic
development clashed, emergency management and related climate change adaptation lost. For
example, a bureaucrat in Craven County, NC lamented that expanding the tax base often
outweighed emergency management. The bureaucrat did not believe that they could pursue
climate adaptation projects because they already faced an uphill battle fighting to mitigate
current flood threats. In Martin County and St. Lucie County, FL, the creation of the Seven50
plan to address climate change threats in the area received significant pushback from citizens and
elected officials because it was seen as limiting economic growth.
3. Consequences of Bureaucrats Driving Local Climate Adaptation Policy Development
What are the consequences of bureaucrats dominating the development of local climate
adaptation policy? First, and most obviously, if local bureaucrats control the development of this
policy, they are the actors that advocates should approach to influence the direction of policy.
Their predilections or any biases they have are likely to show up in climate adaptation. As this
project found, many local bureaucrats emphasized the need to focus on adaptation but did not
want to get entangled in discussions of the causes of climate change. Additionally, local
bureaucrats referenced the precautionary principle – mentioning that it was important to be
prepared for increasingly severe droughts and floods rather than hoping they will not occur.
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Thus, if emergency managers are more likely to embrace the precautionary principle, then
climate adaptation will embody a risk averse approach.
Second, local bureaucrats are constrained and aware of their constraints, which means
that local adaptation efforts are inherently limited. While they are important actors, they cannot
craft effective solutions alone. One of the ways bureaucrats are restrained is through limited
resources. Several bureaucrats in this study acknowledged that a lack of money, staff time, or
other resources were the reasons they could not pursue climate adaptation – either at all or to a
level they would like to. Calls to adapt to climate change at the local level should acknowledge
these inherent limitations. Furthermore, advocates should focus on helping bureaucrats build
coalitions of support to raise necessary resources and overcome other barriers.
Local bureaucrats also acknowledge limits from superior governments. State
governments’ and the federal government’s control over resources coerces local governments to
comply with state and federal priorities. One way to interpret this is to say that progress on
climate adaptation will only occur under climate-friendly state and federal government
administrations – i.e. liberal or Democratic administrations, especially those who prioritize
climate adaptation. Another way this can be interpreted is that local governments will need to
solicit support from alternative sources – like multi-stakeholder cooperative organizations (e.g.
Water for the Seasons or the Yakima Integrated Plan) to secure resources they cannot get from
hostile or apathetic state or federal government administrations.
Last, bureaucrat-driven policy change is not enough to completely adapt to climate
change. In the communities where climate adaptation policy had developed the most, the local
bureaucrats acknowledged the role of including many stakeholders and members of the
community in the conversation. In the Yakima Integrated Plan, participants pointed to the
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inclusion of advocacy groups and other community members as one of its strengths. In Martin
County, the three bureaucrats working on a comprehensive adaptation plan stressed the need for
community and politician buy-in. While bureaucratic action is a step – and in many cases it is a
crucial first step – climate adaptation is a huge task requiring cooperation between governments,
buy-in from stakeholders, and community participation.
4. How Do Bureaucratic Autonomy and Problem Definition Agreement Shape
Bureaucratic Action? Testing the Model
This project posited that bureaucrats’ choice regarding climate adaptation could be
explained by the interaction of their level of autonomy and the amount of problem definition
agreement there was in the policymaking community. It suggested that high autonomy and high
problem definition agreement would yield cooperative action, high autonomy and low problem
definition agreement would yield defiant behavior, low autonomy and low agreement would
yield non-confrontational behavior, and low autonomy and high agreement would yield
politician-led action. Although the model accurately predicted how 13 bureaucrats acted (of the
16 bureaucrats who acted to address climate adaptation), the model presents an incomplete
picture of bureaucratic action.
Bureaucratic autonomy does not appear to explain action as much as the model predicted.
Bureaucrats who have high levels of autonomy do not necessarily use their autonomy. For
example, Ms. Gucker from Greenville County, SC was an assistant county administrator who ran
the community planning department and could have addressed climate adaptation through her
department. However, she only included it in the hazard mitigation plan – even though she
acknowledged that Greenville County would need to address climate adaptation. Similarly, NVLocal Bureaucrat-895 had low levels of bureaucratic autonomy suggesting the bureaucrat should
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have followed the lead of the bureaucrat’s superiors in Fernley, NV. However, the Water for the
Seasons project created a cooperative framework for the elected officials and the bureaucrats to
work on climate-driven drought preparedness. While this does not negate the importance of
bureaucratic autonomy, autonomy is better conceived as a potential for action.
Instead, we should look at both autonomy and external sources of support bureaucrats
can draw upon when crafting policies. When bureaucrats can draw on support from a multistakeholder organization, a nearby university, other governments (local, state, or federal), or a
powerful community group, they are more likely to act defiantly or cooperatively. Shelley Cox
acted defiantly while relying on UNC Chapel Hill students to argue for the importance of climate
adaptation. All the bureaucrats who acted cooperatively had the support of multi-stakeholder
organizations (Water for the Season and the Yakima Integrated Plan). However, this needs to be
tested with a larger sample of communities and bureaucrats (discussed in more detail below).
5. Role of Intergovernmental Relations and Pressure from Superior Governments
Local bureaucrats are not able to tackle climate adaptation on their own. Without support
from the state, local elected officials, and other local bureaucrats, the bureaucrats’ ability to
make significant changes is limited. In other words, local bureaucrats’ efforts seem necessary but
not sufficient to tackle climate adaptation.
As shown in Chapter 5, local government decisions to act on climate change adaptation
are influenced, but not determined by state government preferences. In only one case – Mr.
Holland in Craven County, NC – did a local bureaucrat admit he did not pursue climate
adaptation because he felt the state would object. In Florida, bureaucrats in all three communities
acted to integrate climate change despite the state’s objections. Several bureaucrats in
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Washington State indicated that state support for climate change action helped them find
resources, but claimed it was not the determining factor for why they acted.
However, local governments did point to the vast resources in state governments and the
federal government (FEMA) as critical for the implementation of emergency management
projects in general. Several local bureaucrats mentioned that the state or federal government is
better suited to act on climate change than they are because they have more resources. Support
from the Washington State Department of Ecology breathes life (specifically money) into
Yakima Integrated Plan projects. Many local bureaucrats in this study said that they develop and
update hazard mitigation plans in order to access federal resources. These findings underline the
importance of intergovernmental cooperation in the development of climate adaptation policy,
especially when it comes to resources.
Finally, Chapter 5 supports the conclusion that climate adaptation policy is often
dominated by bureaucrats. Local bureaucrats wrote emergency management plans and these
plans were reviewed by state bureaucrats (like Jamie Leigh Price in Florida). Local bureaucrats
also interacted with federal representatives in the creation of hazard mitigation plans, as was the
case with Brian Bishop’s conversations with FEMA, NOAA, and NWS. This could enhance
climate adaptation policy development generally because bureaucrats do not face significant
partisan constraints. Indeed, during interviews with local bureaucrats, none mentioned a partisan
commitment as a reason for inaction. Of those who did mention their partisan affiliation,124 they
often said they were addressing climate change despite being Republican.

Bureaucrats’ partisan affiliations were not asked for during the interview. The interviews were focused on the
development of policy and talking to the bureaucrats about their partisan identification would have derailed this
conversation (especially close to the 2016 presidential election).
124
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Additionally, if bureaucrats control climate change adaptation, it is likely we will see
climate adaptation efforts build on existing emergency management efforts. This policy layering
(Beland, 2009; Hacker, 2004; Thelen, 2003) can lead to the neglect of innovative solutions,
unintended consequences, and concentration of influence in existing institutional structures. For
example, the NFIP program was designed in part to move people out of flood-prone areas.
However, the program focuses more on providing financial assistance to people who live in
floodplains whose homes were damaged during floods. The main goal of reducing the number of
people living in floodplains was lost (Wright, 2000). If we deal with climate change driven
flooding using the same program, we might never achieve the needed goal of moving people out
of flood-prone areas. Instead, we will see more of what several bureaucrats in this study
lamented as a silly idea: putting houses on stilts in flood-prone areas so the homes themselves
will not flood.
Downsides of integrating climate adaptation into existing policies are discussed in detail
by Adelle and Russel (2013). They point out that climate adaptation policies that do not rethink
existing strategies for flood management, urban development, storm preparedness, etc. will not
be flexible enough to truly deal with the unpredictable nature of climate change threats.
While Adele and Russel’s argument is sound, policy layering has advantages, especially
in the polarized U.S. context. Layering climate adaptation onto existing policies might bypass a
drawn-out political debate around the creation of new policies, thus speeding up the development
of adaptation efforts. As described by McCright and Dunlap (2011), Antonio and Brulle (2011),
and Leiserowitz and colleagues’s (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Ropser-Renouf, & Hmielowski, 2011;
Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016) conservative strategies to stall the
development of climate policy. By creating new policy “from scratch” opponents can stall policy
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progress at more junctures. Defenders of the status quo have many strategies at their disposal to
defend the status quo (Cobb & Ross, 1997). When policies are layered on existing policy,
changes happen more subtly and incrementally, but they build into larger more significant
changes (e.g. Hacker, 2004; Beland, 2009).
Bureaucrats are better positioned to engage in policy layering than introducing new
policy, especially when they can capitalize on their expertise. As this project showed, most
bureaucrat-driven policy change built on existing policy areas rather than crafting a new program
or plan. (Only Martin County, FL sought to craft a new plan focused on climate adaptation.)
Bureaucrats in this project made arguments that climate change was an important element to
layer onto existing projects like hazard mitigation planning, comprehensive land use
management, drought management, and flood management.
These findings bolster the argument that local governments engage in opportunistic
federalism: seeking to derive the most benefits from their relationship with FEMA or state
governments as possible without necessarily complying with the superior governments’ policy
preferences. It also demonstrates that when the federal and state governments do not act on
climate change adaptation, local governments are left to patch together solutions of their own.
Due to their limited resources, local adaptation efforts do not progress far beyond the policy
formulation or adoption stages. The huge challenge that climate adaptation poses means that
local governments cannot truly address the issue without support from other governments or
organizations with more resources. While the federalism literature sometimes points to this
situation (subordinate governments filling in policy gaps with superior governments do not act)
as an opportunity for innovation (Berry & Berry, 2007), for climate change adaptation the lack of
support from superior governments stymies local action.
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6. Future Research
This project is an important first step towards understanding local bureaucrats’ role in
policy development beyond implementation. However, it is limited by its focus on one issue area
(climate change adaptation) and a small number of cases (both in terms of communities
represented and the number of bureaucrats studied). These limitations were necessary for this
qualitative exploratory study. However, expanding our understanding of the role of local
bureaucrats in policy development requires looking at a larger representative sample of
bureaucrats and communities. The larger number of cases would allow researchers to develop
models that explain what distinguishes bureaucrats who act from those who do not and identify
additional factors affecting the type of action bureaucrats take (e.g. defiant behavior vs. nonconfrontational behavior). Future studies should also expand to other policy areas to determine if
climate change adaptation policy is unique or if this model applies to other policy areas.
Potentially, we would see bureaucrat-driven policy development around many low salience
problems that carry serious consequences if left unaddressed. These types of studies are natural
successors to this project and will help determine the frequency of local bureaucrat-driven policy
development.
This project also represents a snapshot of climate adaptation policy development. After
data collection concluded, the climate-friendly Obama Administration was replaced by the
climate-hostile Trump Administration, and new governors in South Carolina and North Carolina
took office.125 These changes in political administrations came with changes in attitudes towards
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Additionally, the 2017 hurricane season demonstrated

125

Governor Henry McMaster in South Carolina is more openly anti-climate action than his predecessor Nikki
Haley (Petersen, 2017). Governor Roy Cooper in North Carolina is much more climate-friendly than his predecessor
Pat McCrory (Bennett, 2017).
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the devastating costs that may be associated with climate disasters, as Hurricane Harvey
overwhelmed Houston, Texas and Hurricanes Irma and Maria devastated Puerto Rico. The
massive flooding in Houston led to a national re-examination of local flood management efforts,
especially when it became clear that actual flood risk was minimized by development-driven
local planners in Houston (Pralle S., 2017; Boburg & Reinhard, 2017). In short, a lot has
changed since data collection concluded in November 2016. Revisiting these same cases in the
coming years would be a good next step. It would indicate whether and how climate adaptation
policy and bureaucratic action have changed, speak to the permanency of bureaucrat-driven
policy change, shed light on how changes in national attention to climate disasters affect local
action, and reveal how changes in superior government policy or attitudes on climate change
influence local action.
A notable finding of this study centers on the role of multi-stakeholder cooperative
organizations. These organizations helped local governments tackle climate adaptation, even if
the group’s focus was not solely on climate adaptation. This was an unexpected finding and
warrants further examination to understand exactly how these organizations help governments
tackle climate adaptation. Do multi-stakeholder organizations have more resources? Which
resources (time, staff expertise, money, etc.) are the most important? Do these organizations
encourage cooperative behavior because they were formed to prevent future litigation battles?
The participants in the Yakima Integrated Plan and the Water for the Seasons project touted the
uniqueness of their endeavors. However, future research should examine the accuracy of this
claim. What about the Yakima Integrated Plan and the Water for the Seasons project made them
successful? Are these traits shared with other multi-stakeholder cooperative organizations like
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the Southeast Florida Climate Change Compact or the Mayors Climate Change Protection
Agreement? How effective are these organizations? This is a rich area for future study.
Throughout this dissertation, I focused on the political and institutional barriers to
crafting climate adaptation policy. Intentionally, I have not evaluated the efficacy of adaptation
strategies. However, it is an important next step will be to evaluate how effective bureaucratdriven climate adaptation policy is. The potential loss of life, economic costs, and political and
social disruption climate change will cause are so significant that we need to understand if these
policies will be effective.

219

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Search Strings
Searches in Atlas.ti used to identify portions of the documents that are relevant for this research project.
The emboldened word indicates how the phrase was automatically coded by the program. The researcher
then manually evaluated all computer-identified codes to remove false positives. For instance, “business
climate” does not relate to “climate change”, but both terms would be identified by computer auto-coding.
-

climate change will be searched for using: climat|warming|greenhouse|global

-

adaptation will be searched for using: adapt|resilien

-

severe weather will be searched for using: sea level|extrem|storm|hurricane

-

flooding will be searched for using: flood

-

drought will be searched for using: drought|water short|

Many of the search terms of shortened or root words – for instance “resilien” instead of “resilient” or
“resiliency”, or “climat” instead of “climate” or “climatology” – so that multiple words with the same
root can be found in a single search.
For searches related to the bureaucrats of interest, their last name and key words from their position were
used. Because some of the bureaucrats of interest requested that their names not be identified with this
study, the list of bureaucrats will not be included in its entirety here. However, two examples are
presented below which are representative of other searches.
1. Name of Bureaucrat: Anne Murray, Position: Martin County Hydrogeologist
Search: Murray|hydrogeologist
2. Name of Bureaucrat: Shelley Cox, Position: Planning Director and Floodplain Manager
Search: Cox|floodplain manager|planning director
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Appendix B: Codebook for Qualitative Data Analysis
Note: common synonyms for words in the codebook will be acknowledged as that word. For instance,
adapt can also be referred to as “respond” “prepare” “adjust” “acclimate.”

1. Agenda-setter
1a. Determining when climate change arrives on the local agenda
As described in Chapter 2: Methods determining when climate change adaptation arrives on the local
agenda requires looking through government reports, meeting minutes, media articles, and the interviews
with local government officials. These documents are compiled into a single Atlas.ti hermeneutic unit for
analysis where searches for “climate change,” “flooding,” and “drought” were auto-coded by the program
(see the search strings used in Appendix A).
The auto-coded sections were then analyzed manually by the researcher to remove false positives (i.e. “a
flood of positive response to the school levy” instead of a physical flood of water). The researcher then
determined when climate change was first introduced onto the agenda by looking for the following types
of terms to indicate adaptation:
•

adapt

•

respond

•

prepare

•

adjust

•

acclimate

•

become accustomed

These terms needed to be in the same idea expression as terms which refer to climate change or the
effects of climate change including:
•

climate change

•

changes climate

•

global warming

•

greenhouse effect

•

long-term changes in the weather

•

[the climate OR the regular weather is] not like how it used to be around here

As all of these documents are dated, the first chronological mention of climate change adaptation in the
available data will be considered the moment when climate change was introduced onto the agenda. As

221

the issue attention cycle shows us (Downs, Up and down with ecology - the "issue-attention cycle", 1972)
the first mention of an issue does not necessarily mean that decision-makers will pay a lot of attention.
Therefore, after the first mention, the researcher identified subsequent discussions of climate change to
determine when climate change adaptation had achieved low salience on the agenda. When climate
change was discussed by at least two individuals on two separate occasions with a 30-day period,126 it will
be considered on the agenda with low salience. Examples of this coding include:
Local bureaucrat A introduces climate change in a discussion on Day 1. On Day 15 at a subsequent public
meeting, local bureaucrat B brings up climate change adaptation again. Climate change is on the agenda
with low salience.
Local elected official A is quoted saying “climate change adaptation is important” on Day 1 in a local
media article. Three weeks later at a local government meeting, local bureaucrat A and local bureaucrat B
both mention climate change adaptation in their reports. Climate change is on the agenda with low
salience.
Local bureaucrat A introduces climate change adaptation in a hazard mitigation planning document on
Day 1. On Day 15, local bureaucrat A discusses the hazard mitigation plan and climate change adaptation
in the local government meeting. On Day 17, local bureaucrat A discusses climate change adaptation with
a member of the local newspaper. Climate change was mentioned several times within a 30-day period,
but only by one individual is advocating for the issue. It is not on the agenda with low salience.
Local elected official A introduces climate change adaptation in a discussion on Day 1. Three months
later, Local elected official A gives an interview to a newspaper and reasserts that climate change
adaptation is an important issue. Climate change is not on the agenda with low salience because of the
long time between mentions.
Local elected official A introduces climate change adaptation in a discussion on Day 1. Three months
later, Local bureaucrat A gives an interview to a newspaper and reasserts that climate change adaptation
is an important issue. Climate change is not on the agenda with low salience because of the long time
between mentions, even though two people brought up the issue.
1b. Identifying the individual(s) who introduced the issue
The identity and position of the individual(s) who introduced climate change onto the agenda will be
noted.
If the identity of the individual is kept confidential (i.e. in an interview or a media article), then the
individual’s position will be identified as: local citizen, local elected official, local bureaucrat, state
elected official, state bureaucrat, federal elected official or federal bureaucrat.

126

A month was chosen to allow for the variation in meeting schedules and activity levels of different jurisdictions.
Jurisdictions that meet biweekly would then be discussing an issue at two back-to-back meetings in order to qualify.
Any longer period might miss-measure jurisdictions that meet at a more frequent interval, like weekly meetings.

222

2. Status of climate change adaptation policy
This project identifies five potential stages for the status of climate change adaptation policy in any
jurisdiction. Coding decisions for each are discussed below:
1. Not on agenda: No-one has introduced climate change adaptation onto the agenda of the local
government. To qualify for this, the “agenda status” variable would be coded as “not on the
agenda with low salience.” In other words, it is possible that only one person brought up the
issue, or it has been brought up sporadically but not discussed by two or more individuals within
a two-month timespan.
2. No action: climate change adaptation is on the agenda, but policy actors decided not to address
climate change adaptation. Discussions addressing climate change exist, but there is either no
follow up or there is an active discussion not to act.
3. On the agenda: climate change adaptation is being discussed by members of the local
government and policymaking community.
4. Policy formulation: local policymakers are crafting policies to address climate adaptation,
although they are not necessarily adopting any.
5. Policy adoption: the policy to address climate adaptation has been approved by necessary
officials (elected officials but could also be discretionary policy adopted by bureaucrats). The
policy is “on the books.”
6. Implementation of an adaptation policy: a plan is in place for adapting to climate change and
the local government is creating programs or developing infrastructure to respond to climate
change.
These categories are based on Anderson, Brady, and Bullock III (1978). I am not including evaluation because
adaptation policy is in its infancy.

3. Bureaucratic background
3a. Training and Expertise
Bureaucratic background will be coded as either (a) general administrative or public policy background or
(b) specific policy area expertise. General administrative or public policy backgrounds include individuals
whose education and training are in broad areas of public administration and/or management. Those with
specific policy area expertise are individuals who have specialized training in an area like engineering,
land use management, hydrology, disaster management, or water management. Examples of each are
provided below:
General administrative or public policy background:
• degree in political science
• degree in law
• degree in public administration

223

•
•

degree in public policy
job experience in government management

Specific policy area expertise:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

degree or training in engineering
degree or training in land management
degree or training in forest management
degree or training in biology
degree or training in conservation
degree or training in water management
degree or training in disaster management

Some government employees are likely to have training in multiple areas, which can include choices from
each list. Any individual with training both in a specialized and a general area will be evaluated to see
which area they have spent the most time or training dedicated to. If an individual has a political science
degree but has spent 15 years as a water manager (including attending trainings, membership in the water
managers association, etc.), they will be labeled as having more specific policy expertise. Similarly, if an
individual was trained as a public engineer, but has spent the majority of their 20-year career as a city
manager then they will be coded as having a general administrative background.
When used in the measure of autonomy, this is coded 0 = general training and 1 = special training. This is
coded with only two options because it is intended to have a lower weight than the four types of
autonomy listed in the next section
3b. Years in Current Job
The number of years an individual spent in their current job is determined by looking at her resume,
public biography, or asked during interview. The number of years is recoded into one of two categories:
zero to five years, or more than five years.
When used in the measure of autonomy, this is coded 0 = 0-5 years and 1 = five or more years. This is
coded with only two options because it is intended to have a lower weight than the four types of
autonomy listed in the next section

4. Bureaucratic autonomy
4a. Expertise-based autonomy
As described in Chapter 2: Methods, differing knowledge-bases change what type of expertise the
bureaucrat is likely to have. When the principal is at the federal or state government levels, it is likely the
bureaucrat will share knowledge about disaster management with their principal but the bureaucrat will
have specialized knowledge about the local community. Therefore, determining when bureaucrats have
expertise-based autonomy requires two steps.
First, the principal is identified and the principal’s forms of expertise are identified. For instance, if the
principal in question is the state emergency manager’s office, then the principal is identified as having
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expertise in emergency management. However, if the principal is a local elected official, then the local
elected official is likely to have knowledge about local conditions. For each principal, the researcher will
use written biographies, descriptions of the position, and any written documents produced by the
principal127 to determine which issues the individual (or organization) has expertise on. Their expertise
can be identified as being in at least one of the following categories:
•
•
•
•
•

emergency management
FEMA policies
state emergency management policies
local conditions (present and past disasters)
local politics

Second, the bureaucrat’s areas of expertise are identified. Data come from interviews, written
biographies, resumes, reports written by the bureaucrat, and meeting minutes where bureaucrats provide
information to the community and elected officials. Similarly, bureaucratic expertise can be identified as
being in one or more of the following categories:
•
•
•
•
•

emergency management
FEMA policies
state emergency management policies
local conditions (present and past disasters)
local politics

For principals and bureaucrats, Atlas.ti will be used to facilitate qualitative content analysis to determine
forms of expertise. First, the researcher uses Atlas.ti to search for the name of the principal (i.e. Jane
Smith) and for the name of their position (i.e. Director of Flood Management) in documents for each case.
This auto-coding step allows the researcher to identify documents and sections of documents where the
individual spoke or wrote. Those sections will then be manually coded by the researcher to identify what
types of expertise were displayed.
Phrases and words to indicate expertise in each area are listed below:
•

emergency management:
o
o
o

•

discussing emergency preparedness, response, or mitigation programs;
discussing the emergency management policy cycle
discussing specific emergency situations (i.e. natural disasters, man-made disasters)
including flood management and drought management

FEMA policies:
o

discussing details of programs like the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the National
Flood Insurance Program, Community Rating System;

127

For instance, if a state emergency manager is the principal, a guidebook written by the state emergency manager
helps identify the forms of expertise that individual has.
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o
•

discussing FEMA’s operating procedures (vis-à-vis the local community’s experience
with FEMA or how FEMA policies apply to local governments)

state emergency management policies:
o
o

discussing details of state-level emergency management policies (will vary by state
context)
discussing details of state emergency management operating procedures (vis-à-vis the
local community’s experience with the agency)

In all areas, expertise can be shown by providing detail about management strategies, the implementation
of existing policies, and debates or discussions about management and implementation strategies.
For expertise concerning the local community’s present or past disasters and political situation, the
following phrases and words would indicate expertise. However, lack of discussion of the local
community will also be taken as a lack of expertise. For example, if FEMA does not produce documents
about how Onondoga County, New York deals with natural disasters, they will be assumed to lack that
form of expertise.
•

local conditions (present and past disasters):
o
o

•

discussions about specific events (natural disasters) that have hit the community
discussions about recovery efforts following disaster events

local politics:
o
o
o

working in local government
attending public meetings
discussing political differences or political debates occurring in the local community

The measure of expertise-based autonomy is built by comparing the principal’s expertise to the
bureaucrat’s expertise; more areas where the bureaucrat has expertise that the principal does not indicate
more bureaucratic expertise-based autonomy.
Values were assigned in this way:
1 = complete overlap in expertise
2 = three or four (but not all five) areas of overlap
3 = two areas of overlap
4 = one area of overlap
5 = no overlap
4b. Structural independence
Structural independence will be determined by looking at organizational charts and budgets.
Organizational charts show if the local bureaucrat runs their own department or program, and therefore is
expected to make decisions separate from their superiors. However, this form of organizational
independence is limited to local principals’ relationship to bureaucrats. Therefore, fiscal independence
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from state and federal governments is also considered. If the local bureaucrat’s department and/or
programs are reliant on grants from the state or federal government, they have less structural
independence.
Values were assigned in this way:
1 = low
3 = medium
5 = high
4c. Hiring and firing power
For all cases, only local principals will have hiring and firing power. Therefore, when the local
government is the principal, bureaucrats have less autonomy. When the state or federal government is the
principal, bureaucrats have more autonomy.
Values were assigned in this way:
1 = council/board of commissioners AND manager
3 = only council/board of commissioners
5 = no hiring and firing power
4d. Opportunities for exercising discretion
Determining the opportunities that local bureaucrats have to exercise discretion in their work is measured
by looking at the programs and policies they administer. In areas where they are in charge of writing
planning documents or dealing with citizens (on a case-by-case basis), bureaucrats will be coded as
having more opportunities for discretion. For instance, if Bureaucrat A is in charge of approving building
plans to make sure they are compliant with the flood insurance policy, they have the opportunity to use
discretion for each construction plan they approve. Conversely, if Bureaucrat B does not approve plans,
rather her job is primarily to write grants for the department, than Bureaucrat A will have more
opportunities for exercising discretion than Bureaucrat B. Bureaucrats will be coded as having a few, a
moderate number, or many opportunities for exercising discretion. Indicators for each level are described
below:
•

A few:
o
o

•

bureaucrat does not work on cases
bureaucrat’s main responsibilities do not require engagement with the public generally or
individual stakeholders; mainly works with other governments

A moderate number:
o
o

bureaucrat works on some cases
bureaucrat’s main responsibilities are a mix of engaging with the public and working
within government
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•

Many:
o
o

bureaucrat’s main responsibility is to work on cases
bureaucrat works with members of the public or stakeholders often

Values were assigned in this way:
1 = a few areas
3 = a moderate number
5 = many

5. Problem definition agreement
To capture the elements of problem definition agreement described in Chapter 2: Methods, the following
measures is captured for each individual bureaucrat and their superiors. Then, a combined measure of
agreement is built by comparing the individual measures to determining how much agreement there is.
Omitted elements (i.e. the bureaucrat did not mention her opinion about scale or geographic proximity), it
will be coded as “missing data”. When constructing the combined measure of agreement, these values
will not be considered either “agreement” or “disagreement” because assuming a measure for either
would be mis-measuring attitudes. Instead, these elements with missing data will be considered on a caseby-case basis but weighted less than data where there are solid responses.
5a. Individual attitudes on need for climate change adaptation
1. Climate change is the cause or need for changing local flood and/or drought management
policy.
•
•
•
•

we need to prepare for climate change in our [flood or drought] policy
climate change will make [floods or droughts] worse
the future is changing, we need to respond in our [flood or drought] policy
we will consider how climate change will affect [flood or drought]

2. The local government is the right scale for adapting to climate change instead of another scale,
like the state or federal government.
Local Government is the Right Scale

Another Scale is More Appropriate

Climate change is something we will have to
deal with or address

We cannot deal with climate change

We can tackle the challenges of climate
change here

Climate change adaptation should be done by
the states [federal government]
[Name of state or federal government agency]
will or is already dealing with climate change
adaptation
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3. Climate change will be an issue for the local government; in other words there is geographic
proximity.
Geographically Close

Geographically Far Away

Climate change is happening here

Climate change won’t happen here

We are dealing with climate change already
around here

Climate change isn’t an issue here

[Naming areas in jurisdiction] are already
experiencing the effects of climate change

4. Climate change will be an issue for the local government soon; in other words there is
temporal proximity.
Temporally Close

Temporally Far Away

We are already experiencing climate change

Climate change will not hit us for a long time

Climate change is a concern now

Climate change and its effects is something
we will see in the future

We are worried about the effects of climate
change coming soon

5. The problem is severe. Flooding or drought will be a problem for the local community.
Climate change’s effects are severe

Climate change’s effects are not severe

Climate change will be a big problem

[discuss positive outcomes of climate change]

[List many effects of climate change]

We are not too worried about problems from
climate change

[Discuss high cost of climate change]

5b. Combined measure of agreement
The combined measure of agreement is determined by comparing the problem definitions for the
bureaucrat of interest with her superior(s). The more elements of agreement, the higher the combined
measure of agreement is.
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6. Bureaucratic action
As described in Chapter 2: Methods, determining which category of bureaucratic action the bureaucrat
fits into relies on three questions. Coding determinations for each of the three questions are below:
1. Did the bureaucrat work with her superior(s)?
Yes

No
I worked alone

I worked with [city manager, elected
official, anyone above bureaucrat in
organizational chart]

I did this myself
I worked with [equals/coworkers]
I worked with [subordinates]

2. Did the bureaucrat introduce the idea of climate action?
Uses variable for agenda setter to answer.
3. Did the superior say not to act to address climate change?
Uses variable for problem definition agreement, focus on superior(s)’s position(s).
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Appendix C: Interview Solicitation Forms and Scripts

Interview Recruitment Scripts
Telephone:
Hello [NAME], my name is Bridget Fahey128 and I am studying for my PhD in political science. My
dissertation research project is studying local government [FLOOD or DROUGHT – whichever is
appropriate] policy development in the face of new challenges. I found your name [WEBSITE, OTHER
INDIVIDUAL, MEDIA REPORT, etc.] and I think you could give me some really good information
about [LOCALITY NAME]’s efforts at [FLOOD/DROUGHT] management.
Would you be willing to participate in an interview – either in person or over the telephone – with me? It
should only last 45 minutes to an hour at most. You have the option to make your statements confidential
if you wish, which means I will not use your name in any reports from this research.
[IF LEAVING A MESSAGE, SKIP TO CONTACT INFORMATION AT END]
[IF INITIAL POSITIVE RESPONSE]: I can provide more information about the purpose of the research
as well as how your interview responses will be managed. I can offer you confidentiality if you so desire.
I have this information in an electronic document that I can email you, could you give me an email
address?
[IF YES, AND GIVES EMAIL] Thank you. To confirm, your email is [REPEAT EMAIL TO THEM]. I
will be sending you more information within the hour. Please look it over and then we can set up an
interview time and location. The location and mode of the interview is up to you. If you wish to speak
face-to-face, and it would be great to meet you in person, I can travel to you area during [STATE DATES
OF POTENTIAL TRAVEL].
[IF NO EMAIL]: That’s ok, I can also answer any of your questions about the project now.
[IF INITIAL NEGATIVE RESPONSE}: Ok, thank you. If you change your mind and would like to
participate in an interview, please feel free to get in touch with me at any time.
[AT END OF CONVERSATION] You can contact me for more information by emailing me at
bkfahey@syr.edu or calling at 720-884-6363.

128

During the data collection phase of this research, the researcher used the last name of Fahey. Between ending
data collection and completing the dissertation, the researcher changed her last name to Kelley. All documents
reflect the researcher’s maiden name.
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Email:
Dear [NAME],
I’m Bridget Fahey, a doctoral candidate studying Political Science at the Maxwell School at Syracuse
University. For my dissertation research project, I am studying local government [FLOOD or
DROUGHT] management policy. Specifically, I’m interested in how these policies develop in the face of
new challenges.
I found your name [WEBSITE, OTHER INDIVIDUAL, MEDIA REPORT, etc.] and I am interested in
speaking with you about your important role in [FLOOD or DROUGHT] management in [LOCALITY].
I know that your on-the-ground experiences and work in this important policy area will provide valuable
insight for my research. Would you be willing to participate in an interview – either in person or over the
telephone – to speak about your role in [FLOOD or DROUGHT] management as well as where you see
the policy area changing in the future? The interview would only take 45 minutes to an hour maximum.
I have attached a brief description of my project, a copy of the consent form I am using for interview
participants, and a few sample questions for you to look over at your convenience. I am also completely
willing to answer questions about the nature of the study and how any information you provide will be
used for my research (contact information in signature). If you wish, I can provide confidentiality in any
reports, papers, or other written projects that emerge from this research (your name will not be identified).
I look forward to hearing from you. Please feel free to email bkfahey@syr.edu or call 720-884-6363 for
more information. You can also get in touch with the Syracuse Office of Research Integrity and
Protections at 315-443-3013 with questions about the research process.
Sincerely,
Bridget K. Fahey
Email: bkfahey@syr.edu | Phone: 720-884-6363

[Not for email, for IRB information **NOTE: Time, date and location of interview will be determined if
they respond to the initial email inquiry. It is not solicited here because a brief and direct email about
their participation increases the chances of hearing back from potential interview participants. Longer
emails might get pushed aside and forgotten. ]
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Project Description:
This project seeks to uncover and understand how elected politicians and public administrators act when
governments face new problems which fundamentally challenge an existing policy area. This project
looks specifically at flood management and drought management. It hypothesizes that how these actors
behave and their relationships shapes changes to the existing policy areas.
Drawing on the policy development and bureaucratic politics literatures, this study proposes that four
categories of bureaucratic action are possible: (1) defiant bureaucratic behavior where autonomous
bureaucrats take action without support from politicians, (2) cooperative action where autonomous
bureaucrats and politicians accept the same problem definition and act together to make policy, (3)
politician-led action where politicians create policies and bureaucrats lack the autonomy to influence the
outcomes, and (4) non-confrontational behavior where bureaucrats disagree with politicians but do not
have the autonomy to openly defy them and instead they work under-the-radar. Essentially, this project
juxtaposes (a) problem definition agreement (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994) concerning the importance of
integrating new information into existing policies and (b) level of autonomy public administrators have
from politicians (Rourke, 1979; Waterman & Rouse, 1999; Carpenter, 2001; Walters, 2013). While this
project recognizes the importance of other variables like government capacity to change policy and the
role of non-governmental actors, the main goal is to understand how bureaucrats and politicians relate to
one another, even if their interests differ.
In order to understand these relationships, this study has identified local communities in six sites across
the U.S. where the researcher will conduct in-depth case studies. For these case studies, the researcher
will speak with important players in the policy community including elected officials, public
administrators, community activists, and experts to understand the local policy and how these players see
it changing due to new pressures. Additionally, the researcher will collect government reports, meeting
minutes, memos, and media reports where available to paint a complete portrait of these local policy
issues.
The goal of this research is to contribute to theoretical debates in political science as well as collect
important information about the people working on the front-lines of these issues. Floods and droughts
can be incredibly damaging disasters and our understanding of local actions to protect communities is
woefully incomplete.

This project is a requirement for Bridget K. Fahey to complete her PhD. Therefore, the immediate
material goal is to collect data for a dissertation.
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Appendix D: Case Similarities and Differences
Below are tables showing similarities and differences between the cases for variables like geographic location, climate risk, government structure,
budget size, strength of economy, etc. Cases are presented alphabetically by state for each table. Similarities are shown using color coding when
possible.

Table D1: State and Climate Risk

129

Case

State

Climate Hazard129

City of Fort Pierce

Florida

Flooding - Sea Level Rise; Drought - Lack of Precipitation

Martin County

Florida

Flooding - Sea Level Rise; Drought - Lack of Precipitation

St. Lucie County

Florida

Flooding - Sea Level Rise; Drought - Lack of Precipitation

Carson City and County

Nevada

Drought - Lack of Precipitation

City of Fernley

Nevada

Drought - Lack of Precipitation

City of Elizabeth City

North Carolina

Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation

City of Havelock

North Carolina

Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation

City of New Bern

North Carolina

Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation

Craven County

North Carolina

Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation

Pasquotank County

North Carolina

Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation

City of Greer

South Carolina

Flooding - Increased Precipitation

City of Mauldin

South Carolina

Flooding - Increased Precipitation

Greenville County

South Carolina

Flooding - Increased Precipitation

Oconee County

South Carolina

Flooding - Increased Precipitation

City of Yakima

Washington

Drought - Lack of Precipitation

Grant County

Washington

Drought - Lack of Precipitation

Kittitas County

Washington

Drought - Lack of Precipitation

Yakima County

Washington

Drought - Lack of Precipitation

Hazards identified through GIS Analysis of NCAR and USGS data (see Chapter 2, Section 1).
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Table D2: Government Structure and Department in Control of Climate-Related Hazard
State

Government Structure130

City of Fort Pierce

Florida

Commissioner-Manager

Building Department

Martin County

Florida

Commissioner-Manager

Engineering

Utilities

St. Lucie County
Carson City and
County
City of Fernley
City of Elizabeth
City
City of Havelock
City of New Bern

Florida

Commissioner-Manager

Building Department

Public Works

Nevada

Council-Manager

Public Works Department

Nevada

Council-Manager

Public Works Department

North Carolina

Council-Manager

Building Department

North Carolina
North Carolina

Commissioner-Manager
Aldermen-Manager

Building Department
Building Department

Craven County

North Carolina

Commissioner-Manager

Emergency Management

Pasquotank County

North Carolina

Commissioner-Manager

Building Department

City of Greer

South Carolina

Council-Administrator

Engineering

City of Mauldin

South Carolina

Council-Administrator

Business and Development
Services

Greenville County

South Carolina

Council-Administrator

Public Works Department

Oconee County
City of Yakima

South Carolina
Washington

Council-Administrator
Council-Manager

Emergency Management
Utilities Services Division

Grant County

Washington

3 Commissioners (elected
managers)

none - local irrigation districts
manage water and drought

Kittitas County

Washington

3 Commissioners (elected
managers)

Public Works Department

Yakima County

Washington

3 Commissioners (elected
managers)

Water Resources Division (in
the Public Services
Department)

Case

130
131

Department(s) in Control of Flooding OR Drought131
Emergency
Management

Public Services
Public Works
Planning
Department
Engineering
Planning and
Zoning
Department

Community
Planning

Engineering

Emergency
Management

Data from local government websites. All variations on Manager or Administrator are considered the same for the purposes of this project
Data from local government websites, interviews, and email correspondence with the local governments.
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Table D3: Vote Share for Democratic Presidential Candidates (Partisanship)
Case

State

Vote for Obama 2008

Vote for Obama 2012

Vote for Clinton 2016

City of Fort Pierce
(Data for St. Lucie County)

Florida

55.70%

53.50%

47.50%

Martin County

Florida

42.80%

38.20%

35.20%

St. Lucie County

Florida

55.70%

53.50%

47.50%

Carson City and County

Nevada

49.10%

44.10%

38.40%

Nevada

39.80%

34.40%

25.90%

North Carolina

56.60%

57.50%

49.80%

North Carolina

42.60%

40.70%

37.80%

North Carolina

42.60%

40.70%

37.80%

Craven County

North Carolina

42.60%

40.70%

37.80%

Pasquotank County

North Carolina

56.60%

57.50%

49.80%

South Carolina

37.20%

35.20%

34.70%

South Carolina

37.20%

35.20%

34.70%

Greenville County

South Carolina

37.20%

35.20%

34.70%

Oconee County

South Carolina

30.40%

27.90%

23.80%

City of Yakima
(Data for Yakima County)

Washington

43.50%

42.00%

39.40%

Grant County

Washington

35.00%

32.40%

27.50%

Kittitas County

Washington

44.90%

42.60%

39.20%

Yakima County

Washington

43.50%

42.00%

39.40%

City of Fernley
(Data for Lyon County)
City of Elizabeth City
(Data for Pasquotank County)
City of Havelock
(Data for Craven County)
City of New Bern
(Data for Craven County)

City of Greer
(Data for Greenville County)
City of Mauldin
(Data for Greenville County)

Data from the New York Times Presidential Elections Results Maps 2008, 2012, and 2016
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Table D4: Attitudes on Climate Change from the Yale Climate Change Communication Project (2014)

State

Global
Warming is
Happening

Global Warming is
Mostly Caused by
Human Activities

Worried
About
Global
Warming

Global Warming is
Already Harming the
US Now or Within 10
Years

Global
Warming
Will Harm
Them
Personally

Global
Warming
Will Harm
People in the
US

Florida

62%

44%

51%

41%

34%

50%

Florida
Florida
Nevada

62%
62%
64%

45%
44%
51%

50%
51%
52%

40%
41%
41%

33%
34%
34%

49%
50%
51%

Nevada

56%

41%

46%

37%

30%

47%

North Carolina

62%

45%

50%

43%

35%

50%

City of Havelock
(Data for Craven County)

North Carolina

62%

45%

50%

41%

33%

49%

City of New Bern
(Data for Craven County)

North Carolina

62%

45%

50%

41%

33%

49%

Craven County
Pasquotank County

North Carolina
North Carolina

62%
62%

45%
45%

50%
50%

41%
43%

33%
35%

49%
50%

City of Greer
(Data for Greenville County)

South Carolina

59%

44%

48%

41%

32%

48%

City of Mauldin
(Data for Greenville County)

South Carolina

59%

44%

48%

41%

32%

48%

Greenville County
Oconee County

South Carolina
South Carolina

59%
58%

44%
45%

48%
47%

41%
39%

32%
31%

48%
47%

City of Yakima
(Data for Yakima County)

Washington

62%

49%

54%

42%

36%

52%

Grant County
Kittitas County
Yakima County

Washington
Washington
Washington

62%
67%
62%

46%
52%
49%

53%
58%
54%

41%
45%
42%

35%
36%
36%

51%
54%
52%

Case

City of Fort Pierce
(Data for St. Lucie County)
Martin County
St. Lucie County
Carson City and County
City of Fernley
(Data for Lyon County)
City of Elizabeth City
(Data for Pasquotank County)

Data from the Yale Climate Change Communication Project, 2014 Survey (Howe, Mildenberger, Marlon, & Leiserowitz, 2015)
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Table D5: Demographics: Population Size, Age, and Educational Attainment

Case

City of Fort Pierce
Martin County
St. Lucie County
Carson City and County
City of Fernley
City of Elizabeth City
City of Havelock
City of New Bern
Craven County
Pasquotank County
City of Greer
City of Mauldin
Greenville County
Oconee County
City of Yakima
Grant County
Kittitas County
Yakima County

State

Population,
Census, April
1, 2010

Households,
2011-2015

Florida
Florida
Florida
Nevada
Nevada
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
Washington
Washington
Washington
Washington

41,590
146,318
277,789
55,274
19,368
18,683
20,735
29,524
103,505
40,661
25,515
22,889
451,225
74,273
91,067
89,120
40,915
243,231

16,522
61,952
107,898
21,594
6,875
6,602
6,454
12,746
40,131
14,448
10,339
9,363
179,862
30,556
33,081
30,358
16,953
79,972

Data from the U.S. Census Bureau: Quick Facts
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Persons
under 5
years,
percent,
April 1,
2010
8.2
4.2
5.9
5.8
8.0
7.5
11.4
7.5
7.4
6.6
8.5
6.8
6.9
5.6
8.6
9.1
5.0
8.8

Persons
under 18
years,
percent,
April 1,
2010
25.9
17.6
22.3
21.4
27.7
22.4
27.0
22.8
23.4
22.6
26.6
24.5
24.2
21.1
28.3
30.5
18.3
30.4

Persons 65
years and
over,
percent,
April 1,
2010
15.2
27.3
19.9
16.5
11.8
13.9
4.2
17.9
15.3
13.6
10.9
11.8
12.8
19.0
13.1
11.8
12.7
11.6

High school
graduate or
higher, percent
of persons age
25 years+, 20112015
76.1
89.8
85.4
86.8
88.0
80.5
94.9
83.8
87.3
83.8
84.5
93.3
86.7
83.2
73.3
75.5
90.8
71.9

Table D6: Demographics: Housing Statistics

Case
City of Fort Pierce
Martin County
St. Lucie County
Carson City and County
City of Fernley
City of Elizabeth City
City of Havelock
City of New Bern
Craven County
Pasquotank County
City of Greer
City of Mauldin
Greenville County
Oconee County
City of Yakima
Grant County
Kittitas County
Yakima County

State

Housing units,
April 1, 2010

Owner-occupied
housing unit rate,
2011-2015

Median value of owneroccupied housing units,
2011-2015

Persons per
household, 20112015

Florida
Florida
Florida
Nevada
Nevada
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
Washington
Washington
Washington
Washington

21,357
78,131
137,029
23,534
7,975
8,167
6,810
14,471
45,002
16,833
11,127
9,929
195,462
38,763
34,829
35,083
21,900
85,474

44.6
75.5
72.8
56.1
65.8
43.1
39.8
50.3
62.6
62.5
53
67
66
74.1
53.9
60.5
57.6
62.5

85,900
200,200
125,600
186,000
136,800
125,300
142,000
147,700
154,500
158,800
143,800
153,600
156,200
147,000
156,700
157,500
242,900
158,200

2.58
2.39
2.64
2.43
2.79
2.49
2.85
2.34
2.51
2.61
2.62
2.60
2.58
2.43
2.74
3.00
2.34
3.05
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Table D7: Demographics: Income and Employment
Case
City of Fort Pierce
Martin County
St. Lucie County
Carson City and County
City of Fernley
City of Elizabeth City
City of Havelock
City of New Bern
Craven County
Pasquotank County
City of Greer
City of Mauldin
Greenville County
Oconee County
City of Yakima
Grant County
Kittitas County
Yakima County

State

In civilian labor force, total,
percent of population age
16 years+, 2011-2015

Median household
income (in 2015
dollars), 2011-2015

Florida
Florida
Florida
Nevada
Nevada
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
Washington
Washington
Washington
Washington

52.5
52.4
54.7
59.7
59.7
56.7
47.3
59.9
55.2
59.1
68.6
68
63.4
52.4
61.6
63.5
60.6
61.6

43,459
51,593
25,635
47,668
52,001
30,803
47,208
41,148
47,985
45,378
44,455
59,960
50,540
41,237
40,726
48,714
46,458
44,749

Data from the U.S. Census Bureau: Quick Facts
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Per capita income in
past 12 months (in
2015 dollars), 20112015
23,657
34,742
17,027
26,127
23,189
16,783
20,322
23,511
24,553
22,187
24,360
28,161
27,200
24,666
20,187
20,251
24,014
19,793

Persons in
poverty,
percent
16.4
11.2
36.6
16.4
11.1
29.8
13.6
19.9
15
19.1
18.9
6.5
13.8
18
23
16.1
20
19.1

Table D8: FEMA Declared Disasters
Case
City of Fort Pierce
(Data for St. Lucie County)
Martin County
St. Lucie County
Carson City and County
City of Fernley
(Data for Lyon County)
City of Elizabeth City
(Data for Pasquotank County)
City of Havelock
(Data for Craven County)
City of New Bern
(Data for Craven County)
Craven County
Pasquotank County
City of Greer
(Data for Greenville County)
City of Mauldin
(Data for Greenville County)
Greenville County
Oconee County
City of Yakima
(Data for Yakima County)
Grant County
Kittitas County
Yakima County

State

Total FEMA Declared
Disasters Since 1953

Total FEMA Declared
Disasters since 2000

Florida

25

11

Florida
Florida
Nevada

28
25
11

13
11
9

Nevada

9

6

North Carolina

13

6

North Carolina

20

8

North Carolina

20

8

North Carolina
North Carolina

20
13

8
6

South Carolina

9

7

South Carolina

9

7

South Carolina
South Carolina

9
8

7
7

Washington

23

12

Washington
Washington
Washington

6
22
23

3
13
12

Data from the FEMA Disaster Declaration Database for States and Counties
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Table D9: Estimated Costs of Climate Change by County
Case
City of Fort Pierce
(Data for St. Lucie County)
Martin County
St. Lucie County
Carson City and County
City of Fernley
(Data for Lyon County)
City of Elizabeth City
(Data for Pasquotank County)
City of Havelock
(Data for Craven County)
City of New Bern
(Data for Craven County)
Craven County
Pasquotank County
City of Greer
(Data for Greenville County)
City of Mauldin
(Data for Greenville County)
Greenville County
Oconee County
City of Yakima
(Data for Yakima County)
Grant County
Kittitas County
Yakima County

State

Mortality (deaths per
100,000 people)

Total Damages (percent of
county income)

Florida

42.56

14.44

Florida
Florida
Nevada

57.02
42.56
-7.78

8.84
14.44
0.15

Nevada

-3.76

0.18

North Carolina

17.48

6.22

North Carolina

17.73

5.71

North Carolina

17.73

5.71

North Carolina
North Carolina

17.73
17.48

5.71
6.22

South Carolina

18.49

5.92

South Carolina

18.49

5.92

South Carolina
South Carolina

18.49
16.05

5.92
6.02

Washington

-5.81

-0.34

Washington
Washington
Washington

-1.07
-7.22
-5.81

0.77
-0.30
-0.34

Data from Hsaing et al (2017).
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Appendix E: Problem Definition Agreement and Autonomy Measures
Table E1: Problem Definition

Locality

Bureaucrat

Local Level
Appropriate
Level of
Government

Geographically
Proximate

Temporally
Proximate

Problem is
Severe
Disagree bureaucrat
thinks
happening,
elected leaders
do not

3

Disagree bureaucrat thinks
happening, elected
leaders do not

No - agree

Yes - agree

Disagree bureaucrat
thinks
happening,
elected leaders
do not

Marc Meyers,
Director of the
Building Department

4

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

FL-Local
Bureaucrat-762,
Lower level bureaucrat

4

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Anne Murray,
Hydrogeologist

10

Yes - agree

Yes - agree

Yes - agree

Yes - agree

Yes - agree

Yes - agree

Yes - agree

Disagree –
bureaucrat
doesn’t think it
is severe, elected
leaders do

Yes - agree

Disagree –
bureaucrat
doesn’t think it
is happening
yet, elected
leaders do

Yes - agree

Pasquotank
Shelley Cox, Planning
County,
Director
NC

City of
Fort
Pierce, FL

Overall
Climate Change
Agreement (Scale
is Cause for
from 0 to 10; 10 is
Changing
Policy
full agreement)

Kathy Fitzpatrick,
Coastal Engineer

7

Yes - agree

Yes - agree

Martin
County, FL
Don Donaldson,
Director of
Engineering

8

Yes - agree
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Yes - agree

Locality

St. Lucie
County, FL

City of
Fernley,
NV

Bureaucrat

Overall
Climate Change
Agreement (Scale
is Cause for
from 0 to 10; 10 is
Changing
Policy
full agreement)

Local Level
Appropriate
Level of
Government

Geographically
Proximate

Temporally
Proximate

Problem is
Severe

Jason Bessey,
Stormwater Program
Coordinator

4

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Mark Satterlee,
Deputy County
Administrator

4

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

No - opinion only
from bureaucrat

No - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes – agree

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

No opinion
from
Yes - opinion only
bureaucrats or
from bureaucrat
elected
officials

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

NV-Local
Bureaucrat-282, City
Department Head

NV-Local
Bureaucrat-895,
Lower level bureaucrat

Paula Gucker,
Assistant County
Administrator for
Greenville
Community
Planning
County,
SC
Brian Bishop,
Floodplain Manager

7

7

Yes – agree

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

No opinion
from
Yes - opinion only
bureaucrats or
from bureaucrat
elected
officials

4

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

No - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

4

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

No - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Kittitas
County,
WA

Mark Cook, Public
Works Director

10

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

City of
Yakima,
WA

David Brown, Water
and Irrigation Manager

7

Yes – agree

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion only
from bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat

Yes - opinion
only from
bureaucrat
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Locality

Yakima
County,
WA

Bureaucrat

Overall
Climate Change
Agreement (Scale
is Cause for
from 0 to 10; 10 is
Changing
Policy
full agreement)

Local Level
Appropriate
Level of
Government

Geographically
Proximate

Temporally
Proximate

Problem is
Severe

Joel Freudenthal,
Senior Natural
Resource Specialist

10

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Scott Revell, Director
of the Roza Irrigation
District

10

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Yes – agree

Yes – agree
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Table E2: Bureaucratic Independence (Autonomy)

Locality

Bureaucrat

Overall
Independence

Training:
Years in
Difference in
Structural
Hiring and Opportunities
General
or
(Scale from 5 to 16,
Position
Expertise
Independence Firing Power for Discretion
16 is the highest level
Special
of independence)

Pasquotank
Shelley Cox,
County,
Planning Director
NC

City of
Fort
Pierce, FL

Marc Meyers,
Director of the
Building
Department
FL-Local
Bureaucrat-762,
Lower level
bureaucrat
Anne Murray,
Hydrogeologist

Martin
County, FL

Kathy
Fitzpatrick,
Coastal Engineer

Don Donaldson,
Director of
Engineering

14

14

9

8

8

9

5+

5+

not clear

5+

5+

5+

special

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

moderate - runs commissioners
own department, and manager
answers to
hiring and firing
manager
power

many

special

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

moderate - runs
city council, city
own department,
manager hiring
answers to
and firing power
manager

many

special

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

low - answers to
city council, city
department
manager hiring
director then to
and firing power
city council

many

special

two areas of
overlap: local
conditions,
emergency
management

low - answers to commissioners
department
and manager
director then to hiring and firing
city council
power

a moderate
number

special

two areas of
overlap: local
conditions,
emergency
management

low - answers to commissioners
department
and manager
director then to hiring and firing
city council
power

a moderate
number

special

two areas of
overlap: local
conditions,
emergency
management

moderate - runs commissioners
own department, and manager
answers to
hiring and firing
manager
power

a few

246

Locality

Bureaucrat

Overall
Independence

Training:
Years in
Difference in
Structural
Hiring and Opportunities
General
or
(Scale from 5 to 16,
Position
Expertise
Independence Firing Power for Discretion
16 is the highest level
Special
of independence)

St. Lucie
County, FL

Jason Bessey,
Stormwater
Program
Coordinator
Mark Satterlee,
Deputy County
Administrator

City of
Fernley,
NV

NV-Local
Bureaucrat-282,
City Department
Head
NV-Local
Bureaucrat-895,
Lower level
bureaucrat

Paula Gucker,
Assistant County
Administrator for
Community
Greenville
Planning
County,
SC
Brian Bishop,
Floodplain
Manager

9

5+

9

0-5 (but
5+ with
city as
planning
director)

12

7

12

11

0-5

not clear

5+

0-5

special

two areas of
overlap: local
conditions,
emergency
management

low - answers to commissioners
department
and manager
director then to hiring and firing
city council
power

a moderate
number

special

two areas of
overlap: local
conditions,
emergency
management

moderate - runs commissioners
own department, and manager
answers to
hiring and firing
manager
power

a few

general

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

high - answers
city council
directly to
hiring and firing
mayor and city
power
council

a few

special

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

low - answers to
city council, city
department
manager hiring
director then to
and firing power
city council

a few

special

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

moderate - runs
commissioners
own department,
hiring and firing
answers to
power
manager

a moderate
number

special

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

low - answers to
commissioners
department
hiring and firing
director then to
power
city council

many
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Locality

Bureaucrat

Overall
Independence

Training:
Years in
Difference in
Structural
Hiring and Opportunities
General
or
(Scale from 5 to 16,
Position
Expertise
Independence Firing Power for Discretion
16 is the highest level
Special
of independence)

Kittitas
County,
WA

Mark Cook,
Public Works
Director

City of
Yakima,
WA

David Brown,
Water and
Irrigation Manager

Yakima
County,
WA

Joel Freudenthal,
Senior Natural
Resource
Specialist
Scott Revell,
Director of the
Roza Irrigation
District

12

12

12

15

0-5

5+

5+

0-5

special

two areas of
overlap: local
conditions,
emergency
management

moderate - runs
commissioners
own department,
hiring and firing
answers to
power
manager

a moderate
number

special

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

moderate - runs city council, city
own department, manager hiring
answers to
and firing power
manager

a moderate
number

special

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

low - answers to commissioners
department
and manager
director then to hiring and firing
city council
power

many

special

one area of
overlap: local
conditions

high - runs own
special-purpose commissioners
government
hiring and firing
(irrigation
power
district)

a moderate
number
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Appendix F: Bureaucrats Who Did Not Act but Thought Climate Change Adaptation Was Necessary

Low Independence

Figure F1: Predicted Forms of Bureaucratic Behavior for Bureaucrats Who Think Climate Change is Happening but Did
Not Act, Based on Observed Autonomy and Agreement Measures
Disagreement
Agreement
NV-Local Bureaucrat734

Amanda Boone

David Bruketta

Non-confrontational behavior

Politician-led action

Defiant behavior

Cooperative action

High Independence

NC-Local Bureaucrat823

Landin Holland
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